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Introduction
For approximately 200 years leading up to the nineteenth century, the technology 
Americans used for illumination remained as primitive as that used by the ancient 
Romans and Greeks. The colonial whaling industry had long hunted right whales to 
provide for Americans’ illumination needs but discovered early in the eighteenth century 
that the fats and oils of sperm whales proved markedly superior for burning and 
lubrication. Spermaceti, a sponge-like substance from the heads of sperm whales, 
provided an unrivaled material for making candles. On the eve of the American 
Revolution, a fleet of approximately 150 vessels regularly docked at the port of 
Nantucket Island off the coast of Massachusetts as a base of operations for launching 
expeditions to hunt and kill sperm whales to provide fuel for lighting Americans’ homes. 
The decreasing number of sperm whales and increasing demand for illumination gave rise 
to four new alternatives for providing light from 1830 to 1850: distillation of oil from 
terpentine, expanded production of lard oil, the growth of a domestic manufactured-gas 
industry, and coal-oil production.*
The production of coal-oil proved most important to the development of the 
petroleum industry within the United States. Coal-oil production began during the mid- 
1850s and disappeared merely six years later but provided a foundation for the
* Harold F. Williamson and Arnold R. Daum, The American Petroleum Industry, 
vol. 1, The Age o f Illumination, 1859-1899 (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 
1959), 29; 33.
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distillation, refining, and commercial patterns the petroleum industry would follow. 
Chemists in France and Scotland first experimented with applying low temperatures to 
coal in order to distill oil in the 1830s and 1840s. The process found its way to the U. S. 
where two separate groups of inventors and investors working out of Boston and New 
York began producing coal-oil on a commercial basis. The industry boomed throughout 
1858-1860 as these and other cities became home to numerous production plants. At the 
same time, the manufactured-gas industry grew at an even faster rate, but coal oil offered 
a more attractive source of illumination to the majority of Americans because it was safer 
and produced a better quality of light. From the outset, coal-oil producers considered 
using petroleum as the primary raw material for illumination and some applied methods 
of distilling and treating coal to petroleum in order to extract kerosene which they burned 
in lamps. For petroleum to supplant coal permanently as the primary raw material for 
illumination, however, producers had to be sure they could find adequate supplies and 
that they could produce petroleum less expensively than mining coal and converting it to 
oil. Until such time, the coal-oil industry’s infrastructure continued to expand.^
The possibility of inexpensive and plentiful supplies of oil came to fruition in 
1859 when Edwin Drake drilled the first commercial oil well in Pennsylvania. Initially, 
many questioned whether petroleum existed in a sufficient quantity to replace coal oil 
permanently as a raw material for illumination and lubrication. As a result, 
transportation, marketing, and refining facilities lagged behind the production of
 ^Ibid., 43; 37-8; 43-44; 56; 57; 59; 60.
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petroleum for two years after Drake’s discovery. As producers continued to find oil and 
pump it from the ground, coal-oil refineries gradually converted their operations to 
accommodate the new material. By 1861, Pennsylvania drillers realized that they had 
only scratched the surface of potential oil production when Henry Rouse struck the area’s 
first flowing well, or “gusher.” Gushing wells accounted for much of the total output 
during 1861 and 1862 but a much smaller proportion of Pennsylvania’s future production. 
Once the pressure that pushed petroleum to the surface dissipated, workers extracted oil 
from the reservoir with pumps. Although gushers lasted a relatively short time in 
Pennsylvania, their impact was lasting and lay at the heart of many problems the industry 
faced into the twentieth century.^
Overproduction destabilized the oil industry early-on, and producers struggled to 
balance supply and demand in order to avoid wasting both oil and capital. A cycle of 
boom and bust plagued the oil industry throughout much of its history. In Pennsylvania, 
for example, output decreased slightly in 1862 but increased annually thereafter for nine 
years. Production leveled off again in 1873 but soon began climbing and peaked at thirty 
million barrels annually in 1882. As inventories rose, prices fell and consternation grew 
among oil producers. Although they attempted to negotiate shutdown agreements to 
eliminate glutted markets, the difficulty of convincing thousands of oil men to ignore the 
opportunity to expand into new fields undermined the success of such efforts. Continued 
production swamped existing transport and refining facilities and prompted businessmen
Ibid. 82; 111; 112; 113-14.
to begin thinking about organizing their industry more efficiently/
No one deplored the chaos that prevailed in the industry more than John D. 
Rockefeller. Vilified as a ruthless monopolist by some and praised as a sagacious 
businessman by others, no single person did more to shape the structure of the oil 
industry. His efforts in assembling the Standard Oil trust and vertically integrating the 
industry have been well documented and need not be retold here. Of significance to this 
study, however, is how the passion for order and efficiency motivated him. Rockefeller 
looked with revulsion at the mad scramble among producers who competed to extract oil 
and blamed them for the industry’s overproduction, wild price fluctuations, and waste. 
Although independent producers understandably resented Rockefeller’s ruthless business 
tactics, his efforts to consolidate control over refining capacity reflected his recognition 
that unrestrained production destabilized the industry and undermined everyone’s long­
term interests.^
The director of Pennsylvania’s state geological survey, J. Peter Lesley, agreed that 
overproduction destabilized the industry and wasted oil but attributed the industry’s 
problems to oil men’s poor understanding of geological principles. Like Rockefeller, 
Lesley lamented the “utter demoralization of the crowded population which scrambles for
Ibid., 118; 373; 374.
 ^The most authoritative biography of Rockefeller is Allan Nevins, John D. 
Rockefeller: The Heroic Age o f  American Enterprise, 2 vols. (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1954). Probably the best single-volume account is Ron Chernow, Titan: 
The Life o f  John D. Rockefeller, Sr. (New York: Vintage Books, 1998); Daniel Yergin, 
The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1991), 42.
it [oil] in so unmanly and thriftless a manner.” Drilling wells indiscriminately caused 
gushers to unleash more oil than markets could absorb, but Lesley believed science 
offered a solution to the problem. From his vantage point as director of the state survey, 
“violent fluctuations of the market would be impossible but for a still prevalent ignorance 
of the Geology of Petroleum...” The Pennsylvania geological survey generated 
voluminous amounts of information about the state’s resources but did not significantly 
influence the oil industry’s prospecting or production practices. Oil men easily supplied 
markets without consulting professional geologists but their inefficiency perpetuated the 
problems of overproduction, waste, and instability.^
The availability of petroleum and the kerosene it produced radically transformed 
people’s lives in America and around the globe. By 1873 kerosene had grown into the 
leading illuminant in both Europe and America. A Pennsylvania newspaper reporter 
declared the same year that petroleum had “become of such commercial and social 
importance to the world that if it were suddenly to cease no other known substance could 
supply its place, and such an event could not be looked upon in any other light than of a 
widespread calamity.” Previously, the limited supply and poorer burning quality of 
whale oil prevented people from spending their evenings in activities other than sleeping. 
Wider availability of kerosene in the U.S. and its better luminescence meant that more 
people had the option of reading into the night or engaged in other amusements requiring
 ^ J. P. Lesley, “Geological Report on Warren County,” Second Geological 
Survey o f  Pennsylvania 1880 to 1883, IIII, xiv; Quoted in John Ise, The United States Oil 
Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1926), 36.
light. Petroleum transformed people’s lives in other countries as well. Only by 
supplying foreign markets could the American petroleum industry have continued to 
grow. Throughout the 1870s and 1880s, kerosene was the country’s largest manufactured 
good and Europe provided the largest market.^
By the end of the nineteenth century, the electric light all but eliminated the 
kerosene market. Thomas Edison’s invention of the incandescent bulb and efforts to 
commercialize electric power provided a cleaner and economically competitive 
alternative. Edison began experimenting with electric illumination in 1877. Eight years 
later, 250,000 light bulbs were in use and the number mushroomed to 18 million by 1902. 
Europeans also began to choose electricity for their lighting needs, further diminishing 
the market for kerosene. In America, only residents in rural locales relied upon kerosene 
to light their homes.*
Just as the need for petroleum as an illuminant diminished, new markets opened 
that required petroleum as an energy source. From 1899 to 1919, the amount of energy 
Americans consumed increased by approximately two and one-half times. Coal 
decreased as a source of energy throughout this period while water power and natural gas 
increased slightly. Petroleum increased the most, however, from 4.5% to 12% of total
’ Williamson and Daum, American Petroleum Industry, 371-372; Titusville 
Morning Herald, April 30, 1873; Quoted in Ibid., 371; Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The 
Epic Quest fo r Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 50; Ibid, 
56.
* Ibid. 79; Harold F. Williamson, Ralph L. Andreano, Arnold R. Daum, and 
Gilbert C. Klose, The American Petroleum Industry, vol. 2, The Age o f Energy, 1899- 
1959 (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1963), 171.
energy generated. At the start of the twentieth century, consumers of petroleum included 
gas manufacturers, commercial companies, and various industries. Each of these 
consumers converted petroleum to fuel oil to serve its own purposes. Gas manufacturers 
purchased petroleum to enrich the fuel extracted from coal. A commercial demand for 
fuel oil emerged when marketers began selling space heating to residences and 
businesses. Industry needed fuel oil to generate heat for smelting operations, iron and 
steel production, cement and brick manufacturing, and for boilers which powered steam- 
driven machinery. The petroleum industry had used crude oil to fire boilers and stills as 
early as the 1860s and continued to rely on petroleum when the price of coal grew too 
high. By far the greatest demand for petroleum came from its growing use in marine 
transportation.^
The U.S. Navy began experimenting with petroleum as an energy source as early 
as the 1860s but did not begin to adopt fuel oil to power its ships until early in the 
twentieth century. The navy concluded early-on that petroleum provided more control 
over heat than coal, reduced the weight and space required for storing fuel, and required 
fewer personnel to stoke ships’ boilers. The higher cost of petroleum, however, 
prevented navies throughout the world from converting their ships’ engines to bum fuel 
oil until the eve of the First World War. The conversion to fuel oil was well underway by 
1914 and by the end of the war demand for petroleum by navies and merchant marines
Ibid., 169; 170.
worldwide accounted for approximately twenty percent of total fuel oil sales.
The automotive industry’s adoption of the internal combustion engine further 
increased the demand for gasoline and accelerated transformation of the petroleum 
industry from a supplier of illuminating oil to a supplier of fuel oil. A German inventor 
built a four-cycle engine in 1876 that served as the basis for all modem gas engines.
Even with an internal combustion engine to model, the high cost of fuel compared to coal 
throughout the nineteenth century prevented factories, railroads, or marine transportation 
from abandoning steam engines before 1900. Discovery of vast oil reserves in the 
Midcontinent states of Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas facilitated adoption of the internal 
combustion engine and enabled the automobile industry to expand. Prospectors found oil 
at Texas’ Spindletop field in 1901, at Oklahoma’s Gleim Pool field in 1905, Cushing in 
1912, and Healdton in 1913, hut these were only some of the largest discoveries. As the 
availability of oil grew, so too did the market for automobiles. The number of gasoline 
automobiles increased from just under 17,000 in 1904 to nearly 1.7 million in 1919. In a 
very brief period of time, the future of the automobile had become inextricably linked to 
the necessity of finding additional supplies of oil."
As the twentieth century began, the federal government facilitated the need to find 
more oil. As the political battles between Congress and U.S. Geological Survey director 
John Wesley Powell subsided, economic geology became the survey’s primary focus and
Ibid.,183; 184. 
"  Ibid.
geologists visited or investigated mining camps throughout the country. Initially, they 
focused their efforts on metalliferous ores and later on coal, but as petroleum became 
more important to the nation’s economy and energy supply the survey emphasized 
locating, mapping, and classifying lands where this resource could be found. The survey 
began issuing reports focusing specifically on oil and conducting investigations into oil 
shales. The U.S. Bureau of Mines, created in 1910 to promote conservation and safety,
established a Petroleum and Natural Gas Division four years later. In 1918, this division 
opened a petroleum experiment station in Bartlesville, Oklahoma which conducted some 
of the first systematic scientific and engineering research related to the oil industry. After 
World War I, the USGS struggled to retain many of its geologists who quit to take more 
lucrative positions in private industry. Oil companies integrated geological prospecting 
into their production process to meet the increasing demand for petroleum and found that 
they could profit from the surveying and mapping skills geologists learned while working 
for the survey. By the 1920s, the oil industry had located so much oil that some within 
the industry began clamoring for federal intervention to regulate production along 
geological principles as Lesley intimated was necessary when the industry first began.
This dissertation will explore prospectors’ encounters with the landscape from 
1860 to 1930 and discuss how key individuals’ physical interactions with and mental
Thomas G. Manning, Government in Science: The U.S. Geological Survey, 
1867-1894 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), 218; August W. 
Giebelhaus, “The Emergence of the Discipline of Petroleum Engineering: An 
International Comparison,” Journal o f the International Committee for the History o f  
Technology, 2 (1996), 111.
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conceptions of the environment shaped the search for oil, the discipline of petroleum 
geology, and the political debate over the best method for conserving this resource. 
Throughout this period, some prospectors, commonly referred to as “practical men,” 
demonstrated an uncanny ability to find oil without formal scientific techniques long 
before the industry began to accept petroleum geology as a legitimate method for finding 
oil. They derived their prospecting techniques from a vernacular form of knowledge that 
grew out of local experience rather than a scientific understanding of universal earth 
processes they could systematically employ in different environments. Petroleum 
geologists cultivated a somewhat different form of knowledge which prevented them 
from understanding how practical men’s experience within a particular local environment 
often developed into a hunch, knack, feel, or instinct about where to look for oil.
Geologists participated in the oil industry from its inception in 1859 when 
practical men drilled the first commercial oil well but would not exert a significant 
influence until approximately 1915.'^ Even though some geologists made considerable 
money as consultants, the advice they offered produced minimal results in Pennsylvania 
and other states throughout the nineteenth century. A speculative boom of the 1860s 
presented scientific consultants with a flood of monetary and intellectual opportunities. 
Mining engineers and geologists who worked in the Pennsylvania coal industry found
Keith Miller, "Petroleum Geology to 1920," in Sciences o f  the Earth: An 
Encyclopedia o f  Events, People, and Phenomena, 2 vols., Gregory A. Good, ed.(New 
York: Garland, 1995), 33, 673; Edgar Owen, Trek o f the Oil Finders, A History o f  
Exploration for Petroleum, (Tulsa, OK: American Association of Petroleum Geologists, 
1975), 66.
Ibid., 442.
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employment as consultants in the oil business but mostly suggested methods that oil 
prospectors who learned by trial and error had already been using .A lthough  they may 
have supplemented their income, geologists failed to provide the oil industry with a 
systematic method for finding oil based upon geological knowledge that prospectors 
could apply on a consistent basis. As a result, practical men generally placed little 
authority in geologists’ advice.
Practical oil men could afford to ignore geologists in the early days of the industry 
and even into the twentieth century because they needed no assistance finding oil. Even 
with no rational foundation to their approach, practical men found oil by surface 
indications alone because untapped reserves of petroleum sat atop the soil, creeks, and 
s t r eams .Even  so-called “creekologists” who divined for oil by employing “witching 
sticks” or relied upon supposed psychic powers often met with success because oil could 
be observed, felt, or smelt with the senses. Although sometimes derided as creekologists 
for rejecting geology in favor of their own methods, practical men found oil by following 
production “trends” because they believed oil lay in linear, belt-like patterns beneath the 
ground.”  As long as they continued to supply the country and much of the world’s oil 
requirements, practical men felt no compulsion to listen to geologists, scorned their
”  Owen, Trek o f the Oil Finders, 68.
In support of this point, it is important to remember that Drake’s well was 
shallow by modern standards. The drillers struck oil at seventy feet. Lucier, “Scientists 
and Swindlers,” 397-98; William Wright, Oil Regions o f Pennsylvania, showing where 
petroleum I s  found, how it is obtained, and at what cost, with hints for whom it may 
concern (New York: Haper, 1865).
”  Owen, Trek o f the Oil Finders, xiii.
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advice, and carried their bias against geologists with them as they migrated westward to 
explore the Midcontinent region.**
My organization of this dissertation and the themes I have chosen to emphasize 
flow from the idea that oil prospectors were bound to nature through their work. Many 
environmental histories have explored the idea that human beings are bound to nature in 
one way or another through the relationships they established with the natural world..*^ 
This was certainly true of practical men who established a particular kind of relationship 
with nature as they prospected, but it was also true of petroleum geologists who 
undertook “scientific” excursions in order to conduct field work. Gould did not make an 
effective oil prospector because the relationship with nature he valued most enabled him 
to study geology for the sake of simply knowing rather than for its practical application. 
Doherty’s genius lay in recognizing the potential utility of geologists’ relationships with 
nature and systematically organizing their effort to achieve the goal he relished 
most-finding oil. My thesis, then, is that both practical men and geologists fashioned 
dialectics with the environment in order to locate and conserve oil but that over time the 
efforts of large oil companies to rationalize these processes transformed those 
relationships, shifting control of the natural world to extra-local sources of authority.
18 Ibid., 292, xiii.
*^ This is an idea beautifully articulated by Richard White in The Organic 
Machine: The Remaking o f the Columbia River (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), ix-x.
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Chapter 1
‘Creekologists, Practical Men, and Geologists: 
Contests for Authority the Oil Field”
Historians often cite the first commercial oil well drilled in 1859 as the event 
which launched the modern oil industry, but its symbolism extends beyond simply 
marking the first time Americans tried to profit from oil. The cast of characters involved, 
particularly a university-trained geologist and a down-and-out director of operations, 
epitomized the different class and educational backgrounds of geologists and so-called 
practical oil men which persisted well into the twentieth century. In 1854, two 
businessmen founded the Peimsylvania Rock Oil Company with the aid of a scientific 
report authored by the famous Yale University geologist Benjamin Silliman, Jr., who 
testified to the quality and usefulness of oil bubbling forth from natural springs at Oil 
Creek, Pennsylvania. After a series of frustrations, the company changed ownership, 
adopted the new name Seneca Oil Company, and placed Colonel Edwin L. Drake in 
charge of operations.' Prior to his employment with the oil company, Drake had worked 
as a steamboat night clerk, farm laborer, hotel clerk, and salesman in a dry-goods store. 
The only time the “colonel” had worn a uniform was at his job as a railroad conductor, 
but company backers suggested he adopt the title to lend dignity and credibility to their
' Edgar Owen, Trek o f  the Oil Finders, A History o f Exploration for Petroleum, 
(Tulsa, OK: American Association of Petroleum Geologists, 1975), 11-12.
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venture/ On August 28,1859, Drake struck oil at sixty-nine-and-a-half feet below the 
surface, not because of Silliman’s recommendations but from hard work, persistence, and 
phenomenal determination. In the early days of the oil industry, prospectors did not need 
geologists’ recommendations to find oil.
No systematic method for finding oil existed throughout most of the nineteenth 
and early-twentieth centuries, and prospectors relied upon a variety of techniques which 
fell under the rubric of “creekology.” Literally, the term referred to the supposed 
relationship between the flow of a creek and the presence of oil, but it grew to encompass 
a variety of techniques and acquired a more generic meaning. The different methods of 
creekology generally fell into one of two categories, those which invoked superstition or 
the supernatural and those which involved surveying the landscape. Prospectors who 
considered searching for a creek or other geographical feature adopted a more practical 
approach to finding oil and thereby earned the name “practical oil men.” Rather than 
laying claim to some vague, obscure “power,” they traversed the surface of the earth in 
search of concrete, verifiable evidence of oil that lay beneath. Whatever the approach, 
each of these prospectors relied on intuition albeit to varying extents.
Geologists also relied on intuition but competed with both kinds of creekologists 
as brokers of information who claimed to possess the knowledge many investors and 
speculators sought. As long as professional geologists could not consistently demonstrate 
an ability to find oil, people remained skeptical about their “expertise.” The possibility of
 ^Ruth Sheldon Knowles, The Greatest Gamblers: The Epic o f American Oil 
Exploration, 2™" ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959), 3.
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locating oil with geological principles remained unproven until 1885. Even though 
geologists demonstrated the practical application of their knowledge at this time, oil 
companies did not employ them systematically for approximately another thirty years. 
Part of the reason for the industry’s recalcitrance resulted from the abundant signs of oil 
apparent to the naked eye.
Searching for oil in the nineteenth century was primarily a sensory experience. 
Locating oil required prospectors to encounter the landscape physically, by looking for it 
with their eyes, smelling it with their noses, diVià touching it with their hands. Finding oil 
in this manner remained possible for much of the nineteenth century because black liquid 
still bubbled out of the ground to create "seepages," or seeps, which the eyes, nose, and 
hands could identify. A seep exuded anywhere from a few drops to a few barrels of oil.  ^
The black ooze seeped into creeks and streams, intermixing with the water and 
impressing the eyes vwth the rainbow swirls that rotated on the surface. Because the oil 
seeps and associated natural gas resided close to the surface, they emitted their distinctive 
smells signalling that gas and oil might be lurking nearby, perhaps even directly beneath 
the feet."' Gas also revealed itself to prospectors' eyes when it bubbled to the surface of a 
stream or to the ears when it issued forth in a volume large enough to emit a whistling
 ^Kenneth K. Landes, Petroleum Geology (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 
1951 21-29.
 ^Locating oil by sense of smell was a valuable technique, but the idea of "oil 
smelling" became a generic term employed for a variety of searching methods. Mody C. 
Boatright, Folklore o f the Oil Industry, (Dallas: Southern Methodist University, 1963), 16.
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noise/ Surface indications other than oil and gas seeps included asphalt veins and oil- 
impregnated outcrops, all phenomena ^vhich led prospectors to the first commercial oil 
fields in America and guided the search for oil throughout the industry's first fifty years/ 
Locating oil by physically encountering the environment remained particularly 
necessary during much of the latter-nineteenth century because the knowledge and 
technology for locating oil remained rudimentary. Searching for oil required grueling 
physical labor as prospectors ventured onto the landscape, climbed hills and descended 
into valleys, exploring the banks of streams and creeks. Once found, collecting oil 
required perhaps an even greater physical encounter with the environment. So 
rudimentary was the knowledge for extracting oil at the time of Drake's well that once 
prospectors found oil they gathered it by digging pits or trenches.’ In instances where it 
"bubbled up in mid stream," Indians and settlers after them obtained the oil "by throwing 
a. blanket on the water, and, after it became saturated, squeezing the oil into the vessel 
prepared to receive it."® In the early days of most oil regions, prospectors relied almost
 ^Landes, Petroleum Geology, 21.
® Owen, Trek o f  the Oil Finders, (Tulsa, OK: American Association of Petroleum 
Geologists, 1975), 6. For a list and description of the five basic types of surface 
indications, see A.I. Levorsen, Geology o f Petroleum (San Francisco: W.H. Freemon and 
Co. 1959), 15 ; Frederick G. Clapp, “The Occurrence of Petroleum," in ^  Handbook o f  
the Petroleum Industry, David T. Day, ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.), 1922.
’ Everette DeGolyer, The Development o f the Art o f Prospecting, (Princeton: The 
Guild of Brackett Lecturers, 1940), 24; Samuel Tait, The Wildcatters: An Informal 
History o f Oil Hunting in America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), 10.
® J.H.A. Bone, Petroleum and Petroleum Wells (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott and 
Co., 1865), 20.
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exclusively upon direct indications they could visually identify to locate oil and required 
little assistance from professional scientists.^ They often looked next to creeks for 
indications of oil.
With only rudimentary knowledge of how and where oil accumulated, early 
prospectors erroneously believed that creeks and streams sat atop large fissures in the 
earth's surface and that oil flowed to the surface through these openings. They reasoned 
that drilling next to creeks could lead them to large cracks, or “fissures,” in the earth’s 
surface, through which oil supposedly flowed.’® The practice of studying creeks in order 
to find oil encompassed a mix of superstition and very crude geological reasoning.” Oil 
men who considered creeks indicators of oil so readily perpetuated this unsound principle 
they elevated it to the status of a superstition people wholeheartedly adopted and applied 
as a fool-proof methodology into the early-twentieth century. Although geologically 
unsound, the search for a feature of the landscape which correlated with oil reserves 
beneath the surface constituted the basic principle geologists later developed into a 
workable strategy for consistently finding oil.
Even though some methods of creekology contained the seeds of geological
® Prospecting for direct indications of oil gave rise to petroleum production in 
Pennsylvania and throughout the world. DeGolyer, The Development o f  the Art o f  
Prospecting, 24.
Mody C. Boatright and William A. Owens, Tales from the Derrick Floor: A 
People’s History o f  the Oil Industry, (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 
1970), 15; DeGolyer, "Concepts on the Occurrence of Oil and Gas," 22.
” Max Ball, Douglas Ball and Daniel S. Turner, This Fascinating Oil Business, 
(Indianapolis, Kansas City, New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1940), 46-7.
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reasoning, prospectors who dogmatically applied this principle decreased the probability 
of finding oil over time because they limited themselves to a very narrow geographic 
range. After the completion of Drake’s well in 1859, oil men in the Pennsylvania oil 
fields confined their search to the valleys through which the Allegheny river and its 
tributaries flowed.'^ prospectors explored creek valleys “on the supposition that the 
present configuration of surface was related to the strata containing the oil.” '^  They 
supposed correctly that they could find oil by establishing a relationship between surface 
structures and strata beneath the ground but they erred in believing that creeks constituted 
such structures. Although creekology originally referred to the supposed relationship 
between creeks and oil, the term grew into a generic label referring to a variety of other 
techniques which included superstition and the occult. Unlike the search for creeks, 
these forms of creekology were less concerned with geographical features of the 
environment.
As more people realized the potential to profit from oil, there emerged in 
Peimsylvania a brand of creekologists who claimed they possessed special powers to 
locate underground resources. One visitor to the oil region noted the increasing presence
Stephen Farnum Peckham, Report on the Production, Technology, and Uses o f  
Petroleum and its Products, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1885), 11.
Ibid.
The variety of methods for locating oil encompassed by the term "creekology" 
included following seepages, drilling near "breaks" and "belt-lines," or following a 
dowser or doodlebug. Owen, Trek o f  the Oil Finders, 1577.
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of people “claiming to be gifted with extraordinary powers.”*^ Shortly after the discovery 
of Drake's Well, another contemporary observed that '"a new class of people has sprung 
into existence under the cognomen of 'oil smellers,' who profess to be able to ascertain the 
proper spot by smelling the earth." Not all oil-finders who claimed supernatural powers 
possessed unscrupulous intentions. Many oil prospectors who claimed supernatural 
abilities held deep convictions about their “powers” as did the individuals who employed 
them.*  ^ One contemporary observed that supernatural creekologists exerted “more real 
power among the operators than the latter are willing to openly concede.”'* Oil companies 
typically refrained from mentioning in their prospectuses whether they had hired a 
consultant who employed unorthodox or unscientific methods. Companies justified
hiring them, however, because the small fee they charged amounted to “an inconsiderable 
item in the general expense, seeing we mean to bore any how.” °^ As long as no proven, 
systematic approach for finding oil existed even the most unorthodox methods maintained 
a degree of legitimacy in the eyes of investors. Whether they called themselves smellers.
William Wright, Oil Regions o f Pennsylvania, showing where petroleum is 
found, how it is obtained, and at what cost. With hints for whom it may concern. (New 
York: Harper, 1865), 61.
Bone, Petroleum and Petroleum Wells, 35.
Paul Lucier, “Scientists and Swindlers: Coal, Oil, and Scientific Consulting in 
the American Industrial Revolution.” (Ph.D. diss.: Princeton University, 1994), 418.
'* Wright, Oil Regions o f Pennsylvania, 63.
Lucier, “Scientists and Swindlers,” 418-419.
Wright, Oil Regions o f Pennsylvania, 62-3.
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seers, diviners, or clairvoyants, v^hat distinguished this type of creekologist from those 
who looked for surface structures was the lack of any conscious attempt to correlate 
surface features with subsurface stratigraphy
Creekologists who claimed the ability to summon spirits or super-human gifts of 
smell, sight, and intuition attempted to bolster their authority by circumventing the more 
difficult approach of surveying and traversing the landscape to understand how geography 
and geology could lead them to o il/ ' An oil “seer” constituted one type of creekologist 
who claimed the ability to locate oil without having to observe the landscape. An Indian 
woman named Augusta Del Pio Lougo felt shocks passing from her head to her feet 
"’causing distinct pain’" when she walked through a field containing oil or water. 
Although she had to walk over the landscape in order to activate her alleged ability, she 
made no attempt to correlate specific identifiable land forms or structures with 
underground reserves. Similarly, when the seer Evelyn Penrose walked over an oil field 
she felt a "Violent stab in the soles of my feet like a red-hot knife.'"^^ Any indication of 
where oil reserves might lay rested solely on the seer’s advice and bore no relationship to 
the physical terrain.
Many other seers did not even require close proximity to a potential site in order to
The use of occult methods for locating oil dates to the earliest days of the 
industry. Mody C. Boatright, Folklore o f the Oil Industry, (Dallas: Southern Methodist 
University Press, 1963), 23.
New York Times, 10-8-22, II, 5:1; Quoted in Boatright, Folklore o f the Oil 
Industry, 20-21.
Evelyn M. Penrose, "Dowsing," Blackwood Magazine, CCXXXII (Sept. 1932), 
345-53 ;Quoted in Boatright, Folklore o f the Oil Industry, 21.
2 0
locate oil/'' Ruth Bryant of Abilene, Texas (also known as Madame Virginia) claimed to 
determine whether a farm contained oil simply by talking to its o w n e r T h e  environment 
remained so irrelevant to her approach she did not even have to see or walk upon the 
landscape. In one instance, she intuitively sensed where oil lay when she passed over it 
while riding a train at night.^® Not having to identify specific features on the landscape 
which might lead to oil allowed Madame Virginia to retain a high degree of authority 
among oil investors. She enhanced her authority further by not identifying the source of 
her alleged ability. All she conceded about the origin of her power was that she received it 
early in life, before the age of six.
Like Madame Virginia, surveying the landscape for specific geological or 
geographical features played no part in the methodology employed by Guy Findley, also 
known as the x-ray-eyed boy. Findley also received visions of oil from a very early age.
In order to be most effective, he preferred to search at night, the darker the better. When a 
group of oil investors heard of his ability, “they buried a barrel of oil and a barrel of water 
out where I didn't know where it was, and took me out there.”^^  Findley claimed to have
Boatright, Folklore o f the Oil Industry, 24
^  Ruth Bryan, tape-recorded interview, August 2, 1959; Quoted in Boatright, 
Folklore o f the Oil Industry, 27. A large portion of the interview is reproduced in Mody 
C. Boatright and William A. Owens, Tales from the Derrick Floor: A People's History o f  
the Oil Industry, (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1970), 23-25.
Ruth Bryant, tape-recorded interview, August 2, 1959; Quoted in Boatright, 
Folklore o f the Oil Industry, 28.
Guy Findley, tape-recorded interview. May 5, 1956; Boatright, FbWore o f the 
Oil Industry, 19.
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located both barrels successfully, but did not elaborate upon his approach. His preference 
for working in the dark of night revealed that he was not looking for surface structures and 
probably reflected his concern to shield onlookers from some kind of subterfuge.
By keeping oil investors guessing about their supposed powers, creekologists like 
Madame Virginia and the x-ray-eyed boy carefully protected the authority some people 
willingly bestowed upon them. Unlike creekologists who searched for surface structures, 
seers did not face the difficult task of having to identify specific features on the landscape, 
even if only a creek, and risk their credibility by stating a probable relationship to oil 
beneath the ground. Instead, they relied on superstition to the exclusion of any sensory 
experience informed by physical or visual encounters with the environment. Attributing 
their power to a vague unidentifiable source enabled seers to protect their status as a class 
of prospectors who possessed unique abilities to locate oil and to continue selling their 
expertise. As long as other oil prospectors could not articulate a systematic approach 
which led to oil more consistently, seers enjoyed a favorable position among investors.
The methods of seers and other creekologists who claimed supernatural abilities 
remained popular as long as they appeared to produce results, but their success remained 
greater within the folk tales, stories, and traditions that described them than was actually 
the case.^* One example from the Pennsylvania oil region in the 1860s illustrates this 
point. Another prospecting method under the rubric of supernatural creekology involved 
people who claimed they could locate oil through dreams. Like seers, clairvoyants and 
spiritualists, dreamers offered no systematic method for locating oil but their stories
Boatright, Folklore o f  the Oil Industry, 11.
22
resonated with many people. For example, a Pennsylvanian clerk named Kepler dreamed 
in 1864 that he was wandering through the woods with a coquettish young woman when 
an Indian appeared who threatened to shoot them with a bow and arrow. The woman 
handed Kepler a rifle which he fired at the Indian who subsequently vanished, but in the 
spot where he stood a flood of oil gushed. At a later date, Kepler happened to encounter 
the location he had envisioned in his dream and leased the spot where the Indian had been 
standing. He drilled a well there, named the Coquette, which produced more than ten 
thousand barrels and netted him eighty thousand dollars.^^ Dreams like this one located oil 
with less frequency than the proliferation of such reports suggested.^”
The success story of the Coquette and those like it reflected a strong folk tradition 
involving the ability to locate oil with non-scientific techniques, metaphors to which the 
folk ascribed literal meaning.^* Less significant than the well's success was the manner in 
which the story of finding it with a dream resonated with so many people. Because Kepler 
acquired instant wealth, the well served as a tourist attraction to people visiting the oil 
region once it ceased producing. The well owners built steps up to it and charged each
^  The story of the Coquette well is told in Bone, Petroleum and Petroleum Wells, 
72-74, and in Herbert Asbury, The Golden Flood (New York, 1942), 74.
Boatright reports that the people who dreamed about oil often cannot be found 
or that acquaintances cannot recall in subsequent years that the person ever talked about 
finding oil in a dream. He speculates the possibility that one person's experience may 
have been transferred onto another's or that the dream was "perhaps a metaphor...given 
literal interpretation," Boatright, Folklore o f the Oil Industry, II.
"  Ibid.
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spectator a dime to observe the wonder/^ Newspapers exacerbated the hysteria and played 
a significant role in disseminating fantastic stories to audiences both within and outside of 
the oil industry/^ Dreamers and clairvoyants’ chances for finding oil remained high in 
untapped oil regions where they could still see seeps or where pools remained close to the 
surface, but finding oil with metaphors could not last forever. As prospectors identified 
and extracted easily-recognizable pools of oil, creekologists who relied upon the 
supernatural had to work harder to retain their credibility.
When clairvoyance and dreams failed to convince speculators to invest their 
money, creekologists cast their methods as “science” in order to impress, confuse, and 
deceive. Enticing investors had always required creekologists to engage in a significant 
degree of theater. Indeed, as one observer noted after the discovery of Drake’s Well,
“some of them practice considerable mummery in order to mystify their employers.'"^''
The "mummery" necessary to "mystify" investors grew more elaborate over time. As long 
as oil remained close to the surface and easy to identify by sight, creekologists who 
employed supernatural techniques could more easily capture the imagination of investors. 
Surface indications disappeared quickly in new oil regions, however, robbing 
creekologists of the visual aids necessary to supplement their instincts. Struggling to 
maintain their credibility, they increasingly invoked science to explain their methodologies 
but their version of “science” held no rational foundation.
Bone, Petroleum and Petroleum Wells, 72-74. 
Boatright, Folklore o f the Oil Industry, 17. 
Bone, Petroleum and Petroleum Wells, 35.
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Pseudoscientific instruments such as divining rods proliferated as prospectors who 
relied on superstition tried to bolster their sagging authority. The divining rod and other 
devices with a more sophisticated appearance acquired the name of "doodlebug," which 
applied to either the apparatus itself or the person using it. A doodlebug apparatus came in 
a variety of shapes and designs, but the divining rod served as the most recognizable 
example of an oil-finding device based on superstition and alleged scientific principles.
The divining rod, or "wigglestick," is perhaps the oldest device used for locating minerals, 
dating back to the C haldeans.A lso  known as "dowsing," prospectors throughout history 
have divined for a variety of reasons which included locating water, buried treasure, and 
even escaped criminals.^® The divining rod usually consisted of a Y-shaped tree branch, 
often from a peach tree but sometimes a hazel or willow.^’ One creekologist, Jonathan 
Watson, resorted to divining rods only after the advice of spiritualists began to fail, but the 
witching-stick operators he hired proved no more successful as each well they located 
came in dry and tempered Watson's faith in the device.^* Every failed attempt at locating 
oil with a divining rod cast further doubt upon the credibility of the method and its 
operator.
Scientists rejected the efficacy of divining rods outright and declared that any
Roy J. Santschi, Modern 'Divining Rods': A History and Explanation o f  
Geophysical Prospecting Methods (By Author, 1928), 53.
Landes, Petroleum Geology, 8.
Boatright, Tales from the Derrick Floor, 14, 21; Santschi, Modern 'Divining 
Rods', 53.
Tait, The Wildcatters, 73.
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successful oil discovery rested entirely on chance/^ Some oil men agreed with the 
statement by Professor Benjamin Silliman Jr. who declared that '"the pretensions of 
diviners are worthless. The art of finding fountains of minerals by a peculiar twig is a 
cheat upon those who practice it, an offense to reason and common sense, an art abhorrent 
to the laws of nature, and deserves universal rep robation .S illim an 's  statement stands 
out as a direct challenge to those who relied upon supernatural methods of finding oil. 
Silliman staked a claim for scientists as the defenders of reason and declared the 
superiority of their knowledge regarding the laws of nature. His statement revealed that 
professional scientists began to challenge the credibility and authority creekologists had 
for a while enjoyed.
By devising more elaborate devices than divining rods and declaring a unique 
ability to operate them, doodlebug prospectors sought to bolster their authority against 
competition presented by scientists such as Silliman. Machines with an exotic appearance 
supplanted the divining rod as the need intensified to convince people that doodlebugs 
possessed an explainable rationale beyond mere superstition."" One machine consisted of 
bells, whistles, and dials attached to a large black box which a man operated while seated 
and covered with a large shroud, as four men carried him and the device over prospective 
oil fields. When the bells wrang, the operator declared that oil lay below. Allegedly, the 
shroud prevented discovery of the machine's secrets, but more likely it concealed the
Santschi, Modern 'Divining Rods', 53.
Source not cited. See Tait, The Wildcatters, 72. 
Landes, Petroleum Geology, 8.
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operator's wringing of the bell/^ As with supernatural creekologists, secrecy allowed 
doodlebugs to prevent scrutiny of their techniques.
Doodlebug prospectors intended the elaborate appearance of their oil-finding 
devices to entice speculators and kept the principles on which they supposedly operated a 
mystery to perpetuate the ruse. Some doodlebugs purportedly operated on an electrical or 
chemical foundation. In one instance, the mechanism accommodated interchangeable 
vials which contained a sample of whatever substance the operator hoped to find.'*^  A 
Houston, Texas doodlebug operator. Dr. Griffith, proffered a variation of this approach. 
Griffith possessed "a contrivance that nobody else could work but he could."'*'* The 
machine contained "little lugs that looked like the size of a silver pencil and it had a plate 
that would fit the palate, the roof of his mouth. ...He would threadscrew one of these little 
lugs marked silver, or gold, or iron, or oil, or gas, or sulphur [onto the machine], and then 
he would walk. ...Sometimes he would start and tremble and you'd see this lug draw down 
toward the ground. There he'd make a mark."'*  ^ Griffith offered a vague scientific 
rationale to explain how the device worked. He also attributed its functioning to a 
mysterious attribute only he possessed. The doctor explained "that it was something in 
these lugs plus a magnetism of his—in his body—some companion property of chemistry
'*^ Blakey, Oil On Their Shoes. 18-22; W. L. Copithome, “From Doodlebug to 
Seismography,” The Lamp 64 (1992), 44.
'*^ Boatright, Folklore o f the Oil Industry, 14.
'*' Ibid., 17.
Ibid.
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that made it possible for him to locate these t h i n g s . A l t h o u g h  doodlebugs could not 
prove their devices operated on scientific principles, the inability to disprove their claims 
prolonged the credibility they enjoyed.‘‘’
A doodlebug who could not describe how his device worked was not necessarily 
trying to swindle the public and sometimes possessed a legitimate knack at finding oil. 
O.W. Killiam earned a reputation as a doodlebug in the Gulf Coast region of Texas. 
Killiam could not even characterize a doodlebug device much less explain how it worked. 
He described it as “a little instrument that goes up and down and around and around" but 
grew exasperated in his explanation and confessed “there’s just no way to describe 
them.”"^* There existed “dozens” of different types and they all “work on the same 
principle.”''^  Although Killiam failed to state that principle explicitly, his description 
revealed that success had more to do with the operator than with the device itself.
The most successful doodlebug prospectors also surveyed the landscape and this 
activity cultivated within them an instinct for recognizing changes in topography and 
vegetation which often indicated the presence of oil. In order to operate the apparatus, 
Killiam explained that “you’ve got to have a lot of common sense and some knowledge of 
oil to get any effective results.” ®^ Although an avowed believer in these devices, he
""Ibid., 18.
Santschi, 'Divining Rods', 61.
O. W. Killiam, in Boatright, ed.. Tales from the Derrick Floor, 20. 
Ibid.
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considered the individual’s “common sense” and “knowledge” the most important 
attributes in finding oil. His elaboration suggested that the device itself probably played 
no part in a successful find, whether he consciously acknowledged this point or not. 
Killiam subscribed to the “theory that if you knew what to look for you could see an oil 
field on top of the ground.” *^ Instinct provided the prospector’s most effective attribute 
“cause if you’ll go to any oil field you’ll see that it differs a little bit from the surrounding 
territory.”^^  Although Killiam conceded that prospectors within the industry had not 
perfected this approach, he knew of Indians who had demonstrated the ability to find oil 
on the basis of vegetation, how it grew, and the shape of the earth. Professional scientists 
confirmed that a relationship existed between vegetation and geological formations.^^ 
What Killiam seemed to be saying was that successful prospectors, whether they used a 
doodlebug or not, cultivated an intuition or knack for finding oil by surveying the 
landscape. Of course, in regions where great pools of oil still remained untapped the 
chances for finding it remained high regardless of the method employed.
Whether creekologists used machines, invoked spirits, or searched for specific 
features on the land, each estimation of the best site to drill amounted to a “hunch” when 
no visible signs of oil existed. Luck had always played a large role in finding oil. 
Especially in untapped regions, the abundance of oil residing at or just below the surface
Ibid.
Ibid.
Charles N. Gould, “Petroleum and Surface Vegetation,” Proceedings o f the 
Oklahoma Academy o f Science 10(1930), 110.
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increased the probabiliy of finding it and the more holes drilled the higher the chance for 
success/'* Killiam conceded that luck played a large role in a doodlebug’s ability to find 
oil. He illustrated this point when he declared that a doodlebug is an instrument “which 
makes you spend your money drilling holes in the ground” even though “the law of 
averages will finally hit you a pool of oil.”^^  Even into the twentieth century when 
petroleum geologists had begun to develop their discipline, one of the most influential, 
Everette L. DeGolyer, noted that “it takes luck to find oil.” An ideal oil-finder possessed 
luck mixed with a large degree of skill, “but don’t ask what the proportion should be. In 
case of doubt, weigh mine with luck.”^^  As important a role as luck played, though, some 
hunches were better informed than others. Creekologists who based their decisions on 
field work rather than luck alone minimized the financial risk of drilling a dry hole. As 
obvious surface indications such as seeps grew more scarce, studying a region’s geology 
increasingly provided the most practical prospecting method.
'^‘Boatright, Tales from the Derrick Floor, 66
For the high probability of finding oil in the early says of unexploited oil region, 
see Boatright, Tales from the Derrick Floor, 96; Ball says that oil was so abundant in the 
early days of the Appalachian oil fuels that “hit-and-miss methods found enough of them 
to glut the market,” Ball, This Fascinating Oil Business, 46-7; Boatright, Folklore o f the 
Oil Industry, 20.
Everette L. DeGolyer; Quoted in Ray Miles, King o f  the Wildcatters: The Life 
and Times o f Tom Slick, 1883-1930, (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 
1969), 68; When DeGolyer questioned his friend and leading petroleum geologist of the 
early-twentieth century, Wallace Pratt, to what he attributed his success, Pratt replied: “If 
I were to reply that I had simply been lucky you would charge me with undue modesty; 
but my ‘successes’ do appear to me to be largely fortuitious...” Wallace E. Pratt to 
Everette DeGolyer, February 23, 1945; Box 12, File 1513; Everette DeGolyer Collection, 
Southern Methodist Universty.
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Creekologists who surveyed the landscape earned the name “practical oil men” 
because they sought-out visible indications of oil and, in the process, developed a crude 
geological reasoning based upon correlations they established between observations in the 
field and the possibility of oil beneath the ground. Although not professional geologists, 
practical oil men in the Petrolia, Pennsylvania field were "nothing if not geological. 
...Nearly every operator is ready to discourse learnedly on rocks, formations, strata, shales, 
sandstones..."”  While traveling the countryside, they "engaged in a kind of blind man's 
buff with nature" to decide whether or not to lease a particular tract of land.”  Any 
decision to lease involved a significant degree of risk without the visible presence of oil, 
but "the more capable prospecting was guided by a combination of instinct, experience and 
rule-of-thumb geology."^^ Drilling oil on the basis of a "hunch" did not necessarily 
translate into guesswork. The shrewdest wildcatters never allowed chance alone to dictate 
their search. Rather, their interactions with the natural environment led them to decipher 
potential correlations with land formations above the ground and oil that lay beneath. That 
some oil men could better predict where oil lay than others suggests that field experience 
developed within them a stronger instinct for identifying surface structures that might lead 
them to oil. In this way, their "rule-of-thumb geology" grew out of visual and physical
”  William Wright, The Oil Regions o f Pennsylvania (New York; Harper, 1865),
58.
”  William Larimer Mellon, Judge Mellon's Sons (By Author, 1948), 158.
”  Ibid.
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encounters with the environment.^
Field work so significantly influenced prospectors’ instincts about where to drill 
that even when they approved of a location on the basis of a hunch or superstition, their 
decision often possessed a geological rationale. Only a very fine line separated the 
superstitious methods of creekology from those which involved the search for surface 
formations. The manner in which different methods of creekology overlapped was 
apparent in one prospector’s choice for the best site to drill. Surface observations led one 
man to "a decision that oil was to be found most probably in association with the base of 
some mountain ridge or creek bed or some other geological feature of the surface..."®' 
Even though based on a mistaken notion, the idea that a relationship existed between 
surface formations and oil beneath the ground at least possessed an inherent logic. The 
same man easily dismissed such logic, however, and allowed superstition to inform his 
decision by concluding that "the place that seemed most attractive to me had for many 
years been used as a burying ground. It was a churchyard cemetery."®  ^ Some prospectors 
so vehemently subscribed to the notion that oil resided beneath cemeteries that "when oil 
was found in some neighborhood, any graveyard there was soon encompassed by a forest
®° Ibid., 158; Boatright supports the view that wildcatters relied upon an eclectic 
mix of oil-finding methods; "...the wildcatter was likely to rely on a strange mixture of 
surface observation, superstition, the occult, and even the divine." Boatright, Tales from  
the Derrick Floor, 14.
®‘ Mellon, Judge Mellon's Sons, 158.
®" Ibid.
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of derricks."^ The superstition took such a hold that "nearly all the country graveyards in 
the oil region at one time or another were leased to oil men, and I leased this one."®'’ The 
contention that oil always underlay graveyards places this approach to oil-finding within 
the realm of superstition or folk tradition. A more rational explanation for drilling in 
cemeteries existed even if wildcatters only recognized it intuitively.
Even when picking a location based on superstition, geological principles informed 
the choice more than oil men realized. Cemeteries often yielded oil not for mystical or 
supernatural reasons but because the hills they sat atop consisted of geologic structures 
that served as repositories for oil. While a graveyard did not guarantee success, 
prospectors often found oil there because structures such as "anticlines" or "salt domes" 
provided high ground which provided ideal burial sites. In fact, most graveyards situated 
in oil regions contained oil.®^  The 1,000 barrels one man extracted from a cemetery led 
him to reflect: "I think back on that churchyard drilling as one of the best of my early 
operations. Although a supernatural belief that the Lord blessed a churchyard 
cemetery's holy ground by bestowing it with oil motivated some men to drill there, the 
decision more often resulted because businessmen lacked a systematic method for finding 
oil and followed a tradition that had proven successful in the past.®’ The notion grew so
Ibid.
Ibid.
Boatright, Folklore o f the Oil Industry, 5-6. 
®® Mellon, Judge Mellon's Sons, 159. 
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popular practical oil men over time transformed the idea into a folk tradition.^* Similarly, 
just as cemeteries yielded oil because of their elevation, sawmills indicated sites to avoid 
because builders typically situated them on lower ground, or in geological structures 
known as synclines, where oil tended not to accumulate.®’ Thus, sound geologic principles 
explained the existence or absence of oil even when superstitious or supernatural 
explanations appeared more obvious.
A rational explanation existed for the frequent success of some practical oil men 
who drilled next to creeks. The downward slope of anticlines often formed valleys 
through which creeks, streams, and rivers flowed. Drilling next to the water met with 
success because the anticlinal structure trapped oil inside, not because the water bore a 
relationship to oil.™ Oil men unknowingly applied geology even when they subscribed to 
the “superstition” that they could find oil by drilling next to creeks. Petroleum geologists 
had not consistently and unanimously articulated principles that prospectors could rely 
upon as tools for exploration. Nevertheless, oil men began to realize that actively studying 
the composition of the earth could lead them to oil.’*
Boatright cites examples of the folk traditions that led congregations to lease- 
out their churchyard cemeteries. See Boatright, Folklore o f the Oil Industry, Chapter 1 :
"There's Oil Under Them Hills."
Ellen Sue Blakey, Oil On Their Shoes: Petroleum Geology to 1920, (Tulsa, OK: 
American Association of Petroleum Geologists, 1985), 18.
™ Edward Bloesch, “Early Day Petroleum Geology in Oklahoma,” Box 3 A, File 
“Ed Bloesch Letters,” Edgar Owen Collection, American Heritage Center, University of 
Wyoming.
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One of the earliest attempts to formulate a systematic method for finding structures 
that revealed the presence of oil resulted in the mistaken idea that large, underground 
crevices or fissures provided cavernous reservoirs for oil/^ This idea constituted oil- 
country folklore which remained current during the first twenty years of the industry and 
probably originated with Uncle Billy Smith who drilled Drake's well. Smith vowed that 
when the hole reached sixty-nine feet, he encountered an opening that caused his tools to 
drop six inches.’  ^The idea so captured the imagination of drillers throughout the 
Pennsylvania oil region that "it was the popular belief that a fissure must be struck in the 
oil sand or a well would be a failure. The idea that the quantity of oil bore a direct 
relationship to the size of an underground crevice possessed no geological validity, but 
drillers adopted this misconception as truth. If a driller happened to locate a productive 
well, he suddenly "recalled" that, indeed, his drill had dropped at a certain point. 
Subsequent production of the well influenced his recollection of how far the drill had 
dropped.’  ^ The more prolific the well, the greater the distance he imagined his drill had 
dropped in order to reflect the size of the supposed crevice. The manner in which practical
For a more extensive discussion of reservoir rocks, see "The Reservoir Rock," 
in Robert H. Dott, Sr., and Merrill J. Reynolds, comps.. Sourcebook for Petroleum 
Geology, Semicentennial Commemorative Volume, Memoir 5 (Tulsa, OK: American 
Association of Petroleum Geologists, 1969)
DeGolyer, "Concepts on Occurrence of Oil and Gas," 24; Tait, The Wildcatters,
75.
John F. Carll, "The Geology of the Oil Regions of Warren, Venango, Clarion 
and Butler Counties," in Pennsylvania 2nd Geological Survey Report, III, xxiv, 482 and 
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oil men transformed the geologically mistaken notion of crevices into truth resembled the 
way in which they elevated other oil-finding techniques into folk tradition.
Petroleum geology took a significant step away from folk tradition when C.D. 
Angell articulated the belt-line theory in 1861. Although practical oil men incorrectly 
perceived a relationship between creeks and oil, they correctly reasoned that oil often lay 
in a pattern beneath the surface. A practical operator without any geological training, 
Angell observed that a number of successful wells tended to occur in a pattern irrespective 
of flowing water.^® Based upon his experiments, Angell concluded that oil lay in 
continuous belts which ran along a straight line in a northeast-southwest direction, at an 
angle of twenty-two-and-a-half degrees longitude.^^ According to his reasoning, this 
meant that he could locate a belt and plot its course from the surface and that creeks had 
no relation to the belt whatsoever.’* He successfully demonstrated this belt-line theory in 
1871 and again in 1873 by locating a productive well after correlating the stratigraphy of a 
potential site with that of a known producer.™ Even though some of Angell's assumptions 
and principles were exaggerated, invalid, or parochial in the maimer he applied them, he 
provided a method of exploration based upon quasi-geological principles in order to
Ibid., 22; Owen, Trek o f  the Oil Finders, 66.
™ Fuller, “Appalachian Oil Field,” 625.
’* C.E. Bishop, Letter to Editor, New York Tribune (1873), in Early and Later 
History o f  Petroleum, J.T. Henry, comp. (Philadelphia: Jas. B. Rodgers Co.; Philadelphia, 
1873), 486-492.
™ Frederick Prentice who was briefly associated with Angell first observed the 
belt pattern in 1861 and deserves partial credit for the theory. Owen, Trek o f  the Oil 
Finders, 102, 104; Dott, Sourcebook for Petroleum Geology, 411.
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eliminate the role of chance/"
Despite limitations of the belt-line theory, it grew in popularity and displaced
many of the methods creekologists employed. Practical oil men had remained so blindly
attached to the idea that oil resided along creeks they rarely drilled at higher elevations
which looked down into the valleys where water flowed. The belt-line theory changed
their conception of how to find oil. Many realized that, regardless of where the creek
flowed, if two wells "are alike in depth, and appearance of oil, and of the rocks bored
through, I should be inclined to think they are all on one belt."*' This new way of thinking
placed a premium on gathering geological data:
In nearly all the shanties, or in the enginehouses adjoining the wells, or else in the 
offices of the owners of the wells, were preserved specimens of the different kinds 
of rock found in each well. They asked for little specimens of these to compare 
with similar ones from all other wells.*^
The belt-line theory widened oil prospectors' perspectives ftom the confines of a single
river valley or creek bed to a much larger region. Gathering and correlating geological
"specimens" led them to see that the geology of two locations "six miles apart, separated
by a mountain, were almost exactly alike."** A broader perspective paid dividends
because identifying relationships between two distant sites meant that "that they could find
*" Owen, Trek o f the Oil Finders, 105.
*' Bishop, Letter to Editor, 488-89.
*^ Ibid.
** Ibid.
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good wells all along the line, or belt, six miles between these developments."®'' Not all 
practical oil men, however, consistently applied this new way of thinking.
Well into the twentieth century, many practical oil men ignored the criteria Angell 
outlined in his hypothesis and followed fortuitous and delusive "belt lines" based on their 
own idiosyncratic philosophies.®^ Whereas Angell designated the oil line's longitude at 
twenty-two and a half degrees based upon the geology of the region he examined, 
additional degree lines grew in popularity among practical men without regard to the 
geology of a particular locale. Drilling for oil along a line that ran twenty-two and a half 
degrees in a region where the geology suggested a line of forty-five degrees meant failure 
from the start.®^  By co-opting Angell's theory as he articulated it and applying it in their 
own idiosyncratic manner, some practical men disavowed the quasi-geological reasoning 
which undergirded the theory and proffered in its place a speculative conception of 
locating oil based more upon hunch and intuition than observable facts. Stripped of its 
geological principles, the theory held less benefit but proved successful enough to remain 
the most popular approach among practical men until about 1920.®^
Practical oil men enjoyed a high probability of finding oil with techniques they had 
fashioned such as belt-line theory, particularly in unexploited oil regions. In Pennsylvania
84 Ibid.
®^ Owen, Trek o f  the Oil Finders, 102; DeGolyer, "Concepts on Occurrence of Oil 
and Gas," 23; Fuller, “Appalachian Oil Field”, 625.
®^ Even one of the largest oil companies in Pennsylvania explored for oil by 
following lines without a geological justification. Fuller, “Appalachian Oil Field”, 626.
®^ Owen, Trek o f the Oil Finders, 102.
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from 1860 to 1863, three years after the discovery of Drake’s well, practical men found 
new oil fields by drilling along the valleys which carried the tributaries of the Allegheny 
River.** Signs presented themselves in the form of oil saturating the soil or swirling on 
the top of creeks and streams.*® Marks of disturbance in the topography or in rocks, 
rugged hills, and sharply defined valleys also indicated good places to drill. They knew 
that as long as they continued drilling eventually they would find oil.®° Extracting shallow 
pools in this manner proved successful for a time, but eventually they had to either drill 
deeper or move to new regions where they could find oil closer to the surface.®* Rather 
than incurring the additional cost of drilling, prospectors followed the traditional surface 
signs and discovered another major oil-producing belt in Pennsylvania which they worked 
from 1864 to 1865.®^  The Clarion-Butler trend, or “lower oil belt,” eventually rivaled 
production in the older upper-belt.®^ Field experience provided an opportunity for 
practical men to cultivate their skill and intuition by learning how to identify geographical
** Ibid., 68; Specifically, the wells were “put down near the junction of the Clarion 
and Allegheny rivers...” Feckham, Report on the Production, Technology, and Uses o f  
Petroleum, 12.
*® In support of this point, it is important to remember that Drake’s well was 
shallow by modern standards. The drillers struck oil at seventy feet. Lucier, “Scientists 
and Swindlers,” 397-98; Owen, Trek o f  the Oil Finders, 11-12.
®® Owen, Trek o f  the Oil Finders, 68.
®* Ibid.
®^ Ibid.; See also Feckham, Report on the Production, Technology, and Uses o f  
Petroleum, 12.
®^ Owen, Trek o f the Oil Finders, 68.
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and geological markers whieh suggested relationships between surface and subsurface 
conditions.®'* The better prospectors met with success by relying on their instincts and 
intuition and had no need for the less tangible hypotheses and theories proffered by 
geologists.®^
Geologists proposed one hypothesis, the anticlinal theory, repeatedly throughout 
the nineteenth century but their impact on the oil industry remained slight despite the 
revolutionary potential of this prospecting guide. Geologists described the theory in 
published form as early as 1836, but it languished until 1885 when I. C. White 
demonstrated that he could significantly increase the probability of finding oil with the 
theory. By demonstrating its practieal application. White presented the industry with a 
reliable prospecting tool based upon definable geological principles rather than instinct 
and intuition cultivated through field work. Given its potential advantages, the anticlinal 
theory should have revolutionized oil-finding shortly after White’s demonstration but the 
industry as a whole did not take either the theory nor geology seriously for another thirty 
years. Historians have not yet explained why the industry responded so slowly, and this 
study partially attempts to answer that question.®®
®'* Ibid.; For a description of many of their “practical” methods, see James Orton, 
Underground Treasures: How and Where to Find Them. (Hartford, Connecticut: 
Worthington, Dustino and Co., 1872)
®® Although Owen states that operators adopted some geologists’ ideas, they also 
may have originated others. Many operators knew more about underground conditions 
than the geoloigsts. Owen, Trek o f the Oil Finders, 97.
®® The question of geologists’ involvement in the oil industry in the nineteenth 
century is the subjeet of historiographic debate. Traditionally, most historians agree that 
even though professional geologists articulated the anticlinal theory as a workable
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Much of the reason for the industry’s slow acceptance of geologists and their 
theories for finding oil stemmed from the longtime antipathy between practical oil men 
and university-trained geologists. Practical men probably did not read about White’s 
demonstration or simply remained unimpressed and continued exploring on the basis of 
methods they devised such as belt-line theorySl igh t ly  more surprising, though, is the 
delay of almost another thirty years after 1885 before companies began to take geologists 
seriously and consistently hire them. Given practical oil men’s ill-feelings toward
doctrine for finding oil, the industry failed to adopt it. Petroleum geologist and historian 
J.V. Howell notes that even though some geologists knew about the relationship between 
oil and anticlines before White’s demonstration of the theory, “little effort was made to 
utilize this information.” He notes the “astonishment” o f some that between Drake’s well 
in 1859 and White’s demonstration in 1885 “little was written by geologists and 
seemingly they were giving little thought to the subject." Howell, “How Old is Petroleum 
Geology?”, 607; Campbell, "Historical Review of Theories Advanced by American 
Geologists"; Edgar Owen, another petroleum geologist and historian, contends that from 
1860-1870 "most of the major elements of a workable doctrine of petroleum geology 
were shaped and fitted into place" but that geologists' efforts "failed dismally, partly 
because of their ovra deficiencies and partly by the caprice of fortune." Owen, Trek o f the 
Oil Finders, 56.
Although concerned primarily with the period 1830 to 1870, Paul Lucier argues 
that geologists were more important to the nineteenth-century oil business than historians 
have typically suggested. He reaches this conclusion, however, with rather curious 
reasoning. He evaluates geologists’ importance on the basis of the inroads they made as 
business consultants rather on than their success at finding oil. Geologists were important 
to the oil industry, he argues, because “in a broad perspective, success was not the 
measure of the expertise of scientific consultants. ...Judging by the number and size of 
petroleum discoveries, the record of consulting geologists in the industry was not 
astounding. They were not unimportant, however. Several eventually successful 
companies relied on their services.” Lucier, “Scientists and Swindlers,” 478, 480.
Myron L. Fuller, “Appalachian Oil Field,” Bulletin o f the Geological Society o f  
America 28 (1917), 626; Paul H. Price, "Anticlinal Theory and Later Developments in 
West Virginia," American Association o f Petroleum Geologists Bulletin 22/8 (August 
1938), 1097-98.
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geologists, it is not surprising that independent oil men so often ignored the theory.®* One 
historian of the oil industry remembered that a copy of a report published by the Second 
Geological Survey of Pennsylvania and written by John F. Carll, one of the most 
significant petroleum geologists of the nineteenth century, sat untouched in his father’s 
office.®® His father received geology reports for free but never considered them: "I will 
wager the price of a string of casing that my Scotch father never spent a dime of his good 
money for a book by a rockhound."*®® The Survey’s publication committee confirmed this 
point: “There is no doubt that books given away are one-half wasted by falling into the 
hands of persons who make little use of them.”*®' Old attitudes died hard, and geologists 
struggled for credibility long after White’s demonstration. Petroleum geologist and 
historian, Edgar Owen, attended school in Marietta, Ohio from 1910 to 1912, and “almost 
all of my classmates belonged to oil producers’ families. But I never heard of anybody
®* A number of sources make note of the antipathy practical oil men felt for 
petroleum geologists. See for example: Owen, Trek o f the Oil Finders, xiii; Ball, This 
Fascinating Oil Business, 46-7. It was not unusual for craftsmen working in the mineral 
industries to resent an influx of university-trained professionals into their profession. 
Many of the attitudes that existed among practical oil men toward petroleum geologists 
were displayed toward college-educated engineers by mining prospectors who followed 
traditional practices, Clark C. Spence, Mining Engineers and the American West: The 
Lace-Boot Brigade, 1849-1933, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970
®® Tait, TAe , 79.
'®® Ibid.
‘®‘ Committee on Publication, August 16,1877, “Report of Publication 
Committee,” Item 19-Diary Volume 4, 1877-1881, J. P. Lesley Collection, American 
Philosophical Society.
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who had any use for geology.”’'’^  An incident Owen recounted typified the resentment 
many practical oil men felt when geologists invaded their turf. His grandfather who 
worked as a practical oil man from 1861 to 1913 went bankrupt when one of the most 
famous nineteenth-century geologists, E.B. Andrews, issued a statement in a local 
newspaper which amounted to “an unfavorable geological report on his properties and 
prevented their sale.”*“  Practical oil men had their own ideas about how to find oil and 
they resented geologists who contradicted opinions they had long held dear.
Practical oil men held on fiercely to prospecting methods they had crafted and 
relied upon for decades and felt threatened when geologists presented alternatives. 
Reflecting on the reception petroleum geologists received in the early twentieth century, 
Wallace Pratt remembered that “we naturally ran into a lot of trouble with the old-timer 
who had always relied on surface indications for the presence of oil. ...To them a college- 
trained geologist was the fool of books.”*®'' Practical men felt particularly threatened when 
they encountered geologists in the field. When the two crossed paths, practical men 
sometimes deliberately tried to confuse them by supplying false information or bogus 
samples from the wells they had drilled.'®  ^ One geologist instantly perceived a practical 
oil man’s temperament when he approached a well and spotted a shallow, mock gravesite
*®^ Edgar Owen to J. V. Howell, May 28,1964, Box 16, J. V. Howell Collection, 
American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming.
'®'Ibid.
'®'* Copithome, “From Doodlebug to Seismography,” 42.
'®^ Blakey, Oil On Their Shoes, 52-53.
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with boots protruding from the ground at one end at a headstone at the other which read, 
“He asked too many damned questions.”'®® Geologists had to ask questions, however, 
because they lacked what the practical man possessed in abundance-firsthand experience 
in the oil fields.
Practical oil men possessed more hands-on field experience searching for oil and 
drilling promising sites, and they resented geologists who assumed superior knowledge 
because of their formal education. Perhaps more than any other attribute, the experience 
of conducting extensive field work contributed the “practical” element to the non­
professional oil man’s identity and temperament. Unlike the university-trained geologist, 
the practical man had "begun with nothing, and by hard labor, amid grease and dirt, 
learned all about putting down wells so as to make them work, or by diligent selection of 
likely lands have made them known to capitalists..."'®’ Finding oil meant labor, grease, 
and dirt, not effete intellectual theorizing about how to find oil without ever venturing into 
the field. The famous wildcatter Joseph C. Trees who had earned an engineering degree 
proved an exception among practical oil men who for the most part never finished high 
school.'®* Rather than education, they valued hands-on experience which they acquired 
while roaming the countryside and looking for the best place to drill. Geologists who
106 Quoted in Blakey, Oil On Their Shoes, 61.
'°’ Edmund Morris, Derrick and Drill, or An Insight into the Discovery, 
Development and Present Condition and Future Prospects o f Petroleum in New York, 
Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia. (New York: James Miller, 1865), p. 19; Quoted in 
Lucier, “Scientists and Swindlers,” 422.
'®* Owen, Trek o f  the Oil Finders, 293.
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professed to know more about finding oil on the basis of theories learned in the classroom 
presented an affront to the sweat and toil wildcatters endured while practicing their craft.
Practical men did not have to possess great powers of perception to see that 
university-trained geologists lacked field experience. Most geologists in Oklahoma had 
never observed the drilling of a well before graduating from c o l l ege . Mer e l y  a quick 
glance revealed that the yOung men tfesh from universities who claimed they could find oil 
with geology had never sunk a well. One oil man refused to let a geologist observe him 
drill a well when he noticed the “fancy new” wristwatch strapped to his wrist.''® Starting 
out his career as a petroleum geologist, J. Elmer Thomas was so unprepared for the 
physical demands of field work that he was fired when he asked how many pairs of 
pajamas he should take on an outing.'" Geologists made matters worse by exerting little 
effort to ingratiate themselves to the practical oil men.
Although both groups displayed arrogance and believed they possessed superior 
knowledge, geologists had more to gain by demonstrating humility but instead showed-off 
with pedantic language and flashy attire. Chief geologist of the U.S.G.S., David White, 
scolded petroleum geologists at an annual meeting for their complaints about the 
“unregenerate driller”:"^
'0^  Ibid.
"® Quoted in Blakey, Oil On Their Shoes, 61.
'"  Owen, Trek o f the Oil Finders, 330-31.
David White, ‘'’'Discvission,''’ American Association o f Petroleum Geologists, 
Bulletin 3 (1919): 79.
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...is it not possible that after all, your failure to get adequate and accurate well 
criteria may be due to the fact that you are not in cordial contact and sympathy with 
the driller? ...His ability and intelligence are not inferior to yours. ...How many of 
you put aside your high-brow clothes and forego your high-brow language (which 
is worse than high-brow clothes) and so present the subject of rock characters that 
he, recognizing them will take pride in good logs and in gathering the samples to 
serve as vouchers for his identification.”^
Wildcatters generated valuable information, or “well criteria,” from the holes they drilled
which offered important clues about subsurface conditions to a geologist who knew how
to interpret them. Ascertaining samples of that information, however, required diplomacy
on the part of young geologists which they often failed to demonstrate. Rather than
encouraging practical oil men to “take pride in good logs” by recording the specific depths
at which they encountered various strata, geologists condescendingly adopted the
terminology and attire of the college classroom rather than the oil field. What geologists
learned from their professors and books could not substitute for the lessons field work
taught.
Working on a drilling rig enabled practical oil men to gather important samples as 
their drills pulled minerals from different strata to the surface, but this information meant 
less to them than to geologists who could extrapolate from it ideas about subsurface 
geological conditions. White delivered the above admonition in 1919, but geologists 
expressed concern for the inadequate attention practical men paid to well records in the 
1860s soon after the petroleum boom in Pennsylvania started. The use of well records to 
map subsurface geology was one of the most important innovations that resulted from
Ibid.
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geologists’ participation in the oil industry."'' J. Peter Lesley was one of the first to 
advocate increased attention to keeping accurate records and to stress the important role 
practical oil men played in recording this valuable data. In his view, practical men failed 
to understand their potential contribution to geological science. He lamented that very few 
drillers “knew the importance of keeping any other than a contract account for number of 
feet sunk.”*" Drillers failed to appreciate the necessity of recording facts about the 
geology they encountered as their drills penetrated deeper stratigraphie layers. The 
irritation Lesley expressed at this neglect reflected very clearly geologists’ condescending 
attitude toward practical men. He complained that “it is impossible to estimate the loss 
which geology has suffered during the last six years from this reckless ignorance.”**® 
Drillers could have generated a great quantity of “priceless information” if only they had 
kept records from the ten to twenty thousand holes they had drilled, but instead “it was 
allowed to flow off into the ocean of forgetfulness...”**^ Much of the problem lay in the
**'* Lucier, “Scientists and Swindlers,” 476; A geologist who worked for Lesley on 
the Second Pennsylvania Geological Survey, John Carll, expressed his frustration at 
relying on drillers’ descriptions of geology because often “they are a delusion and a 
snare.” In attempting to map Venango County, “our personal experience in endeavoring 
to get a correct idea of the stratification of the oil rocks from published well-reeords, 
given promiscuously by different drillers or well owners, and colored by their individual 
theories or pecuniary interests, discourages us from introducing that kind of record here.” 
John F. Carll, “Report of Progress in the Venango County District,” Second Geological 
Survey of Pennsylvania; Second Geological Survey of Pennsylvania, vol. 1,1878 ed., p. 
23; Quoted in Owen, Trek o f the Oil Finders, 108.
**^ J. Peter Lesley, [Petroleum in the Eastern Coal-Field of Kentucky] Proceedings 
o f the American Philosophical Society, 10 (April 1865), 62.
**® Ibid.
**’ Ibid.
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lack of a repository to deposit the information.
Even if drillers had recorded accurate and abundant data from wells they drilled, no 
entity existed which could gather, store, and preserve it. Lesley lamented the lack of “any 
bureau in the State, any society, or any individual” authorized or willing to preserve the 
few well logs generated by “men of intelligence [who] have waked to the importance” of 
keeping adequate reeords."* Without a repository for their information, practieal men 
continued drilling on the basis of contraets which made no provisions “for compelling a 
careful reeord of the strata.”"® In addition to storing the information, Lesley identified the 
need for some mechanism “compelling” practieal men to deposit their records. In order to 
organize and systematize the oil industry, geologists needed the power and authority of the 
state. In Pennsylvania, government involved itself in the oil industry when the legislature 
appropriated money to fund a geological survey and generate information about the state’s 
resources.
Lesley served as direetor of the Second Permsylvania Geological Survey, and 
according to him the impetus for it originated from oil men who clamored for information 
about the state’s resources. He explained that Pennsylvanians looked to seience for 
answers to their questions about oil because earlier innovations in bessemer iron and 
metallurgy “exereised an important influence upon the sentiment of the Commonwealth 
towards geology and applied seience.”'^ ® Having witnessed how they could benefit from
""Ibid.
"® Ibid.
'^"Ibid.
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science, “a largely increased geological intelligence in the public mind” spread throughout 
the s t a t e . Na t ur a l ly ,  when an oil boom in 1873 threw western Pennsylvania into “a state 
of the highest excitement,” people expected the scientific community to provide them with 
answers
Every one was asking, how long will it last? What is its original source? 
Where are the limits of the reservoirs? Who can give us a rule to locate a 
well? How many oil sands are there? Can geology teach us anything?
Why does the State Legislature not provide for a scientific examination of 
the phenomenon?'^^
Pennsylvania lacked immediate answers to these questions because the first geological 
survey was mostly a reconnaissance and had disbanded in 1842. No state official could 
provide the public with the information it sought. Businessmen attempted to fill this void 
themselves by financing “a multitude of private surveys” and generating “a world of fresh 
data of a specially precise kind...”‘^ '‘ Private enterprise seemingly solved the problem, but 
“business refused to give away its valuable secrets.”*^  ^ Lesley argued that oil men without 
capital still lacked information and that the state should supply their needs. Exactly which 
oil men sought this information and which rejected it, however, remains unclear.
While the Pennsylvania legislature considered whether to fimd a second geological
J. Peter Lesley, “Concerning the State Geological Survey,” 303; J. P. Lesley 
Collection, American Philosophical Society.
Ibid.
Ibid., 305.
Ibid., 303.
*2' Ibid.
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survey, one state senator opposed the measure on the principle that practical men did not
require it. Senator White from Indiana County could not justify the expenditure for
another survey because, he argued, the first had been a failure, was “incorrect,” and “fails
to give the kind of information” people d e s i r e d . W h i t e  wanted Pennsylvanians to derive
tangible, demonstrable benefits from the survey, and asked “What will be the practical
effect of a geological survey of the State? Will it increase our wealth? I do not see how it
will.”'^ ’ In addition to not generating more wealth. White felt that geologists knew less
about finding oil than practical men who worked in the fields daily:
Go to the oil regions of the State, and who knows the most about the situation of 
the ground? Why, the practical men in that region-parties employed by private 
interests. ...what can a geological survey tell us more than we already know?
Who is to be trusted to make a satisfactory report? Men employed by private 
enterprises.’^ *
White felt that the practical oil man “knows the most about the situation of the ground” 
and not the geologist. His contention that “private enterprise” produced the most 
“satisfactory” information reflected his belief in a laissez-faire approach to the oil industry. 
Rather than looking to state government, the practical oil man had always functioned best
J. P. Lesley, Notebook Miscellaneous #16, Diary Volume 1, 1874, J. Peter 
Lesley Collection, American Philosophical Society. Lesley’s own statements confirm 
White’s opinion: “Yet the first survey was essentially a reconnaissance ...Their views 
were broad, their isolated observations numerous and exact, but their districts were never 
accurately surveyed by them...” J.P. Lesley, ’’Early Observations of the Geology of 
Pennsylvania," in Historical Sketch o f Geological Explorations in Pennsylvania and 
other States, Second Geological Survey of Pennsylvania. (Harrisburg, PA: Board of 
Commissioners for the Second Geological Survey, 1876), viii-ix.
J. P. Lesley, Notebook Miscellaneous #16, Diary Volume 1, 1874, J. Peter 
Lesley Collection, American Philosophical Society.
Ibid.
50
when left to his own devices. Among Pennsylvania legislators, White stood alone in his 
opposition to the survey.
Three senators from other counties disagreed with White, contending that the state 
should fund a survey and that geologists had played a pivotal role in finding oil. Senators 
Dill, Maclay, and Cooper all favored the bill to fund a second geological survey. Dill felt 
White was mistaken “to say that the people do not desire a survey.”’^  ^ Even people “who 
do not aspire to scientific knowledge” seemed to crave geology and expressed “a very 
great interest” in the subject.*^” Maclay, who claimed “to have had some experience in the 
matter” of oil production, felt that White particularly erred in his statement about 
geologists’ inadequate store of knowledge: “The great oil districts of the State have been 
discovered and their development commenced through the recommendation of 
geologists.”'^* Senator Cooper expressed his constituents’ desire for a survey and, like 
Maclay, explained that “not only scientific men, but gentlemen who interest themselves in 
geology are earnestly appealing for a measure of this kind.” As the senators asserted, 
many of their constituents desired a survey but they never indicated specifically where 
practical men stood on the issue. In fact, most practical men probably did not want a 
geological survey.
Once Lesley became director of the Second Pennsylvania Geological Survey, he 
too expressed doubts about exactly who desired the geological survey and the information
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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it produced. On one hand, Lesley concurred with the state senators who believed that the 
“oil interest” in the state demanded a survey and that “it was supported by intelligent men 
from all parts of the s t a t e . . E x a c t l y  who belonged to this homogenous group, the “oil 
interest,” Lesley never specified except to say that they were “intelligent men.” Further, 
he appeared to have some doubt about exactly who wanted geological information, 
speculating that “the immediate motive for the survey was probably, but not certainly, the 
clamour [sic] of the oil men in 1873 for a survey of the oil regions.”"^ Most likely, the 
demand from “all parts of the state” that the senators and Lesley described originated from 
people not employed in the oil industry and who hoped that geologists would find valuable 
minerals on their property. Lesley confirmed this when he indicated that people in 
counties where prospectors failed to find resources particularly argued that “their mineral 
poverty was merely a mistake or oversight chargeable to the inadequacy of the old 
survey.”*^'^  Although many Pennsylvania residents may have wanted the survey, practical 
men had less need for it because they had been successfully finding oil without the 
assistance of professional geologists.
Just as the label “oil interest” inaccurately homogenized a diverse array of oil 
industry participants, not all “practical men” fit neatly into a single group who opposed 
geology as a prospecting tool and some may have even supported the geological survey.
J. Peter Lesley, “Concerning the State Geological 305, J. P. Lesley Collection, 
American Philosophical Society.
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One faction of alleged “practical men” who professed to speak for all within their group 
proclaimed in a newspaper article that “the time has gone by when the advisability of such 
a survey can be questioned.” '^  ^ Whether practical men or scheming politicians authored 
this article, even this group of survey supporters acknowledged that “there is probably one 
class” of Pennsylvanians who opposed the survey, but they are a group to whom the state 
“owes nothing but a quiet burial place-they are the people who have opposed canals and 
railroads, and telegraphs and gas companies-the representatives of old fogyism, and 
prejudice and illiberality.” '^ ® The logic of this statement was clear: Supporters of the 
survey were enlightened and progressive thinkers, but those who opposed it held 
prejudieed and illiberal views of a bygone era and teetered on the brink of death. Clearly, 
some Pennsylvanians wanted the geological survey as evidenced by the sentiments 
expressed in this article. The caricature of those who opposed it, however, underscores the 
markedly contrasting worldview of those who favored it. Proponents of the survey wanted 
to harness the power and authority of the state in order to improve their fortune and chose 
Lesley to speak for their cause.
Lesley had no qualms claiming authority which he felt his position as a geologist 
warranted and which the state had bestowed upon him as director of the geological survey.
Although this article was signed “Practical Men,” it is highly likely that 
politicians who favored the survey wrote it. The article attacks the biggest opponent to 
the geological survey. Senator White from Indiana County, and refutes his opposition 
point by point and describes him as “ignorant of the character and merits of the bill”; J. P. 
Lesley, Notebook Miscellaneous #16, Diary Volume 1,1874. [p. 20]; J. Peter Lesley 
Collection, American Philosophical Society.
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When editorials in the Pittsburgh newspaper criticized his actions as director, he 
contended that they “only go to show how completely the average business man 
misunderstands and, necessarily misunderstands, the real objects, drift and necessary 
methods of a state geological survey.”*^’ Criticism did not shake Lesley’s convictions of 
how he thought the survey should function, especially because he had the endorsement of 
the state behind him. Without apology, he declared “I have my own ideas of what a 
geological survey ought to be, and they are approved by the board.” '^ ® Lesley felt a 
responsibility to perform the kind of work desired by the board of commissioners who 
appointed him, the scientific community, and the taxpaying public.*®® In his opinion, the 
best way to satisfy these constituents involved the hiring and training of competent 
assistants he could deploy as field geologists throughout Pennsylvania.
The key to conducting an effective survey lay in hiring well-trained geological 
experts, and Lesley had a very clear idea of the kind of men he wanted. When the citizens 
of Pittsburgh expressed concern that geologists spent too little time surveying the western 
half of the state, he explained that budget constraints prevented him from hiring and 
training more assistants. He informed his critics that “geology is a special science, and 
requires trained experts.”*'**’ Any man who has “not been engaged for years in practical
*®® J. P. Lesley, Letter from Professor Leslie, reprinted in Monogahela City 
Republican, August 21, Item 19-Diary Volume 4, 1877-1881; J. Peter Lesley Collection, 
American Philosophical Society.
*®® Ibid.
*®®Ibid.
*'**’ Ibid.
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geological field work" could ever understand “how few such experts there are” qualified to 
perform the work given the small appropriation at his dispense.''" Sure, Lesley conceded, 
with the money at his disposal he “could obtain for such compensation a hundred men in 
all parts of the State who think themselves and are judged by their friends and neighbors to 
be quite competent to make a geological survey,” but they would lack the necessary 
qualifications.''*^ In addition to deflecting criticism for not employing more assistants, 
Lesley appeared concerned to make a case for the specialized skills of professional 
geologists and to delineate their expertise from the methods of amateur prospectors. The 
authority for determining an assistant’s expertise lay not in not in the “hundreds” of people 
who “think themselves” qualified to perform field work nor in the judgments of their 
“friends and neighbors” but in his discretion as the survey’s director. Given his criteria, 
the knowledge practical men produced had no place on the survey.
Lesley saw a clear distinction between the quality of knowledge trained scientific 
experts and practical oil men produced, and he exhibited little tolerance for what he 
deemed amateur geology. He received extensive practice as a field geologist on 
Pennsylvania’s first geological survey, and “experience has taught me that good geological 
work can only be done by men long trained to it...”''*^  Given his emphasis on extensive 
training, Lesley never considered the possibility of relying on information provided by 
practical oil men. An amateur geologist, “however good a man” he might be and
"" Ibid.
'^ 2 Ibid.
Ibid.
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“however enthusiastic his so-called love for geology,” amounted to merely a “raw hand” 
who Lesley refused to take seriously/'*'' For a practical oil man to meet Lesley’s standards, 
he “would have to be put through such a course of training, for at least a year, before his 
work as geological work could begin to be reliable.”*'*^ Even if he had taken a chance and 
hired amateur geologists, their reports “would be good for nothing” and not fit to publish 
unless he “entirely” rewrote them, “and even then would be of little or no value.”*'*® The 
knowledge they produced failed to pass muster because they lacked the necessary 
qualifications.
Lesley disagreed with the concepts practical men devised for finding oil and saw 
the survey as a way to combat their ill-conceived views. Many practical men believed that 
oil gathered in linear “belts” beneath the surface and that they could find these belts next 
to creeks or by drilling along an imaginary line between two productive wells. Even 
though some prospectors found oil in this manner, Lesley argued, their success resulted 
more from luck than the geological credibility of their methods and he set out to 
demonstrate this point. He rejected belt-line theory outright: “There are no ‘belts of oil,’ 
as some imagine, distinguishable on the surface.”"*’ He went even further, declaring that 
“all straight-edge locations of wells upon a map are mere charlantry.”*'** He explained that
*"'* Ibid.
"*® Ibid.
Ibid.
*'*’ Everette DeGolyer, Notes on J. P. Lesley, Box 8, File 1038; Everette DeGolyer 
Collection, Southern Methodist University.
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productive wells only appeared to fall in a linear pattern because of geological factors 
which practical oil men failed to understand. Lesley reasoned that “belts of wells have 
been caused by the fact that they are sunk in valleys” along the banks of creeks.*''®
Practical men avoided drilling on the hillsides looking down upon the valleys, where they 
would have also found oil, “in order to avoid the need of going down to inconvenient 
depths” and incurring additional c o s t s . A s  a result, their wells “clustered along certain 
outcrops” in a somewhat linear pattern..'^' They found oil because they unknowingly 
drilled atop outcrops, not because they followed an imaginary line. Whether Lesley 
thought advocates of belt-line theory truly practiced “charlantry” or simply misunderstood 
reasons for their success, he considered it his job as director of the survey to replace their 
bogus ideas with geologically sound information.
As conceived by Lesley, the geological survey represented a triumph of reason and 
intelligence over superstition and ignorance, and this philosophical orientation placed him 
at odds with the methods practical oil men employed. He felt strongly that a survey should 
possess the “power to stimulate the intellect of the State.”'^  ^ The state must behave 
rationally in order “to sweep away costly superstitions respecting the mineral resources of 
the Commonwealth.” '^  ^ He expressed an almost missionary zeal to eliminate superstition
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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and saw attempts by the first and second surveys as a forty-year, “manly struggle” of 
science against “the powers of darkness of the Underworld, the stubborn instinct for 
concealment in Nature, and the prejudices and falsifications of half-educated men.”*^'* 
While he never specifically mentioned practical oil men, he drew a clear line between men 
who possessed an education and employed science to locate resources and those who 
relied on superstition. He charged the survey with the mission of enlightening the “half­
educated men” who kept nature concealed with their darkness and “stubborn instinct” 
rather than yielding to the light of science.
Ibid.
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Chapter 2:
“J. Peter Lesley and the Search for a Prospecting Method”
Historians who write about the relationship between science and industry tend to 
focus on either the late-eighteenth century or the latter-nineteenth to early-twentieth 
centuries, often neglecting the years in-between. At least one historian recently attempted 
to fill this void by examining the first generation of scientific consultants who lent their skills 
to the coal and oil industries jfrom the 1830s to the 1860s.* The study concluded that the 
practical and theoretical aspects of geology at mid-century complimented one another and 
laid the foundation for a successful partnership between business and science. Indeed, 
nineteenth-century scientists drew no sharp distinction between their work’s economic utility 
and its intellectual contributions, often contending that the two went hand-in-hand.^ Not all 
geologists, however, easily reconciled practical and theoretical science at this time. Although 
he was an accomplished scientist, J. Peter Lesley’s personal eccentricities prevented him 
from accepting the possibility that practical and theoretical science could co-exist and 
reinforce one another. Lesley’s personal eccentricities coupled with a disinclination toward 
theorizing resulted in his failure to provide prospectors with a reliable method for 
consistently finding oil because he disavowed the anticlinal theory which eventually
* Paul Lucier, “Scientists and Swindlers: Coal, Oil, and Scientific Consulting in the 
American Industrial Revolution, 1830-1870.” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, June 1994); 
Lucier, "Commercial Interests and Scientific Disinterestedness: Consulting Geologists in 
Antebellum America," Isis 86 (1996): 245-67.
 ^Anne Marie Millbrooke, “State Geological Surveys of the Nineteenth Century,” 
(Ph.D. diss.. University of Pennsylvania, 1981)
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revolutionized the oil industry.
In the nineteenth century, Lesley probably knew more about the geology of 
Pennsylvania than any other person.^ Born in 1819, he spent approximately sixty years of 
his eighty-four-year life working as a geologist. Immediately after graduating from the 
University of Pennsylvania, he began working as a map-maker on the Pennsylvania 
Geological Survey under H.D. Rogers. Lesley suspended his geological work temporarily 
in 1841 when he entered the Princeton Theological Seminary to train as a minister. For 
approximately the next fifteen years, he worked in various capacities, including as a pastor 
at a Congregational church, a consultant for private and corporate geological surveys, and 
sporadically resuming his work as a map-maker for the geological survey. At the age of 
forty, Lesley began working as a professor of mining at the University of Pennsylvania. 
When he was not teaching, he stayed so busy as a private consultant for iron, coal, and oil 
companies that this work provided him with his chief source of income until 1874 when he 
accepted the position as Pennsylvania’s state geologist and foeused his energies entirely on 
directing the Second Pennsylvania Geological Survey. No other person could have been 
more qualified or better situated to provide practical men with a systematic method for 
finding oil, yet Lesley opposed the theory other prominent geologists suggested could fill that 
role.
To begin understanding why Lesley so vociferously opposed the anticlinal theory, 
it is necessary to understand what the theory stated. Defined most simply, an anticline
 ^ Edgar Owen, Trek o f the Oil Finders, A History o f Exploration for Petroleum, 
(Tulsa, OK: American Association of Petroleum Geologists, 1975), 78-79.
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consists of an upfold in strata which creates an elevated point but does not break the 
stratigraphical layers/ As underground pressure forces oil to the surface, the elevation, or 
anticline, serves as a trap into which gravity drives the oil. Because of their different 
weights, gas, oil, and water separate into different layers instead of remaining mixed 
together. Although geologists have modified and expanded this idea over time, its 
fimdamentalrole as a structure trapping oil inside remains sound and credible.^ Some of 
the most prominent geologists in North America either hinted at, described, or postulated that 
anticlines served as habitats for oil for at least fifty years before the industry took the idea 
seriously.® In 1836, S. P. Hildreth provided a detailed description of his observations while 
travelling in the Ohio valley and implied that oil accumulated in anticlines but did not layout 
a clearly-delineated hypothesis.’ Sir William E. Logan of Canada associated oil with 
anticlines in an 1844. Not until 1861 did a geologist, T. Sterry Hunt, fully articulate the
Max Ball, Douglas Ball and Daniel S. Turner, This Fascinating Oil Business,
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1940), 49.
® Ibid., 139
® There are many sources that describe each of the several geologists who postulated 
the anticlinal theory, revised it, or played a part in formulating it. For the most
comprehensive accounts, see Robert H. Dott, Sr. and Merrill J. Reynolds, comp.. Sourcebook 
fo r Petroleum Geology Semicentennial Commemorative Volume, Memoir 5 (Tulsa, OK: 
American Association of Petroleum Geologists, 1969), 399-410; Owen, Trek o f  the Oil 
Finders', Howell, "Historical Development of the Structural Theory," in Problems o f 
Petroleum Geology, W.E. Wrather and F.H. Lahee, eds. (Tulsa, OK: American Association 
of Petroleum Geologists, 1934), 2-5; DeGolyer, "Concepts on Occurrence of Oil and Gas," 
in History o f  Petroleum Engineering (New York: American Petroleum Institute, 1961), 17- 
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hypothesis and describe how oil accumulated in anticlines.* Within fifteen years after Hunt's 
statement, a number of other prominent geologists in North America and Europe endorsed 
the anticlinal theory and referred to it in their publications.^ Despite its acceptance by 
numerous geologists, a few within the oil industry began to take the idea seriously after 1885 
when I.e. White wrote a now-famous paper in which he demonstrated how he had located 
oil and natural gas by applying the theory. Oil men probably did not read about it or simply 
remained unimpressed with geology and continued exploring on the basis of methods they 
devised.” Still, however, the industry as a whole failed to adopt it. Like many practical oil 
men, Lesley also disavowed the anticlinal theory and part of the explanation for his rejection 
of it lay in the politics surrounding the creation of a state survey.
The director of a state geological survey in the first half of the nineteenth century
* Dott, Sourcebookfor Petroleum Geology, 401.
® The geologists include: Charles Hitchcock, H.D. Rogers, E.W. Evans, E.B. 
Andrews, Alexander Winchell, Henry Hind, and Hans Hoefer. Howell, "Historical 
Development of the Structural Theory," 13; Galey lists John S. Newberry as a contributor. 
Although he did not receive formal training as a geologist, F.W. Minshall significantly 
contributed to the theory as well. John T. Galey, "The Anticlinal Theory of Oil and Gas 
Accumulation: Its Role in the Inception of the Natural Gas and Modem Oil Industries in 
North America," in Geologists and Ideas: A History o f  North America (Boulder, CO: 
Geological Society of America, 1985), 428-29; "The completeness of its acceptance may be 
judged by the fact that a great majority of the papers on petroleum, written by geologists 
between 1861 and 1880, refer to the work of either Hunt or Andrews, both advocates of the 
anticlinal theory." Howell, "Historical Development of the Stmctural Theory," 6.
M.R. Campbell, "Historical Review of Theories Advanced by American Geologists 
to Account for the Origin and Accumulation of Oil," Economic Geology 6 (1911), 363-395.
” Myron L. Fuller, “Appalachian Oil Field,” Bulletin o f  the Geological Society o f  
America 28(1917), 626; Paul H. Price, "Anticlinal Theory and Later Developments in West 
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often found himself in a very politically tense position. State surveys started in the South 
in the 1820s, quickly spread throughout the rest of the country, and within two decades had 
grown into important institutions for geological research.'^ Legislators appropriated money 
to establish surveys with the intention of disseminating information to all social levels in 
society.*^ Particularly in the Jacksonian era, lawmakers hoped to democratize education, in 
particular, by requiring surveys to make scientific information available to common men 
rather than just an educated elite."' More than its educational value, however, a survey’s 
ability to generate “practical” information which potentially improved an individual’s 
material well-being or enhanced the state’s economy determined whether the legislature 
appropriated the necessary fimds.*  ^ Some geologists perfected the art of balancing the 
practical and purely scientific results of their work when speaking to lawmakers, while others 
saw the survey as an opportunity to pursue a purely scientific agenda while paying lip serve 
to legislators’ demands for utility.'® Whatever the approach, success required the geologist
Aldrich, “American State Geological Surveys, 1820-1845,” 133.
Walter B. Hendrickson, “Nineteenth-Century State Geological Surveys: Early 
Governmental Support of Science,” Isis (September 1961), 363 ; M.W.P. to James Hall, June 
19, 1847 in Rachel Laudan, From Mineralogy to Geology: The Foundations o f a Science, 
1650-1830, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 295. This letter 
offers a classic example of the politics involved in fimding a survey.
14 Hendrickson, “Nineteenth-Century State Geological Surveys,” 363.
Ibid., 363-64; “State Geological Surveys and Economic Geology,” Economic 
Geology 20 (June-July 1925), 376; in Everette DeGolyer Collection, Box 16, File 2245, 
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to possess a broader vision than legislators of the survey’s scope and less myopic views of 
how research might result in economically useful information.’’
Scientists and legislators sometimes disagreed over what constituted practical 
information because the matter presented a subjective question open to interpretation. Some 
state geologists found themselves unemployed or under-funded when legislatures deemed 
their work to lack any apparent educational or economic value. James Hall directed the New 
Y ork State Survey and contributed to Iowa and Wisconsin’s surveys and provided the classic 
example of a geologist who subordinated his work’s practical application to its scientific 
relevance.'* Rather than perform the humdrum work of locating and testing building stones 
or other natural resources, Hall published reports with detailed descriptions of fossil shells 
accompanied by expensive reproductions of steel-engraved plates. Uncertain how his work 
might translate into economic gains, the Iowa legislature discontinued its survey, Wisconsin 
refused to reimburse him for engravings to illustrate his reports, and both legislatures 
objected to funds for expensive and arcane books which benefitted only a small group of
”  “State Geological Surveys and Economic Geology,” Economic Geology 20 (June- 
July 1925), 377; in Everette DeGolyer Collection, Box 16, File 2245, Everette DeGolyer 
Library, Southern Methodist Universty.
’* Despite his bad luck with Iowa and Wisconsin, Hall had better luck with other 
attempts to acquire appropriations for purely scientific work. See “State Geological Surveys 
and Economic Geology,” Economic Geology 20/4 (June-July 1925), 376; in DeGolyer 
Collection, Box 16, File 2245. Hendrickson, “Nineteenth-Century State Geological 
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scientists.^® What Hall considered “practical” legislators viewed as science for the sake of 
science, without apparent benefit to taxpayers.
Henry D. Rogers encountered similar opposition from the Pennsylvania legislature. 
Rogers directed the first Permsylvania geological survey from 1836 to 1842^* Between he 
and his brother, William B. Rogers, the two men directed three state surveys and often 
complained to each other about the obstacles each legislature presented to their work. Henry 
considered the Permsylvania state legislature a “tribunal to which I have to bow” for money 
and complained about one senator who refused to vote for a bill funding the survey because 
it unfairly neglected other sciences, making ‘“no provision for phrenology, animal 
magnetism, and the highly important science of water-smelling...'’"'^  ^The senator’s statement 
made clear that determining what constituted “practical” knowledge presented a very 
politically-charged debate neither geologists nor legislators could easily resolve.^^ The kind 
of science mattered as much as the cost involved. A political fight to fund fringe sciences 
such as animal magnetism and water-smelling at the expense of geology revealed that the 
senator held an entirely different conception of “practical” knowledge than Rogers. If 
legislators mirrored the views of their constituents, the senator’s position revealed that the 
public and its representatives conceived of science and its utility very differently than
Ibid., 368.
Rogers was reinstated as director in 1851.
^  Henry D. Rogers to William B. Rogers, May 1,1841, Zi/c and Letters o f William 
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geologists.
Unlike James Hall, Henry Rogers understood that the public and politicians wanted 
state geologists to produce results, but this pressure presented no problem because he 
considered pure and applied science compatible and mutually reinforcing. Rogers 
recognized that in the discipline of geology, “whose aims are eminently practical, it 
frequently happens that useful results connected with the arts are involved in the higher 
generalizations of the science...” '^* To ensure that the legislature and its constituents 
remained content, he published annual reports which recounted the survey’s activities and 
documented its progress.^^ He also included glossaries with geological terms in many of 
these reports, a common tactic by state geologists to avoid alienating the public with arcane 
scientific terms.^® He targeted a different constituency, however, with his three-volume 
Final Report which addressed the scientific community and discussed more theoretical 
matters. Rogers and other notable geologists such as David Dale Owen and Edward 
Hitchcock proved adept at highlighting both the practical and theoretical results of their work 
because they recognized that no clear distinction existed between pure and applied science.^’
As an assistant to Rogers on the first geological survey, Lesley learned perhaps too 
well that in order to prosper a state geologist must emphasize the practical application of a
^  H.D. Rogers, First Annual Report o f the State Geologist, (Harrisburg: Emanuel 
Guyer, 1836), 22; Quoted in Anne Millbrooke, “Henry Darwin Rogers and the First State 
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survey’s work. If James Hall presented an example of a scientist who subordinated the 
practical application of his work to its theoretical relevance, Lesley fell at the other end of 
the spectrum because he strived to produce practical information devoid of theoretical 
statements and speculation. Even though Rogers understood the necessity of justifying the 
survey’s existence by producing annual reports informing the legislature and public of his 
progress, he exhibited some administrative ineptitude and had to ask the legislature for 
additional funding on two occasions which delayed the Final Report for approximately 
sixteen years after the survey had disbanded. Lesley strove to avoid similar mistakes 
throughout his tenure as director of the Second Pennsylvania Geological Survey. Whereas 
Rogers waited to publish a definitive final report after amassing multiple drafts, maps, and 
cross-sections from his assistants, Lesley published material from individual districts or 
projects as soon as he received them.^* This approach ensured that business interests 
received helpful information as quickly as possible and offered tangible evidence of the 
survey’s work to the legislature. Rogers’ rather vague conclusions on the first survey also 
influenced Lesley to adopt an anti-theoretical orientation. Lesley determined to improve 
upon the first geological survey by reducing generalizations and theories to precise 
statements verified by direct observation in order to provide mineral prospectors with a 
systematic method for locating coal and oil.
Rogers’ Final Report provided mostly generalizations and speculations because 
inadequate funding prevented him from surveying and mapping the state in detail, and Lesley
Frederick G. Clapp, “The Occurrence of Petroleum," in A Handbook o f the 
Petroleum Industry (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1922), 376.
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committed himself to offering more concrete results devoid of uncertainty. Lesley did not 
blame Rogers for the character or quality of his work and recognized that the first survey was 
“essentially a reconnoissance” performed without “instruments of precision and under the 
greatest inconvenience.”^^  Despite these limitations, he observed that many still considered 
the Final Report a “matter of frequent remark and admiration...” ®^ The assistants Rogers 
employed worked diligently, but their “views were broad, their isolated observations 
numerous” and the lack of adequate instrumentation prevented them from accurately 
surveying their districts.^' Lesley considered it his mission to accomplish all the first survey 
had not:
The second survey is intended to supply this lack to take up their work where they 
left off; to reduce their general statements to precision; to measure, where they could 
only estimate; to define, what they could only indicate; to demonstrate what they 
could see to be true, but which they could not prove and show in all its truth.®^
He rejected outright any statement that lacked verifiable proof and considered any “general”
idea or “estimate” devoid of the rigorous standards he committed himself to upholding as
state geologist and as a scientist. Lesley felt so strongly about achieving these objectives that
he sought to ensure that “precision” and sharp definitions always prevailed over speculation,
and this approach formed the guiding principle he instituted as director and imposed upon
J.P. Lesley, ’’Early Observations of the Geology of Pennsylvania," in Historical 
Sketch o f  Geological Explorations in Pennsylvania and other States, Second Geological 
Survey of Pennsylvania. (Harrisburg, PA: Board of Commissioners for the Second 
Geological Survey, 1876), viii.
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his assistants.
The political pressure to produce practical results which Rogers encountered as 
director of the first geological survey established a context which influenced Lesley’s actions 
as director of the second geological survey. When a ten-member board of commissioners 
named Lesley director, he heard loud and clear the mandate to produce only economically 
useful information. He recalled that “when the geological survey of Pennsylvania was first 
ordered, its first business was well understood to be not scientific, but practical.”^^  Lesley 
took seriously his role to uncover information that helped coal, gas, and oil companies earn 
a profit by locating Pennsylvania’s natural resources. Distinguishing between practical 
objectives on the one hand and scientific objectives on the other, Lesley refused to allow 
theoretical science to undermine the survey’s utilitarian function. This meant that he must 
“direct the State survey almost exclusively in an economic direction, so as to make the whole 
of every appropriation bring as much fruit to the business community as possible, neglecting, 
in what systematic geologists may possibly or probably consider a shameful manner, strictly 
scientific researches.” '^* In order to make every dollar count, he specifically disavowed
Benjamin Smith Lyman, “Biographical Notice of J. Peter Lesley,” Transactions 
o f the American Institute o f  Engineers 34 (1903), 734. Lyman was Lesley’s nephew and 
worked for him on the survey. Lyman said: “The practical character of the Survey was 
always kept in view, and the constant aim was to gather knowledge that would have a useful 
bearing upon the working of coal, iron, gas and other minerals of the State. ...He not only 
aimed to have the Survey work and investigations of an entirely practical character, but to 
have the results reported in language that would be simple, clear and readily understood.” 
Ibid., 735-6.
“From the inception of the work it therefore was essential that reports be made 
each year, that these reports consist of great accumulations of facts describing the occurrence 
of ores, oils, coals and other valuable deposits in a form useful to the practical miner, and
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theoretical, or “strictly scientific,” research. Unlike other geologists, including his mentor 
Rogers, Lesley failed to realize that applied and theoretical science complemented one 
another. Whatever his peers in the scientific community might think, he felt no shame 
making clear that theoretical science played no role in the survey’s objectives: “Even when 
I have ordered long and extensive scientific researches...it has been, not in the spirit of 
transcendental science, but with the express intention to use the results directly as applied 
science to the economical demands of the State.”^^  Although Lesley’s objectives for the 
survey grew out of the political pressure to appease the legislature, they also reflected his 
personal philosophy about how to conduct science. He approached science as an either/or 
proposition, as a method of inquiry that either served practical and economic purposes or as 
a purely theoretical exercise.
In attempting to divorce applied and theoretical science, Lesley demonstrated a naive 
and unsophisticated philosophical orientation. Geologists formulated the conceptual 
foundations of their science roughly during the half century which spaimed from 1780 to 
1830.^ ® Although they used a spectrum o f methods in their investigations, most or all of 
them relied upon theories in their work as long as they could point to observable evidence
that the deduction of general laws, correlation of geological names, elaboration of geological 
structure, investigations of deposits of obscure origin and paleontological studies all must 
be deferred until the survey had been in progress for several years.” Henry M. Chance, “A 
Biographical Notice of J. Peter Lesley,” Proceedings o f the American Philosophical Society 
45(1906% 903.
George P. Merrill, The First One Hundred Years o f American Geology (New 
Have: Yale University Press, 1924), 496.
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to substantiate their claims. When geologists disagreed about methodology, they did not 
argue over whether to rely solely upon theory or fact-gathering but, rather, over the proper 
relationship between theory and facts in order to justify a hypothesis.^’ Drawing a sharp 
distinction between “speculation” on the one hand and “empirical observation” on the other 
to characterize a methodology failed to consider that the two approaches went hand-in-hand, 
like building blocks in support of an idea.^ ® Like other geologists of his time, Lesley 
employed both theory and observation in his work but exhibited difficulty seeing how the 
two complemented one another.
Lesley particularly objected to the tenuous relationship between theory and 
observation practical oil men displayed in the methods they used for locating oil. He realized 
that both geologists and practical men relied on theories to find oil and had no problem with 
theories per se, as long as “they are supported by a great multitude of harmonized facts.”^^  
According to Lesley, practical men were too theoretical. He explained that “practical men, 
so-called, are just as theoretical, and much more theoretical, than men of science.”'*® 
Geologists produced more reliable information because they “base their theories on a wide 
range of well connected facts” whereas practical men “establish theoretical prejudices upon 
the basis of a comparatively narrow circle of the facts...”'** Practical men developed theories
”  Ibid.
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that led them to oil in particular locales, but when they applied the same theories in areas 
where the geology differed they met with failure. Lesley correctly pointed out that, in many 
instances, practical men formulated theories and applied them dogmatically. Like practical 
men, however, he too struggled to establish the appropriate balance between theory and 
observation.
As much as he criticized practical men for their wild speculations, he too 
demonstrated the capacity to indulge a theoretical bent. Henry M. Chance worked for 
Lesley on the survey and witnessed that his boss often displayed a great fondness for 
theoretical science. According to Chance, Lesley was “intensely interested in abstract 
science, loving it for itself a l o n e . . . H e  witnessed Lesley “dreamily looking back through 
the ages, reconstructing mentally the conditions and forces at work, which have given us the 
earth as we now have it, and perhaps looking forward to foretell the future...”'*^ Despite such 
reveries. Chance described Lesley as “eminently practical, a man of affairs, an engineer.” 
He noticed that Lesley’s mind often shifted abruptly from the theoretical to the practical. 
Lesley contemplated geological processes that took place over thousands of years, but “in 
a moment, divorcing these poetic dreams, he became a utilitarian, a conservative mining 
engineer, accepting and weighing only those facts and agencies having direct bearing upon 
the extent, quality and value of the minerals with which as a master of the art he continually
Henry M. Chance, “A Biographical Notice of J. Peter Lesley,” v. 
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had to deal.”'^ '* Chance’s description suggests that Lesley recognized the value of both 
practical and theoretical science but that they seemed at odds within his mind. He appeared 
unable to reconcile these differing conceptions of science, and as an eminently utilitarian and 
conservative engineer he determined to prevent unsubstantiated theories from undermining 
the survey’s practical contributions.
His commitment to producing practical results led him to administer the survey on 
the basis of a policy which called for fact-gathering alone and specifically avoided larger 
questions which fell within the realm of theoretical, and therefore impractical, science. 
Lesley consciously strove to produce reports which contained only “simple descriptions of 
work done, records of facts observed, and explanations of the local geology of each district 
within the limits of what is known by geologists.”'*^ This approach left no room for 
speculation about larger ideas unless they logically followed from assistants’ observations 
while in the field.'*® He mandated that assistants collect data only while “avoiding the 
discussion of abstruse questions, which do not concern the inhabitants, and are still subjects 
of speculation among geologists.”'*’ Again, Lesley demonstrated a provincial orientation that 
pure and applied science served different purposes and could never complement one another. 
He interpreted theoretical statements by his assistants as showboating and he wanted the 
record to reflect that should any of them pose open-ended questions “they are made under
'*'* Ibid.
'*® Lesley, “Early Observations of the Geology of Pennsylvania,” xxii. 
'*® Ibid.
Ibid.
73
protest.. In his mind, publishing theories would have undermined his mandate to generate 
information that helped prospectors locate resources.
As an assistant to Rogers on the first geological survey, Lesley could not have found 
himself better paired with a mentor who understood the futility of separating pure and 
applied science but he failed to learn this lesson due, in part, to difficulties in their friendship 
and business relationship. Lesley began surveying for the first geological survey of 
Pennsylvania in 1839 and performed field work during each of the following three summers 
until the survey disbanded when a shortage of fimds caused the legislature to cease 
appropriations.'*^ The survey temporarily recommenced in 1851, but only a short time 
elapsed until Lesley realized he could no longer work with Rogers. Although the two felt 
a strong affection for one another, their friendship often suffered when they disagreed over 
business matters. Lesley viewed Rogers as more than just a boss and perhaps even 
considered him a father figure. He told Rogers that he felt “as strong an affection for you, 
as one man can for another...” *^* As early as 1851, however, relations between the two men 
began to deteriorate. Lesley’s daughter Mary speculated that her father and Rogers were 
“temperamentally antagonistic” because both possessed irritable, “extremely nervous”
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personalities, but more than personality differences effected their relationship.^' When the 
two began working together after the survey recommenced, they squabbled about the length 
of employment, salary, and other work-related matters. Lesley complained that Rogers was 
“a most uncomfortable partner in any work...,” particularly when he extended the length of 
employment without providing additional compensation.^^ When he complained about these 
matters, Rogers responded to these complaints with an earnest desire to retain the services 
of a valued assistant.
Lesley probably had legitimate gripes about the terms of employment, but most of 
his resentment resulted from his perception that Rogers took him for granted and placed the 
objectives of the survey above his struggle to establish himself within the scientific 
community. At times, Rogers sounded like an unsympathetic boss who randomly altered the 
terms of employment, informing Lesley that “a much larger part of your work demands your 
presence in the field than was at first imagined.”^^  Such whimsy did not sit well with Lesley 
who made his feelings known: “You seem to have allowed my ten years devotion to your 
wishes to induce you to forget that I have affairs of my own sometimes to attend to, which
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are not so wholly unimportant...” '^' In addition to feeling neglected, Lesley complained that 
he had “ruined my eyes” making a map, work he would not have accepted “but for your 
solicitation.”^^  Rogers took advantage of their close relationship, leading Lesley to object 
“that when I have to [do] something it must be done with business punctuality and exactness 
but when you have to do something it may be left to the loose convenience and kindly 
constructions of friendship.” ®^ The only solution in Lesley’s mind was to base their 
relationship on either business or on friendship. By December 1851, he appeared to have 
reached a breaking point, and he tried as diplomatically as possible to extricate himself from 
continued professional involvement with Rogers and to preserve amicable relations. Lesley 
spoke clearly and to the point: “...In order to save the feelings of both in future, I wish to 
repeat what I did not perhaps put before beyond all doubt—that we cannot work together 
upon this survey...”®^ As much as they argued throughout 1851, their relationship continued 
for seven more years.
When Rogers published a geological report and failed to credit his assistants ’ for their 
work, Lesley lashed out at his former boss in print and the two never spoke again. Over the 
years, he expressed resentment for Rogers for a number of issues and took every opportunity 
to make his feelings known. Lesley spent the winters of 1846 and 1847 in Boston working
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as a draftsman, duplicating a map that he had previously drawn for Rogers to reproduce in 
the survey’s final report. He grew enraged when Rogers published the map twelve years 
later and only mentioned Lesley briefly in the preface and failed to credit other assistants for 
their work.^* The following year, Lesley published a work on iron manufacturing and took 
the opportunity in his preface to attack Rogers personally, calling the “so-called” author of 
the report an “imposture,” and accusing him of failing to acknowledge the apprentices’ 
contributions on the survey. To make-up for Rogers’ neglect, he listed each member of 
the survey and their efforts. This incident initiated a serious rift between the two men which 
lasted the rest of their lives.®” According to Lesley’s daughter, Mary, the conflict was “the 
most painful episode of my father’s life.”®' Because of their disagreement, Lesley resigned 
from the survey in 1852.
As the years passed and Lesley matured, the anger he once harbored toward Rogers 
had begun to subside. When Lesley began working on the survey, he was a “young fellow 
of twenty” and felt “full of enthusiasm for his leader.”®^ This excitement waned, however, 
as Lesley entered the next phase of his life. Twenty years later, the pressure to make a name 
for himself within the scientific community compelled him to step out from his mentors’
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shadow even if doing so required a verbal attack. He had grown into “a striving man of 
nearly forty when he excitedly” lashed out at Rogers in pr int .Having established himself 
professionally seemed to have cooled the passions of youth. By the time “he had gained 
secure position and was well towards sixty,” he had matured enough to praise his former 
boss’ work.®"* In critiquing Rogers’ Final Report of the first geological survey, he observed 
that “there can be no sentiment but one of admiration for the breadth of his views, and the 
clearness, force and elegance of his delineations.”®^ It had taken twenty years, but the 
ambitious, driven young scientist had mellowed.
Lesley’s attitude had changed because his experience as director of the second 
geological survey gave him a new appreciation for the administrative responsibilities that 
accompanied the position. Lesley’s administrative style pervaded all aspects of the survey 
and developed in large part from the rift between he and Rogers.®® One historian of state 
geological surveys felt that Lesley overestimated his value as an assistant and underestimated 
Rogers’ burden as director. He described Lesley’s conflict with Rogers as “another 
illustration of the experiences of every executive who has planned, directed, and rendered 
possible the work of subordinates, only to find in the end that the value of his instrumentality
®^ Ibid.
®" Ibid.
®® Second Geological Survey of Pennsylvania, Vol. A., 1876, p. 122, 127; in Davis, 
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is quite underestimated, and all credit claimed by him to whom opportunity was given.”®’ 
Directing the survey taught Lesley very quickly how instrumental Rogers had been to the first 
survey’s functioning.
As director of the Second Pennsylvania Geological Survey, Lesley experienced 
firsthand the difficulty his former boss faced adhering to a budget when assistants demanded 
higher salaries. When I.C. White asked for more money, Lesley replied in a manner 
reminiscent of Rogers’ response to him when he had inquired about monetary issues. Lesley 
explained that his remaining fimds had “to be shared among the corps, offices, equipment, 
and expenses of all kinds.”®* At the same time, he assured White “that no one is more aware 
of the inadequacy of all new stipends than I am.”®^ Like Rogers, Lesley faced the difficulty 
of maintaining a staff large enough to perform the necessary work and finding the money to 
pay them. He could not offer White an increase because “this year the survey is overloaded” 
and he doubted whether his funds would hold out until the end of the year.™ Rather than lose 
an employee, however, he struck a compromise and paid White an extra $25 after stumbling 
upon some “unexpected savings.”’' As director, Lesley acquired a new appreciation for 
stretching the budget. The burdens of administering the survey also influenced his
®’ Laudan, From Mineralogy to Geology, 343.
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philosophy in dealing with assistants.
The falling-out with Rogers taught him to exhibit patience toward the assistants he 
employed, but the open and flexible interpersonal style Lesley possessed prior to accepting 
the directorship of the Second Pennsylvania Geological Survey did not last long. Nine years 
before Lesley accepted the position as director, he gave advice to his nephew, Benjamin 
Lyman, who also directed a geological survey, about how to deal with subordinates. Lesley 
encouraged Lyman to display understanding and cooperation. After years of working on 
geological surveys, Lesley had supervised “a number of men young and old” and had learned 
“to exercise a great deal of patience.”’  ^ A director and his assistants, Lesley advised, “must 
make the best of each other,“ and he urged Lyman to consider that “there is more good in 
every young fellow than appears at first... Lesley could not claim perfection, however, and 
conceded that “many a harsh word I have said which I was sorry for” and that he had at times 
behaved in an “imjust and despotic” manner.’"' He qualified this behavior, though, claiming 
that altruism and not selfishness motivated his despotism, for his “chief desire was to 
advance their interests and consult their comfort rather than my own...”’  ^ The conflict with 
Rogers proved so pivotal an event in his life it tempered his anger in dealing with assistants. 
The relationship could never be an easy one, but as long as subordinates recognized that the
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director possessed a “warm and generous heart, you will find your intercourse with your 
assistants, not always satisfactory, but at all events not intolerable.” ®^ He had learned that 
the demands of directing a survey pushed even the most cool-headed director to the brink of 
frustration.
Lesley’s patience grew so short when assistants violated his injunction against 
making theoretical statements in their reports that he limited their freedom to reach 
independent conclusions. As with Lesley’s administrative style, his scientific methodology 
also pervaded the second geological survey and grew out of his rift with Rogers.”  In 
addition to feeling angry toward Rogers because of his failure to credit assistants for their 
contributions, Lesley also resented his unwillingness to grant them independence in their 
work.’* As a result, he vowed to take a different approach.”  As early as 1856, he insisted 
that “no primary report should receive the touch of any hand but that of the first observer.”*® 
The demands of producing timely and accurate results prevented him from practicing what 
he preached. Rather than granting his assistants the freedom to reach independent
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conclusions after conducting field work, he constantly edited their reports to eliminate 
statements he considered too speculative or theoretical.
Although Lesley’s practice of eliminating theoretical statements from assistants’ 
reports occurred, in part, as a by-product of the demands placed upon him to produce 
accurate information quickly, his excessive editing more accurately reflected a compulsive 
tendency to micro-manage the survey’s findings. Lesley felt committed to the policy of 
“publishing results as fast as obtained” in order to appease the board of commissioners who 
appointed him, and he agreed that “there can be no question about the propriety of this 
policy.”*’ The most pragmatic method of dealing with the demands he faced would have 
been to place more trust in the conclusions his assistants reached or to trust that their training 
qualified them to meet the survey’s objectives. Instead, he interpreted the policy as 
necessarily imposing upon him “unceasing labor as an editor, every day of the entire year. 
Every sentence of every report must be revised...”*^ Lesley failed to discuss opposing points 
of view with assistants or to reconcile disagreements before simply eliminating their 
conclusions on the basis that they sounded too theoretical.** In Lesley’s defense, many of his 
assistants lacked field experience and this understandably increased his caution, but his 
temperament also prevented him from relinquishing control over the survey’s published 
reports. He exercised so much control over his assistants’ reports that they grew to resent
*’ Lesley, “Early Observations of the Geology of Permsylvania,” xx.
*2 Ibid.
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any changes he made.
As director of the survey, Lesley scrutinized the work of young men he hired so 
closely that they exhibited the same impetuous attitude toward him he had displayed toward 
Rogers approximately twenty years earlier. One of his assistants, John J. Stevenson, 
acknowledged that only three or four of the men who worked for Lesley had any field work 
experience. While their inexperience legitimately necessitated careful review their work, he 
suggested that Lesley often criticized them in an overbearing manner. Lesley could “never 
forget...that his assistants were inexperienced, and his constant anxiety was to prevent that 
lack of experience from doing injury either to them or to the state.”*'* Whether altruistic or 
not, his feedback seemed picayune and aroused confusion among many of his assistants. 
Stevenson remembered that “the time of proofreading was often a time of perplexity to 
authors of reports, who frequently discovered parenthetical comments or argumentative foot­
notes which were not in every case edifying.”*^ When Lesley detected an error or even a 
statement with which he disagreed, he “relieved himself in a communication which was a 
model of terseness and clearness” and “his criticisms were none too mild.”*^  Assistants 
usually responded in kind and these disagreements endured only briefly, but Lesley walked 
a fine line between providing feedback and censoring his assistants’ ideas.
Assistants who addressed the scientific community in their reports rather than the
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narrow economic interests of the Permsylvania taxpayers also caused Lesley to censor their 
findings. In one instance, Lesley chastised White for taking too long to produce a report on 
Crawford and Erie counties, but his irritation stemmed from more than just tardiness. Lesley 
expressed armoyance with White for discussing issues which appeared to concern only the 
scientific community rather than the Permsylvania taxpayers. In addition to objecting to 
White’s delay, Lesley reminded him that “the treatment of general geological subjects is not 
called for. I care nothing at all about the ‘geologists of the country.’”*’ Ever mindful of the 
need to prove the Survey’s practical orientation, Lesley admonished him that they published 
reports “not at all for the geologists of the country, but for the citizens of the counties and the 
state, who pay for the Survey.” Not only did he struggle to maintian equilibrium between 
pure and applied science, but he mistrusted his assistants’ abilities to formulate accurate 
theories based upon what they observed in the field. In short, he questioned the relationships 
they established between theory and observation.
If assistants failed to eliminate statements which sounded too theoretical, Lesley 
simply rewrote their reports. He spent much of his time trying to prevent one assistant in 
particular, I.C. White, from making theoretical statements. He chastised White on many 
occasions for using language that sounded too speculative and re-wrote large sections of his 
reports. In one case, he rewrote eighty-two pages of what White had written, “condensing 
it and making it easily readable.”** Lesley experienced difficulty deciding whether he
*’ J.P. Lesley to I.C. White, August 11, 1879, J. P. Lesley Collection, American 
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objected most to White’s writing style or the content of his reports. He commented that 
White’s “style is so verbose and inverted that I will not accept it. He makes assertions and 
generalizations which I will not allow.”*’ Lesley’s criticism suggests that as an editor he 
elided matters of style and content. Rather than identifying a particular issue and presenting 
an opposing point of view, he objected to the verbose style because he could not trust that 
White sufficiently based his “assertions and generalizations” upon observations while in the 
field. Unwilling to place too much trust in White’s judgment, he chose to rewrite the report.
While Lesley understandably felt obligated to review what his assistants wrote and 
even to influence the results of their work, he constrained their conclusions by imposing 
upon them his overly rigid commitment to practical science. In some cases Lesley refused 
to publish the results of an assistant’s work he deemed too theoretical. When I.C. White 
proposed researching a particular geological question, Lesley disapprovingly stated that 
“your plan of Lake Shore work won’t do.””  He lacked confidence in White’s ability to 
handle too theoretical an issue, and told him that he “can’t risk having you slash away” at the 
question because “it is a fearfully big thing.”’' Time constraints militated against the work 
as well. Answering the question involved so much effort that “three or four weeks work 
won’t settle it.”’  ^ Behind his objections to White’s qualifications and the time involved lay
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Lesley’s personal bias against expending effort “merely for a theoretical (scientific) question 
of nomenclature of no importance w h a t e v e r . H e  refused to consider that time spent 
answering a theoretical issue could have produced any practical benefit. Should White have 
decided to shirk his boss’ admonition, Lesley warned that “I shall not publish anything you 
write upon it if you discuss it in large in your report.” '^* Even the most innovative theoretical 
statements faced a small chance of finding their way to print because Lesley would have 
eliminated them.
On occasion Lesley published some statements even though he considered them too 
speculative, but he made sure to present them as the assistant’s views and not those of the 
survey. Lesley demanded such an unrealistic standard of proof to verify every statement 
published it is no wonder he so frequently objected to what his assistants wrote. In one 
instance, he initially told White that he would “not permit a confident expression of a general 
character to go into type, where I know of current doubts.”’  ^ Anything less than absolute 
certainty from his assistants failed to pass muster. Because White could not support his 
statements with “ample and indisputable” evidence, Lesley refused to present them as 
“absolute authority.”®® Rather than eliminate White’s statements entirely, however, Lesley 
conceded to changing “your general assertion into a personal assertion, and let the statement
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go on your authority alone.” ’^ Field work could not always produce “indisputable” evidence 
or “absolute authority” to explain geological processes taking place underground, but this is 
the standard Lesley demanded.
Even when Lesley praised White, he could not resist the urge to remind him that good 
work resulted only from firsthand observations garnered through careful geological field 
work and not from speculation. White had “done nobly” to identify a relationship between 
“the Ohio rocks and our oil belt,” but Lesley harangued that this good work “has been done 
by sticking to your county work, and doing it minutely and locally.”®* Only by gathering 
facts in a slow and prodding manner could geologists construct theories because field work 
provided the only method for making a discovery, a point Lesley wanted to reinforce: “So 
are made all our advances in science.”®® He had always questioned the relationship his 
assistants established between theory and observation but in this case he approved. 
Nevertheless, he still felt compelled to remind White that “prediction and speculation on 
insuffic[ient] data have been and still are the curses of our science, and when you are 60 
years old as I am next month you will feel this keenly.”'®® Lesley’s desire for sufficient data 
to support a theory constituted a perfectly reasonable standard, but field work did not always 
reveal the evidence scientists needed to answer complex questions or to verify their theories.
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Lesley interpreted so many of his assistants’ statements as too theoretical because his 
overly-rigid commitment to a methodology that emphasized fact-gathering to the exclusion 
of theorizing required him to observe every geological phenomenon firsthand before he could 
endorse it. According to one of his assistants, Lesley displayed an entirely open mind in 
writing his Final Report for the Second Geological Survey. He tackled controversial issues 
head-on, made “no attempt to evade anything, no inclination to undervalue the work of those 
disagreeing with him.”*°* The same assistant qualified this statement to a significant degree. 
While the geological phenomena assistants observed “receive full discussion,” Lesley 
considered them only “from the standpoints of his broad reading and his ovm field work.”'®^ 
To the end, he remained suspicious of the relationships his assistants established between 
theory and observation and evaluated their ideas not upon the weight of their own merit but 
upon his reading and upon his field work.
Lesley’s unwillingness to endorse the existence of any geological phenomenon he had 
not observed with his own eyes presented the biggest obstacle to his acceptance of the 
anticlinal theory. By the early eighteenth century, geologists had recognized that surface 
geological features resulted from subterranean processes.**’^  Throughout the eighteenth 
century, geologists accepted laboratory experimentation as a legitimate method of 
overcoming their inability to observe these processes at work.*®'* From the late-eighteenth
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century on, however, some geologists began to argue that laboratory experiments failed to 
replicate adequately conditions in the natural world and often produced serious 
misconceptions about processes they hoped to understand.’”^  Lesley’s refusal to endorse the 
anticlinal theory was influenced by his unwillingness to accept the legitimacy of laboratory 
experiments which reproduced the geological processes occurring beneath anticlines.
Although geologists who believed oil accumulated beneath anticlines showed that 
gravity stratified gas, water, and oil into different layers within a bottle, Lesley refused to 
accept the experiment’s legitimacy because he contended that the phenomenon operated 
differently within the earth. Lesley accepted that gravity separated gas, oil, and water 
according to their weights, but he refused to believe this phenomenon occurred beneath 
anticlines.’”” He argued that “if the application of this theory was confined to bottles no one 
would dispute it...but the earth is not a bottle.”’”’ A laboratory experiment could never 
replicate the conditions within the earth. The experiment lacked validity because, unlike the 
space inside a bottle, the earth “has no great caverns in it.”’”* In addition, in a laboratory “the 
arrangement takes place naturally under the pressure of only one atmosphere; while any 
arrangement of water, gas, and oil made at depths of a thousand or two thousand feet, must
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be made under pressures of from 100 to 400 pounds to the square inch.”"’^  Because of 
underground pressure, Lesley believed that “the water, oil, and gas at great depths, if they 
could exist at all, would remain practically mixed like the carbonic-acid in a soda-water 
fountain.”'*® The earth did not resemble a bottle, but Lesley was wrong and his refusal to 
accept gravitational stratification beneath anticlines constituted his chief reason for 
dismissing the anticlinal theory’s utility for finding oil.
His refusal to extrapolate conclusions about processes within the earth from a 
laboratory experiment placed him among mainstream European and American scientists, but 
the fault in his methodology lay in his overly insistent demand for a direct cause and effect 
relationship. No single methodology offered geologists a foolproof approach to 
understanding how the earth worked."' Since early in the eighteenth century most 
acknowledged that their inability to observe subterranean processes which produced 
geological phenomena at the surface limited what they could legitimately claim. To 
overcome these limitations, all geologists accepted that any methodology must consist of 
both theory and fact-gathering."^ Each faced the challenge, then, of how best to establish
109 Ibid.
"® Lesley, “The Geology of the Pittsburgh Coal Region,” 655; DeGolyer stated that 
“this was an error in which he persisted throughout his professional life...” Notes on J. P. 
Lesley, Box 8; File 1038, Everette DeGolyer Collection, DeGolyer Library, Southern 
Methodist University.
'"  Laudan, From Mineralogy to Geology, 8.
"2 Ibid.
Ibid.
90
a relationship between these two activities, not of choosing between them. All too often, 
Lesley dismissed theoretical statements outright in an effort to present facts alone. His 
tendency to mistrust his assistants’ observations coupled with his insistence that they produce 
verifiable proof of even the smallest claims in their reports limited the utility of the survey 
for the Pennsylvania taxpayers Lesley so dutifully sought to serve.
For all his commitment to generating practical information, the Second Pennsylvania 
Geological Survey failed to produce a reliable method for locating oil. Lesley so cautiously 
guarded against speculative statements by his assistants that he issued an injunction that they 
refrain from theorizing and, in doing so, single-handedly suppressed the anticlinal theory. ‘ 
Many of the geologists who worked for Lesley recognized the existence of anticlinal 
structures in various fields throughout Pennsylvania but carefully avoided investigating them 
too zealously."^ Knowing that their boss edited every word they wrote and that he 
disavowed the anticlinal theory, most assistants refrained from making any statement which 
supported it. They knew that even if they had referred to the theory, Lesley would have 
eliminated it.*^ ® One assistant, John F. Carll, had acknowledged the significance of the 
theory in a trade journal as early as 1876 but avoided it in his official reports for the
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survey.**^
It would be unfair to contend that Lesley single-handedly delayed the oil industry’s 
adoption of the anticlinal theory without also noting that he reached his position after 
correctly observing that anticlines in eastern Pennsylvania did not contain oil. Indeed, not 
all anticlines contained oil but by extrapolating from his observations in this one locale a 
theory he applied to all regions Lesley committed the error he constantly warned his 
assistants to avoid-speculating on the basis of insufficient evidence. To the end, he insisted 
that scientists formulate theories only after observing them firsthand, but he demanded an 
unrealistic standard of proof that, in the end, even he could not achieve. Even veteran 
scientists make mistakes, but Lesley’s error resulted from personality quirks which prevented 
him from accepting the intuitive and often indefinable dialectic between practical and 
theoretical science.
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Chapter 3:
“When Oil Moved West:
Geologists, Practical Men, and the Search for Structure on the Southern Plains”
Roswell Johnson set-up shop as a petroleum geologist in the northeast corner of 
Oklahoma in 1908 and began advertising his services as an independent consultant. After 
arriving in the small town of Bartlesville, he began dutifidly running ads and occasionally 
even published articles in the pages of the petroleum industry bible, the Oil and Gas 
Journal, as part of a campaign to convince oil men of the practical advantages his 
services could provide.' Prospectors had been pouring into the Midcontinent region from 
the Appalachian oil fields, and Johnson perceived an untapped market for his consulting 
skills if  only he could demonstrate that geology offered a better prospecting method than 
the belt-line theory. He explained that even though practical men had successfully found 
oil in Pennsylvania by drilling along lines that ran at forty-five degree angles, “many 
operators had accordingly come to believe that there was some mystic power in this 
particular direction” and that they could find oil in Oklahoma by applying the theory.^ 
When this approach failed to produce oil in the Midcontinent fields, “those mystically 
inclined” adopted a new faith that drilling along a line of twenty-two and a half degrees
' Roswell H. Johnson to James A. Veasey, February 24, 1941, “Belt-line theory,” 
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would yield o il/ Johnson contended that geology and particularly the anticlinal theory 
offered a better prospecting tool than the belt-line theory. Although his advertisement sat 
prominently on the comer of the same page where his article appeared, he had attracted so 
few clients by 1912 that he accepted a position teaching geology at the University of 
Pittsburgh and quit the oil business.
Sensing that he championed a losing cause, Johnson left Oklahoma but his timing 
could not have been worse because within a year after his departure the oil industry began 
seeking geologists’ advice on an unprecedented scale. Some practical oil men accepted 
petroleum geology earlier than others, but 1913 proved a pivotal year in the history of the 
oil industry because many who had resisted geology began to take it more seriously.'^ It 
was during this year that geologists mapped an anticline in Cushing, Oklahoma and 
demonstrated with a visual representation that they could find oil by applying geological 
principles. Because geologists could never say with absolute certainty whether drilling in 
a particular place would strike oil, their techniques seemed like practical men’s educated 
guesses. Unlike practical men, however, geologists had more specific information about 
the physical conditions beneath the surface of the earth which they used to create a visual 
image of the strata, thereby eliminating much of the guesswork involved.
 ^Ibid.
'' One of the most reliable sources for the history of Oklahoma petroleum geology 
dates the year of acceptance at 1913. Sidney Powers, “Petroleum Geology in Oklahoma,” 
Oil and Gas in Oklahoma, Oklahoma Geological Survey Bulletin 40, vol. 1 (Norman: 
Oklahoma Geological Survey, 1928), 5; DeGolyer also sees 1913 as a pivotal year to 
date geology’s acceptance by the industry. See Everette DeGolyer, The Development o f 
the Art o f  Prospecting (Princeton: The Guild of Brackett Lecturers, 1940), 28.
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As pivotal as the mapping of the Cushing anticline was to petroleum geology’s 
acceptance, to suggest that the oil industry suddenly embraced a more “scientific” 
approach greatly understates and misrepresents practical men’s contributions to the 
knowledge necessary for finding oil. Many practical men still resisted geology even after 
production began at Cushing because they continued to find oil with traditional methods 
such as the belt-line theory. Their knowledge represented a stochastic mode of reasoning 
better characterized as experienced intuition rather than haphazard guessing uninformed 
by scientific principles.^ Most felt no need to adopt geology because they had long 
crafted novel solutions to solve practical problems amidst daunting uncertainties the 
search for oil presented.^ Geologists strove to reduce the level of uncertainty by gleaning 
important data firom practical men’s drilling logs and using it to formulate “geological” 
theories about where to find oil. Although maps of the Cushing field proved pivotal in 
convincing many within the industry of geology’s utility, no clear line demarcated the 
traditional, pre-scientific knowledge prospectors used to find oil from the geological 
principles the industry began to adopt in 1913 and which eventually revolutionized the 
search for oil.
The knowledge which guided oil prospecting in the Midcontinent region during 
the early-twentieth century grew out of a context with roots further to the east as the oil 
industry had been migrating westward since approximately 1890. The modern oil 
industry began in Pennsylvania when Captain Drake drilled the first commercial well in
 ^James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998) 326-7.
 ^Ibid., 327.
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1859. Pennsylvania led United States oil production every year after Drake’s vyell until 
1895 when Ohio produced approximately one million barrels more for the year. Ohio’s 
production climbed steadily throughout the 1880s and 1890s, as did West Virginia and 
New York’s.  ^ Production continued moving west, as Illinois’ production climbed 
steadily from 1898 to 1908.* At the turn of the century, Ohio topped all states at just over 
twenty-two million barrels. About this time, though, the total annual yield in states east 
of the Mississippi River began to decline. As production decreased in the Appalachian 
and upper Midwestern regions, it accelerated in states further to the west.
For at least the first two decades of the twentieth century either California or 
Oklahoma headed the list of the nation’s top oil-producing states. The best indication 
that the industry had shifted to the west was California’s ranking as the top oil-producing 
state in 1903. California out-produced all other states until 1921 except for two periods 
when it placed second to Oklahoma, from 1907-1908 and 1914-1918.^ Despite 
California’s annual ranking as the top oil-producing state for much of the early-twentieth 
century, no state exceeded Oklahoma’s cumulative production for the period 1903 to
David T. Day, A Handbook o f the Petroleum Industry, 2 vols. (New York: John 
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1922), 332-333. New York’s production actually began to decline 
in 1907, but its output was so small as to be negligible by comparison. For statistics on oil 
production, also see Derrick's Hand-Book o f  Petroleum. A Complete Chronological and 
Statistical Review o f  Petroleum Developments during 1859 to 1898, vol. 2 (Oil City, 
Pennsylvania: Derrick Publishing Company, 1898), 35-6.
* Day, Handbook o f the Petroleum Industry, 344.
’ Ibid., 342; Derrick's Hand-Book o f Petroleum, 35-6. Although the number for 
total production in each state varies somewhat between these two sources, they basically 
tell the same story.
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1922/° States comprising the Midcontinent region produced 240 million barrels by 1920 
whereas California produced only 95 million/* Oil men defined the Midcontinent region 
as Kansas, Oklahoma, north and central Texas, and small portions of New Mexico, 
Arkansas, and Louisiana. As a region, the Midcontinent out-produced California by 
nearly 150 percent.*^
Throughout the early 1900s, geologists played little or no role in the large volume 
of oil produced in the states of Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. In 1891, Kansas and 
Oklahoma produced only 1000 barrels of oil but by 1910 they put-out 53 million barrels 
annually.*^ Oklahoma out-produced all other states in 1907 and 1908 and supplied 
twenty-five percent of the nation’s total output from 1907 to 1910, but geologists 
discovered none of this oil.*'* Practical men who ignored geology bore responsibility for 
most of the oil discoveries throughout the Midcontinent region and ignored the advice of 
geological “experts.” In California, however, the oil industry embraced geologists.
California prospectors adopted petroleum geology before oil men working in any
*° Ralph Arnold, “Two Decades of Petroleum Geology, 1903-1922,” American 
Association o f Petroleum Geologists Bulletin 8 (November-December 1923), 605.
**Day, Handbook o f  the Oil Industry, 327.
*^ For some great description of the oil industry in Oklahoma from 1905-1929, see 
Samuel Tait, The Wildcatters: An Informal History o f Oil Hunting in America (Princeton; 
Princeton University Press, 1946), 129.
*^ Edgar Wesley Owen, Trek o f the Oil Finders: A History o f  Exploration for 
Petroleum (Tulsa: American Association of Petroleum Geologists, 1975), 230.
*" Ibid.
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other region of the country.*^ Approximately forty professional geologists and geological 
engineers worked in the California oil industry between 1900 and 1911, a figure probably 
not exceeded by the total number of petroleum geologists working in the rest of the nation 
at that time.'® Petroleum geology met with acceptance in California for several reasons. 
Stanford University and the University of California had long trained students to work in 
the mining industry, and the skills graduates acquired in reconnaissance, subsurface 
investigation, and evaluating untested prospects adapted easily to the oil business and 
provided companies with a plentiful source of geologists and engineers to employ.'’ 
Technical expertise originally intended for the mining industry lent itself to petroleum 
development, but the greatest reason for the early adoption of petroleum geology 
stemmed from the land itself.
Anticlines appeared so prominently on the California landscape that they caught 
the attention of geologists who encouraged oil men to begin drilling at these sites.'® 
Geologists frequently noted the prominent appearance of anticlines in California. They 
more easily observed these geological structures there because “in the eastern states the 
slopes of the domes frequently do not exceed 20 feet to a mile, whereas in California the
Ibid., 161.
'® Ibid., 188.
'’ Ibid., 188; Jesse. V. Howell, “History of Petroleum Geology,” pp. 3-4, Box 16, 
Edgar Owen Collection, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming. (Hereafter 
cited as Owen Collection)
'® Owen, Trek o f  the Oil Finders, 188.
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strata stand at a very steep angle with the horizon, frequently being overturned.”'® Even 
with this recognition, however, California practical operators resisted geological advice 
prior to 1900.^° One geologist recalled that he and his colleagues knew about “several of 
the more obvious of the California structures...for a number of years before any attempt 
was made to develop them.” *^ Geologists continued to suggest drilling near anticlines, 
but “sometimes these recommendations were followed and sometimes they were not.”^^  
The initial reluctance did not last long, however, as the presence of numerous anticlines 
dotting the landscape led some oil men as well as larger companies to take an interest in 
g eo logy .T he  Union Oil Company of California organized a geological department in 
1899 and the Kem Trading and Oil Company followed suit in 1903. '^* California’s 
topography played a role in the early acceptance of petroleum geology because the state’s 
scientists posessed a unique relationship with the environment which had originated in 
the nineteenth century.
The unique qualities of California’s natural environment and the state’s isolation 
from scientific intelligentsia on the east coast conjoined to fashion a distinct social
A.S. Cooper, “The Genesis of Petroleum and Asphaltum in California,” Mining 
and Scientific Press 78/8 (February 25,1899), 205.
^  Robert B. Moran, “The Role of the Geologist in the Development of the 
California Oil Fields,” American Association of Petroleum Geologists Bulletin 8 
(January-February 1924), 77-78; Tait, The Wildcatters, 115.
Moran, “The Role of the Geologist,” 77.
^  Ibid., 78.
Owen, Trek o f  the Oil Finders, 188.
Moran, “The Role of the Geologist,” 73-4.
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climate for the state’s scientists throughout the nineteenth centuryCali forn ia’s 
scientific community began to take shape when geologists, surveyors, botanists, and 
naturalists arrived during the gold rush of 1849.^  ^ A unique subculture soon emerged as 
the state’s geology and vegetation inspired scientists to appreciate the natural world for its 
aesthetic rather than utilitarian attributes/^ Instead of viewing nature with detached 
objectivity, California scientists perceived the natural world holisitically and themselves 
as integral parts of it. The environment figured prominently in their view of science, of 
themselves as scientists, and of society itself.^* The oil industry may have been more 
inclined to embrace geology in California because scientists showed by example how 
fashioning intimate ties to the environment held practical applications. Whatever the 
case, environment influenced the adoption of petroleum geology in California while oil 
prospectors in other parts of the country continued to resist it.
Although practical men experienced significant success with the prospecting 
methods they had crafted at the oil industry’s inception, production eventually began to 
taper off east of the Mississippi River and they headed for the Midcontinent states of 
Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. In the 1890s and early 1900s, oil men from Pennsylvania,
^  Michael L. Smith, Pacific Visions: California Scientists and the Environment, 
1850-1915 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987)
Smith, Pacific Visions, 2.
Their aesthetic appreciation for nature began to diminish by the second decade 
of the twentieth century, at which time California’s scientific community followed the 
pattern evident in the rest of the country by adopting a managerial ethos which 
emphasized the conservation of natural resources. See chapter eight in Smith.
Smith, Pacific Visions, 4.
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West Virginia, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois transplanted themselves onto the Southern 
Plains in significant numbers.^^ The population influx rapidly transformed the small 
town of Bartlesville, Oklahoma into the oil industry’s unofficial capitol just a short time 
after Roswell Johnson left for the University of Pittsburgh/" James Yeasey, a lawyer 
who specialized in oil and gas leases, remembered “that town was literally flooded with 
old-time producers who had operated in all of the eastern fields.” '^ He recalled that “the 
older operators from the east were flocking there in droves,” men steeped in oil-held 
practices which had originated in Pennsylvania’s most famous oil sites, places such as 
Pithole, Pleasantville, Butler and Clarion counties, and the Bradford and McDonald 
fields/^ Some of the prospectors who migrated to the Midcontinent region had been 
drilling along the prolific Oil Creek in Pennsylvania as early as the 1860s. J. S. Sidwell 
began working for the South Penn Oil Company in Pennsylvania beginning in 1896 and 
followed the industry westward, working in West Virginia, Ohio, and Kentucky before 
settling in Oklahoma in 1916.^  ^ Veasey listed several of the men by name and “could
29 Tait, The Wildcatters, 127.
The Bartlesville discovery well was drilled in 1897. For a full account, see C.
B. Glasscock, Then Came Oil: The Story o f the Last Frontier (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 
1938).
James A. Veasey to Alf M. Tandon, June 12,1941, Belt-Line Theory, Box 23, 
Veasey Collection
James A. Veasey to George Otis Smith, October 24, 1941, Belt-Line Theory, 
Box 23, Veasey Collection
J. S. Sidwell to James A. Veasey, July 14,1941. Belt-Line Theory, Box 23, 
Veasey Collection
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mention at least 100 others.” '^* Oil men who “were of the same class” as those moving to 
Bartlesville also settled in eastern Kansas.^^ As men like Sidwell migrated to the 
Midcontinent region, they carried their prospecting methods with them.
While oil men in California embraced petroleum geology, prospectors who moved 
into the Midcontinent region continued to rely on traditions and practices for finding oil 
they had cultivated since the industry began. Despite I. C. White’s 1883 demonstration of 
the anticlinal theory in West Virginia and his articulation of it in print in 1885, practical 
oil men continued prospecting on the basis of the belt-line theory or trendology as they 
moved into Kansas and Oklahoma. Veasey’s work in oil and gas leases brought him into 
contact with many prospectors, and he remembered “very definitely” that “operators who 
came there represented every old field in the east, and they brought with them their settled 
notions regarding oil and gas occurrences.”^^  In describing practical men’s “settled 
notions,” Veasey recalled that “they would have no part of geology, but on the contrary 
were still taking leases and drilling their properties under the old belt-line or trend theory, 
that is, northeast or southwest production.” ’^ Alf Landon began working in the oil 
business in 1912 and never made a decision to lease or drill by making “any reference to
James A. Veasey to George Otis Smith, October 24,1941, Belt-Line Theory, 
Box 23, Veasey Collection
J. S. Sidwell to James A. Veasey, July 14, 1941, Belt-Line Theory, Box 23, 
Veasey Collection
^  James A. Veasey to W. E. Wrather, June 26, 1941, Belt-Line Theory, Box 23, 
Veasey Collection
”  Ibid.; Veasey explained to Alf M. Landon that oil men who came from the east 
“brought the belt-line theory with them.” Veasey to Landon, June 12,1941.
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the guidance of geologists.” *^ Other oil men who worked alongside Landon shared this 
experience, as he recalled that “the operators in the field with which I was connected were 
not at that time following the guidance of geologists in their leasing and drilling 
activities.” ’^ Instead of geology, “the old trend theory of northeast-southwest” guided 
exploration “and the theory had considerable following for many years.”'*” Writing in 
1941, Landon contended that “its psychological effect is still in evidence in selling 
acreage in a block around a wildcat drilling well.”'” Practical men continued prospecting 
with the belt-line theory because it produced results, but their contempt for geologists 
also reinforced their loyalty to traditional prospecting methods.
As practical men carried their theories for finding oil westward, so followed their 
contempt for geologists.'*^ Everette DeGolyer recalled that geologists’ “intrusion into the 
industry was generally resented, often with intense bitterness” by practical oil men.'** 
Writing in 1923, one petroleum geologist recalled that “twenty years ago a geologist was 
just as welcome in a drilling rig as a ‘hornet at a garden party.’ The oil men were 
prejudiced against us.”'*'* The speaker understood their animosity, however, because he
** Landon to Veasey, June 18, 1941, Belt-Line Theory, Box 23, Veasey 
Collection.
Ibid.
'*” Ibid.
'*' Ibid.
'*^ Owen, Trek o f the Oil Finders, 293.
'** DeGolyer, The Development o f  the Art o f Prospecting, 27.
'*'* Ralph Arnold, “Two Decades of Petroleum Geology, \903-\922,” American 
Association o f  Petroleum Geologists Bulletin 8 (November-December 1923), 613.
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recognized that many practical men had experienced the sting of fraud perpetrated by 
some creekologists who claimed to possess supernatural powers or unique gifts for 
locating oil. The possibility that oil men suffered financial loss after investing in one of 
the many fraudulent schemes prompted him to ask, “When one sizes up some of the 
freaks and impostors who have posed as geologists, can we blame the oil men?”"*^ As the 
twentieth century dawned, geologists faced a credibility problem. Practical men who had 
successfully found oil had maintained confidence in their approach and had no reason to 
consider geology as an alternative, especially since many had been burned by confidence 
men hawking the next sure-fire method for finding oil.
Tom Slick offers an excellent example of a Pennsylvania practical oil man who 
followed the industry westward to Oklahoma and like his contemporaries disavowed 
geology in favor of methods he had crafted. After finishing high school. Slick began 
working for his father who owned drilling rigs in various Pennsylvania fields.'*  ^ Slick 
suggested that his birth in the heart of oil country and to a father who worked as a driller 
instilled within him an innate, sensory relationship to oil: “I came west from Clarion, Pa., 
where I was bom among the oil derricks. The first sniff of air I ever breathed into my 
nostrils was laden with the odor of oil.""^ One early historian of the oil industry seemed 
to accept Slick’s suggestion that he possessed an extra-sensory power and could literally
45 Ibid.
Ray Miles, "King o f the Wildcatters": The Life and Times o f Tom Slick, 
1883-1930 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1996 ), 15-16.
Kansas City Star, May 5,1929; Glasscock, Then Came Oil, 218.
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smell oil as deep as two thousand feet below the surface.''* Like a bee drawn to a flower, 
“the smell of oil sands was perfume to his nostrils” and this allegedly innate gift 
explained Slick’s success.'*® By 1903 production in Pennsylvania and other fields east of 
the Mississippi River began to decline, and Slick, his brother, and their father migrated to 
Chanute, Kansas. Like others who headed west in search of oil, the Slick family carried 
their non-scientific methods of finding oil with them to the Midcontinent region. While 
prospecting in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas, Tom occasionally scoffed at geologists 
who claimed that they could find oil with science, but he could not ignore geologists 
forever.*®
For the first two decades of the twentieth century, petroleum geologists and their 
ideas for finding oil gradually gained more credibility in the eyes of some practical men. 
Even Slick eventually proved more willing to listen to geologists’ advice, but he never 
invested more authority in their opinions than in his own judgment. He occasionally 
hired geologists as consultants but ignored their advice when it contradicted his own 
personal hunches.** For example, in 1922 he hired three geologists to survey a tract of 
land on Laura Endicott’s farm in Oklahoma’s Kay and Noble counties before investing 
the money to drill a well.*  ^ Even though none of the geologists recommended the site.
'** Glasscock, Then Came Oil, 218.
Ibid.
*° Miles, "King o f the Wildcatters", 6-7. 
*' Ibid., 7.
*" Ibid., 74-5.
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Slick decided to ignore their advice, follow his instincts, and sink a well/^ The well he 
drilled eventually produced 4,560 barrels per day and along with the production from 
neighboring wells initiated the Tonkawa oil boom, a notable chapter in the history of the 
oil industry/'' Slick’s decision to rely on instinct underscored how successful oil strikes 
at times resulted from subjective evaluations despite geologists’ objective evidence to the 
contrary. Discoveries like Slick’s undermined geologists’ claims that they had crafted a 
scientific approach to oil prospecting. Yet, as demonstrated in Pennsylvania cemeteries, 
no clear line separated creekology and geology and neither practical men nor geologists 
realized that their methods often complimented one another’s.
Petroleum geologist Everette DeGolyer frequently thought and wrote about the 
early history of oil prospecting, and he struggled to understand how practical men found 
so much oil even though they had not formally studied geology and sometimes even 
refused to acknowledge its validity.^^ In contemplating how wildcatters discovered some 
of the most productive and significant oil fields in the United States, from Pennsylvania 
to California, DeGolyer observed that “some of the early day prospectors must have really 
had a nose for oil” but he could not more clearly articulate the reasons for their success.^^
53 Ibid.
Ibid.; There is a relationship between Tonkawa, Slick, and deep sands such the 
Wilcox. See Owen, Trek o f  the Oil Finders, 540.
Among the list of greats, he included John H. Galey, Mike Benedum, Edward 
L. Doheney, and Tom Slick.
^  Everette DeGolyer to Wallace E. Pratt, December 16,1954, File 1513, Box 12, 
Everette DeGolyer Collection, Clements Library, Southern Methodist University. 
(Hereafter cited as DeGolyer Collection.)
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Their ability to find oil without systematically employing geology prompted him to 
acknowledge perhaps somewhat self-consciously that “their prospecting was done 
without the benefit of geological clergy.””  Despite such a self-effacing comment, he 
refused to dismiss geology outright. He considered oil exploration fundamentally “a 
geological enterprise” but also felt “that prospecting was more than just geology and it is 
this ‘more’ that I am interested in.” *^ His training as a petroleum geologist taught him to 
look for systematic, scientific principles that consistently led to oil, but this orientation 
prevented him from understanding how practical men succeeded with an entirely different 
approach.
In his quest to understand how their methods comprised “more than just geology,” 
DeGolyer consulted his friend Wallace Pratt, a notable petroleum geologist in his own 
right, and the two agreed that practical men’s perseverance bore much of the 
responsibility for their success. Pratt considered oil prospectors quintessential American 
pioneers. He felt that “the prime requisite to success in oil-finding is freedom to explore” 
which American culture offered in abundance.^^ Any successful prospector exhibited 
“the adventurous, chance-taking spirit of the pioneer which pervades America and has 
impelled Americans to drill thousands of wells every year in search for oil.” °^ With this 
conception in mind, Pratt replied to DeGolyer that persistence was an “attribute of the
”  Ibid. 
Ibid.
”  Wallace E. Pratt, Oil in the Earth (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of 
Kansas, 1942), 58.
Ibid., 57.
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successful oil-finder that few of us [petroleum geologists] possess.”®' DeGolyer 
concurred, observing that all “any of these men really possessed was a great willingness 
to venture...”®^ Most wildcatters felt compelled to persevere in their searches for oil to 
demonstrate the validity of their hunches. They possessed the instincts of an explorer, an 
unrelenting desire to confirm their suspicions that oil lay in a particular place.
Biographers of famous oil men such as E. W. Marland, H. L. Hunt, and Tom Slick all 
attributed their subjects’ success in part to the willingness to trust their instincts and 
persevere in their searches. Such accounts characterized wildcatters as tough-minded 
optimists who continued “to hang on, keep on going, and never give up. Slick was of that 
kind.”®^ Perseverance certainly increased practical oil men’s chances for success, but 
without a “hunch” they had no idea where to begin searching. As important as 
persistence may have been, a hunch more than any other factor guided and motivated 
their search. DeGolyer and Pratt did not consider how hunches originated, few practical 
men could answer this difficult question.
Although many successful prospectors developed great trust in their instincts, they 
could not explain why their hunches consistently proved correct. Edward R. Wilson, a 
practical oil man based in Oklahoma City, offers another example “of that kind” of 
prospector who found oil because of the compelling desire to demonstrate the veracity of
®' Wallace E. Pratt to Everette DeGolyer, January 24,1955, File 1513, Box 12, 
DeGolyer Collection.
®^ DeGolyer to Pratt, December 16, 1954, File 1513, Box 12, DeGolyer 
Collection.
®^ Literary Digest 48 (March 14, 1914), 568.
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his hunch. He discovered the Pioneer field in Texas even after others abandoned it “due 
to his unfailing belief in his own intuition and his ‘sticktoitiveness.’”®'* When he solicited 
financial backing from an oil company in Tulsa, “they waved him aside.”^^  Wilson’s 
discovery of the field only after “larger companies and big operators were pulling out of 
the territory” seemed only to confirm the legitimacy of his technique.®® Although Wilson 
believed that his instincts led him to oil, he could not articulate any more clearly than 
DeGolyer why or how this approach worked. On one hand he exuded confidence in his 
approach, declaring emphatically that “T never lost when I played a hunch. ”’®^ However, 
he also admitted that even though “‘my hunch was compelling, almost over-powering, I 
had no idea that it would lead me to a 15,000-bbl. gusher.’”®* Neither practical men nor 
petroleum geologists understood what constituted a hunch because this prospecting 
method defied rationalization.
Practical men derived their prospecting techniques from a vernacular form of 
knowledge that grew out of local experience rather than a scientific understanding of 
universal earth proeesses they could systematically employ in different environments. 
Loosely interpreted as “cunning intelligence,” the Greek concept ‘'metis’'’ refers more 
broadly to an array of practical skills and a specific type of intelligence cultivated in
®‘‘ “Hunch, Backed by Unfailing Courage and Fiath esulted in Discovery of 
Pioneer Field,” Oil and Gas Journal 21/2 (June 8, 1922), p. 32
®® Ibid.
®® Ibid.
®" Ibid.
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response to social and environmental change.® For example, when The Farmer’s 
Almanac suggested planting com after a specified date, the most “cunning” farmer 
adjusted this advice to suit the unique circumstances of his immediate surroundings. The 
date to plant varied for crops growing at different altitudes and latitudes, in valleys and on 
hills, and near the coast or inland.™ The shrewdest farmers adapted the Almanac’s 
universal advice to suit local conditions. Practitioners of metis did not seek a universal 
principle based upon rational thought but, instead, applied rules of thumb in their 
endeavors and invoked a strategy based upon feel, knack, or common sense.’’ Similarly, 
practical men did not reduce their prospecting methods to deductive principles or codify 
them into a formal set of procedures based upon rational decisions. Intuition comprised 
such a significant portion of metis that its practitioners often could not characterize their 
methods.™ This explains Edward Wilson’s difficulty justifying the great trust he placed 
in his instincts or how they led him to oil. Like Wilson, other practical men remained 
confused over their methodology.
Both DeGolyer and Pratt noticed that most practical men struggled to explain why 
their methods worked. DeGoyler suggested that many wildcatters denied that luck 
enabled them to find oil and that they offered a rationale for their success even when none 
existed. To present himself as an authority, a wildcatter was “likely to rationalize his
® Scott, Seeing Like a State, 313.
™ Ibid., 312.
™ Ibid., 316.
™ “Metis knowledge is often so implicit and automatic that its bearer is at a loss to 
explain it,” Ibid., 329.
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motives” after finding oil particularly when “the reasons for drilling somewhat vague or 
mistaken. He did not consciously lie when explaining his methodology but “honestly 
believes his revised and entirely fictitious r e a s o n i n g . T o  claim authority as an oil- 
finding expert, the wildcatter offered an explanation that either “fit with then current 
methods of prospecting” or insisted ’’mysteriously on a superior knowledge which he 
does not reveal.”^^  Pratt reached a similar conclusion after conducting a study of oil- 
discovery methods prior to 1911, finding that “ambiguity shrouds records of methods of 
discoveries. I am convinced that even the fellow who drills a well is sometimes unable to 
state accurately what his reasons were!”’  ^ Practical men encountered difficulty 
articulating their methods because of metis' implicit, experiential nature.’’ Like any 
experienced practitioner of a particular skill or craft, practical men developed a repertoire 
of visual judgements and sensations for assessing their work bom out of experience that 
defied articulation.’* It may have appeared to layman and petroleum geologists that luck 
explained their success, but metis played the greater role.
Many of Tom Slick’s contemporaries considered him one of the luckiest oil- 
finders of his day, but he developed his hunches for locating oil from observations he
Everette DeGoyler, “Foreward,” in Carl Coke Rister, Oil! Titan o f  the 
Southwest (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1949), x.
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made of a region’s surface and subsurface geology. Like other practitioners of metis, 
Slick developed a knack or feel for finding oil that grew out of his experiences surveying 
the topography of Kansas, Oklahoma, and northern Texas.^’ As he explained it, “I know 
all this country, every foot of it. As a leaser I drove and walked over all of it, studied it, 
have learned to sort of sense, by intuition, where there ought to be oil.”*° Like Edward 
Wilson, he could not quite explain this knack, believing that he could “sort of sense, by 
intuition” where to drill. Slick’s technique did not rely upon superstition or magic but on 
his ability to translate experiences traversing local environments into a vernacular 
knowledge and to apply that know-how successfully.** While he did not use the term 
“geological” to describe the knowledge he acquired at each potential site, he sought 
information through firsthand observations in order to develop an educated guess about 
the best possible place to drill. Slick admitted that he never knew with certainty whether 
he would find oil, “but I have been at it so long, have studied the lay of the land and the 
underlying formations so persistently, have drilled so many wells, dry and wet, that I 
often get a h u n c h . . . W h a t  Slick considered a hunch, in fact, grew out of “persistently” 
studying “the lay of the land” and from trial-and-error drilling which yielded important
Miles, "King o f  the Wildcatters”, 80. 
*” Kansas City Star, May 5, 1929.
** Another wildcatter expressed clearly how people instinctively attributed the 
successful application of the belt-line theory to “magic” before geologists began offering 
scientific rationales: “From some unknown reason there was a belief that there was some 
magic in the 96**' meridian... At that time anything east of Dewey was taboo, but not for 
any geological reasons.” John H. Kane to James A. Veasey, May 17, 1941, “Belt-line 
theory,” Box 23, Veasey Collection.
Kansas City Star, May 5,1929.
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information about the “underlying formations.” Only after such extensive preparation 
could he “sort of feel that there’s oil in a certain spot...”*^ Slick argued somewhat 
defensively that his success resulted from a tested methodology rather than good fortune, 
explaining that “if I strike oil everyone calls it Tom Slick’s luck, but do you call that 
luck? I call it largely judgment based upon experience.” "^ Observations of the 
environment imbued the judgement of many practical men with authority in the early 
days of the Midcontinent oil booms. As petroleum geologists came onto the scene, they 
too eventually acquired authority and threatened to displace practical men as oil-finding 
experts.
Petroleum geologists set-out to replace what they considered guesswork in oil- 
finding with a systematic methodology a prospector could apply in a variety of different 
environments. Investors who equated a “hunch” to a mere guess worried about the high 
costs of drilling a dry well and wanted more definitive evidence before investing in a 
speculative venture. Relying on rational thought rather than intuition, petroleum 
geologists contended that “there’s a reason why oil and gas occur and accumulate in 
certain rocks and regions” and considered it their job to explain why.*  ^ By conducting 
“scientific study,” they tried “to eliminate the expensive drilling of dry holes and promote 
the testing of ‘reasonable’ looking areas-these men are Oil Geologists.”*^  Unlike
** Ibid.
*" Ibid.
Forest Rees, Circular letter mailed to oil men, General Correspondence 1919, 
Charles Decker Collection, Western History Collection, University of Oklahoma.
Ibid.
113
practical men, geologists strove to provide a rationale for drilling at a particular site 
which they believed offered more security to investors. A geologist’s reason for thinking 
a region might produce oil “amounts to more than a ‘hunch,’ and when he completes a 
Detailed Survey his opinion is worth big financial backing.”*’ Petroleum geologists 
prospected for oil in a more systematic fashion than practical men and articulated a 
rationale for drilling at a particular site, but the attributes of different environments at 
times resisted the application of their generic rules.
Petroleum geologists cultivated a form of knowledge distinctly different than 
metis which prevented them from understanding how a practical man’s experience within 
a particular local environment often bore a relationship to his hunch about where to look 
for oil. Another concept of Greek origin, techne, or technical knowledge, referred to a 
type of learning that consisted of hard-and-fast rules, principles, and propositions.** 
Whereas metis depended upon a local context and was intuitive, techne was universal and 
could be organized into explicit, logical steps.*  ^ The universal quality of techne meant 
that it could be taught as a formal discipline, like geology for instance, whereas 
practitioners of metis acquired their knowledge through local practice and hands-on 
experience.^" The different kinds of knowledge a riverboat pilot relies upon to navigate a
*’ Ibid.
** Scott, Seeing Like a State, 319.
*" Ibid., 320. 
Ibid.
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river illustrates the differenees between metis and techne?^ Every riverboat pilot 
possesses universal knowledge about rivers and the methods for negotiating their 
currents, shallows, and turns. He also acquires more specific knowledge, however, from 
his experience on a particular river. Although he can anticipate that seasonal changes will 
similarly alter water levels in all rivers, only through extended experience can he gain an 
understanding of how depths will vary at different times of the year on particular stretches 
of a given river or in certain harhors. The pilot’s local knowledge is more practical and 
therefore superior to the universal rules of navigation. As with riverboat pilots, extended 
experience in a particular environment often served as better preparation for oil 
prospectors than did universal rules or principles.
Although a university-trained petroleum geologist inculcated with the technical 
expertise of a formal discipline, DeGolyer understood that arbitrary factors often 
undermined universal learning. His undying faith in geology led him to repeat Pratt’s 
often-quoted remark that “the enterprise of winning oil from the earth is essentially a 
geological venture.”^^  Although convinced of his discipline’s utility for finding oil, he 
also believed “that geology is not the whole of prospecting.”^^  After conducting a study 
of past oil discoveries, he concluded that they had often been “controlled by arbitraries.” '^*
91 Ibid., 317.
^  DeGolyer, The Development o f the Art o f Prospecting, 25; For other examples, 
see DeGolyer to Pratt, February 16, 1955; Box 12, File 1513, DeGolyer Collection; 
DeGolyer to Pratt, December 16,1954, Box 12, File 1513, DeGolyer Collection.
DeGolyer to Pratt, December 16, 1954, Box 12, File 1513, DeGolyer 
Collection.
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Unexpected contingencies such as an unconformity in the environment potentially 
undermined the application of generic prospecting methods. In the case of oil 
prospectors, metis at times offered practical advantages over technical, generic knowledge 
because intuition aided oil prospectors in anticipating “arbitraries” like those DeGolyer 
uncovered. The application of metis often appeared so unsystematic to those who 
witnessed it that they confused it with sheer luck.
Whether a geologist or a wildcatter, all oil prospectors relied upon luck to some 
degree but applying the term too loosely potentially obscured a much more complicated 
process. DeGolyer believed that “success in exploration depends upon luck and skill” but 
he hastened to add that “what the proper proportion of each may be, I do not know.”®^ 
Given a choice between the two, he preferred luck over skill. Well sites “selected by the 
most refined and exact of techniques” could result in failure, and a well drilled “at 
random for mistaken reasons or no reason at all may result in the discovery of a new and 
important f i e l d . G o o d  fortune improved one’s chances for success in any endeavor, 
but he cautioned that in oil prospecting “one must recognize luck but not overemphasize 
it” and warned that the term “is merely a convenient catchall.”®’ When petroleum 
geologists accounted for a successful oil find solely on the basis of luck, “we ascribe to 
chance the favorable outcome of a complex of conditions, all of which we have not yet
DeGoyler, “Foreward,” viii.
Ibid.
Ibid., ix.
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been able to analyze, much less understand.” *^ DeGolyer’s inability to grasp the 
“complex of conditions” that enabled practical men to find oil underscores the contingent, 
highly variable quality of the knowledge they produced and his appreciation for geology’s 
limitations.
As much as he strove to evaluate practical men’s methods objectively, he felt 
strongly enough about their inadequacy to distinguish them from those of petroleum 
geologists. DeGolyer recalled that geologists’ “intrustion into the industry was generally 
resented, often with intense bitterness” because they “were regarded by most so-called 
practical oil men as being highly theoretical.”^^  Practical men felt that their prospecting 
methods provided more tangible benefits, were more “practical,” than the arcane theories 
geologists proposed. He reacted defensively to this suggestion and set the record straight 
by indicating that “the truth is that the practical men were just as theoretical as the 
geologists and less soundly so.”'®® He argued that geologists conducted field work more 
systematically, and therefore more reliably, than practical men. Practical men 
encountered the environment haphazardly because they had no formal training in 
geological theories or how to observe them at work in the field. They arrived at 
generalizations based upon a rather “narrow range of facts which had happened to come 
within their experience and which were not studied systematically...”'®' Unlike petroleum
Ibid.
DeGolyer, The Development o f the Art o f  Prospecting, 27. 
'®® Ibid.
'®‘ Ibid.
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geologists who formulated theories eonsistent with knowledge they had learned in the 
classroom and with what they observed outdoors, “their theorizing was uncurbed by any 
knowledge of the laws governing earth processes.”*®^ DeGolyer's contention that finding 
oil was “more than just geology” suggested sympathy with practical men’s methods, but 
as a professionally trained petroleum geologist he could never entirely shed his 
orientation that “the winning of petroleum is a geological enterprise.” This dichotomy in 
his thinking prevented him from fully appreciating the significance of metis to practical 
men’s prospecting methods.
Petroleum geologists failed to comprehend metis as a legitimate form of 
knowledge because of their indoctrination in an empirical science which strove to 
establish universal laws applicable in all locations rather than an intuitive knowledge 
contingent upon local experience. Even though geologists and practical men both 
conducted field work, their approaches differed significantly. Geologists typically 
gathered information in a regimented and structured fashion. While in the field, the 
geologist calculated and measured his observations because he “was a trained observer, 
and subjected his theorizing to the limitations of the laws of stratigraphie and structural 
processes.”*®^ Unlike practical men, the geologist “based his generalizations on a 
systematic study of a much wider range of facts...”""* What geologists perceived as flaws 
in the prospecting methods of practical men, in fact, marked the very reasons for their
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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success.
Although DeGolyer criticized practical men for basing their theories on too 
narrow a range of facts, their experiences in a particular locality marked the strength to 
their approach and not its weakness. Scientists often denigrated metis because its 
practical and highly-contextual character did not lend itself to generalizations or 
integration into scientific discourse. DeGolyer echoed this criticism when he called 
practical men unsystematic, less theoretically sound, and alleged that they sampled facts 
endemic to a particular locale. What he and fellow scientists missed, however, was that 
metis' power lay in its variable and contextual character. Practitioners of metis attempted 
to solve concrete problems in local environments and did not concern themselves with 
contributing to a wider body of knowl edge . The i r  search for practical knowledge to 
solve problems of immediate concern led them to study a “narrow range of facts” because 
metis required close and astute observations of the environment.*®  ^ The conclusions that 
riverboat pilots, peasant farmers, or practical oil men reached bore greatly on their 
material well-being and, therefore, led them to scrutinize the environment more closely 
and pay greater attention to local conditions than research scientists.*®  ^ Scientific 
researchers did not necessarily bear the consequences of their own advice, but the 
marginal economic status many practitioners of metis held provided an even greater 
impetus to close, careful observation. Living in the field throughout the seasons gave
*®^ Scott, Seeing Like a State, 324.
*®® Ibid.
*®" Ibid.
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them an advantage in conducting field work because they could observe changing 
conditions a research scientist might never notice.
Tom Slick put his close and astute observations into practice in 1912 when he 
located a favorable site in northeast Oklahoma and drilled the discovery well for the 
Cushing oil field. Shortly after arriving in the Midcontinent region, Slick departed for 
Illinois where he went to work leasing land for Charles B. Shaffer who had previously 
become a millionaire in western Pennsylvania’s oil fields. Slick prospected for Shaffer in 
Kentucky and Canada before the two decided to try Oklahoma. From 1907 to 1911, Slick 
drilled as many as ten dry holes on land he had leased for Shaffer.'”* Steeped in the 
tradition of Pennsylvania’s practical oil men. Slick relied upon intuition but also actively 
and conseiously evaluated surfaee and subsurface geological phenomena when deciding 
where to sink a well. Just prior to his discovery of the Cushing field, he drilled the Tiger 
well three miles to the east which, although dry, provided him with valuable information 
that buoyed his confidence in finding oil nearby. The Tiger well failed to yield 
commercial quantities of oil, but his drill pulled-up positive indications from 2,000 feet 
below the surface and he studied the dips and slopes of the region’s surface geology and 
these observations led him to Frank Wheeler’s farm where he drilled the Cushing well.'”” 
Slick considered his decision to drill a hunch, but observable and objective data also 
influenced his choice. Shaffer and Slick’s “luck” changed in March 1912 when a well 
they had been drilling for almost two months came in as a gusher and marked the
'”* Ray Miles, ‘King o f the Wildcatters The Life and Times o f  Tom Slick, 1883- 
1930 (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1996), 24.
'”” Literary Digest (March 14, 1914), 568.
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discovery of the Cushing oil field.”® Although Shaffer, Slick, and their business partners 
had leased much of the land surrounding the site, news of Cushing’s production brought 
prospectors and speculators from numerous other states pouring into the surrounding area 
to repeat Slick’s success.
A pivotal moment in the history of the oil industry occurred when Cushing 
operators began drilling to depths beyond which most practical men believed oil 
existed.” ' For nine months after Slick and Shaffer drilled the discovery well, “drilling of 
the shallow sands proceeded rapidly” but they only realized the field’s giant size “when 
production was found in the Bartlesville sand at 2500 feet.”"^ Development of the field 
proceeded apace and by August 1913 the total geographic area encompassed an expanse 
nine miles long and three miles wide.”  ^ In addition to expanding horizontally, the field
”® For a more detailed description of the events leading up to the discovery of 
Cushing and all the major figures involved, see Carl N. Tyson, et. al. The McMan: The 
Lives o f Robert M. McFarlin and James A. Champman, (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1977); Ruth Sheldon Knowles, The Greatest Gamblers: The Epic of 
American Oil Exploration (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1959); Glasscock, Then 
Came Oil, 217-225; Tait, The Wildcatters, 129; Owen, Trek o f  the Oil Finders, 294; 
Rister, Oil! Titan o f  the Southwest, 119-124; Kenny Franks, Oklahoma Petroleum 
Industry, (Oklahoma City: Oklahoma Heritage Association, 1980), 68-78.
I l l Tait, The Wildcatters, 129.
J.V. Howell Collection,“History of Petroleum Geology,” 14; Eventually, oil 
men would continue drilling even deeper. Homer F. Wilcox missed the shallow sands 
entirely when in 1914 he sank a well southeast of Tulsa. This layer soon became the 
state’s primary producing layer of sand and was forever known as the “Wilcox sands.” 
See Tait, The Wildcatters, 129.
Sidney Powers, “Petroleum Geology in Oklahoma,” Oil and Gas in Oklahoma, 
Oklahoma Geological Survey Bulletin 40, vol. 1 (Norman: Oklahoma Geological Survey, 
192&k8.
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also grew vertically as drillers continued finding oil the deeper they went."'* Eventually, 
six successive layers of sand yielded oil, ranging in depth from 1,000 to 3,000 feet.” ^
The significance of deeper wells lay only partially in the fact that they yielded more oil. 
The greater depth of Cushing’s wells provided geologists with important information they 
built upon to map the subsurface geology and eventually find even more oil.
By using the information drillers generated, geologists mapped Cushing’s 
subsurface geology and illustrated in vivid form the principle that I. C. White 
demonstrated in West Virginia almost thirty years before, that a relationship existed 
between the accumulation of oil and geological structures. Slick found oil at Cushing 
because he unknowingly drilled into a giant anticline which ran fifteen miles north-south 
and two to five miles east-west."^ Similarly, when the Gypsy Oil Company sank a well 
to the north, it “was found to have been located by chance on a surface anticline.”” ’
These anticlines located inadvertently formed merely the tip of a much larger iceberg.
The Cushing field produced significant amounts of oil because it consisted of a number of 
anticlines clustered together rather just than a single geologic structure.” * Geologists 
scored a major victory when they illustrated the relationship between these structures and 
the location of oil.
114 Ibid.; Tait, The Wildcatters, 129.
Carl Coke Rister, Oil! Titan o f the Southwest (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1949), 124.
Owen, Trek o f  the Oil Finders, 294.
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Even though Slick drilled the initial well, geologists played a pivotal role in the 
huge amount of oil the field eventually yielded. Although steeped in the prospecting 
traditions of practical men, Slick had proven more willing to consider geologists’ 
recommendations shortly after arriving in the Midcontinent region. Once drilling began 
on the Cushing discovery well, he hired geological consultant L. L. Hutchison to report 
on the prospect."^ Hutchison soon performed additional consulting work on the Cushing 
field for another customer, the McMan Oil Company, and in February 1913 located a 
structure geologically related to Cushing known as the Dropright dome.'^“ The location 
of this prospect resulted in some of McMan’s most valuable production.’^ * Everette 
DeGolyer considered Hutchinson’s work pivotal: “I am inclined to think that the first real 
useful geological work done was the location by L.L. Hutchinson of the Dropright dome 
at Cushing.”’^  ^ Several other geologists played important roles in various oil ventures on 
or near the Cushing anticline and their work collectively caused many practical men who 
had once viewed geology with contempt to alter their o p i n io n s . W i t h  the help of 
geologists, practical men recognized that they had a new and fairly reliable prospecting 
method.
’ Howell, “History of Petroleum Geology,” 20-21 ; Owen, Trek o f  the Oil 
Finders, 294.
Howell, “History of Petroleum Geology,” 21.
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DeGolyer to Veasey, June 10,1941, “Belt-line theory,” Box 23, Veasey 
Collection.
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Discovery and development of the Cushing field proved a pivotal moment in the 
history of the oil industry because geologists demonstrated how practical men could 
reliably and consistently find oil through the application of petroleum geology and 
specifically the anticlinal theory. Although identifying a single date or reason practical 
men accepted petroleum geology risks oversimplifying a much longer and complicated 
process, most geologists agreed that their profession gained much credibility because of 
the events at Cushing. The work they performed made the development of this oil field 
“one of the most important chapters in the history of petroleum geology.” '^ '' By mapping 
the extent of the anticline and the subsidiary traps where oil accumulated, petroleum 
geologists demonstrated that the search for geological structures offered a useful method 
for finding oil. As James O. Lewis recalled, “geology was first generally accepted in the 
Mid-Continent when extensions were successfully predicted by geologists for the 
Cushing pool...”‘^  ^ In addition to mapping the outer limits of the anticline, geologists 
“predicted” the location of subsidiary traps, or “extensions,” by applying the anticlinal 
theory and located additional oil with a greater degree of reliability. DeGolyer agreed that 
even though “Cushing was discovered in 1912 without benefit of geologic clergy... it is 
my opinion that this was probably one of the most important steps toward reduction of the 
theory to actual working practice. I know of no earlier clean cut application of the 
anticlinal theory.” '^ ® After demonstrating that they could find oil by applying the theory.
J. V. Howell, “History of Petroleum Geology,” 8.
James O. Lewis to Veasey, September 10, 1941, Veasey Collection.
DeGolyer felt that although Cushing was important development of Augusta 
and Eldorado was “the greatest impulse” toward acceptance of the anticlinal theory.
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geologists had proven their utility to many within the oil industry.
Geologists’ entry into the oil industry did not mean that practical men simply 
abandoned methods that had served them well in the past. Many prospectors continued to 
ignore geologists and remained skeptical of this emerging, new science. The most skilled 
oil men had no reason to consider geology because they continued finding oil with 
methods that had always proven successful, long before geologists came onto the scene. 
Practical men knew, even if only intuitively, that they encountered the environment in a 
fundamentally different way, as had their fathers before them, and trusted themselves to 
follow the landscape’s lead. Although the strongest hunch or intuition could sometimes 
result in a dry hole, practical men grew even more confident in their own methods when a 
geologist’s prediction failed to produce oil. Every mistake by a geologist only confirmed 
to skeptics that geology was merely the latest form of quackery or, worse, another oil- 
finding scam. When geologists began to prove that their methods worked, they often 
failed to bolster their credibility by behaving arrogantly and condescendingly toward 
lifelong oil men who possessed little knowledge of scientific prospecting. Some practical 
men took notice when university boys with scientific methods produced results, but a 
geologist who failed to find oil after charging a consulting fee remained just another 
college-educated know-it-all.
Everette DeGolyer to James A. Veasey, June 10, 1941, “Belt-line theory,” Box 23, 
American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming. Petroleum geologist and one-time 
director of the U.S.G.S. agreed that Cushing played a significant role in demonstrating 
“that oil accumulation is governed by structure” and he agreed that Augusta and Eldorado 
illustrated the same point. I will cover these fields in a subsequent chapter. W.E. Wrather 
to Veasey, November 3, 1941, “Belt-line theory,” Box 23, Veasey Collection.
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Chapter 4:
“Charles N. Gould: Petroleum Geology Arrives on the Southern Plains”
Scientists conducting field work do not encounter the environment free of 
preconceptions, values, or theories about the land they observe, and Gould N. Gould was 
no exception.* He arrived at the University of Oklahoma in 1900 where he founded the 
geology department and served as the first director of the state’s geological survey.
Gould loved his job as a geology professor and survey director because both positions 
afforded him numerous opportunities to enjoy nature by conducting field work where he 
taught his students by showing them firsthand the geological phenomena they talked 
about in the classroom. He held a great fondness for the Oklahoma landscape and often 
expressed its beauty in prose and poetry.
Gould encountered the environment in a manner fundamentally different than the 
practical oil men who combed Oklahoma’s hills and valleys in search of oil. At the time 
of his arrival, the oil industry had not embraced petroleum geology and practical men had 
discovered most of the oil in the state. Although he eventually resigned his positions as 
university professor and survey director to work as an independent oil consultant, he 
never acquired significant wealth and eventually returned to the university where he 
resumed teaching and directing the survey. Many of his students, however, also entered
* Richard White, “Discovering Nature in North America,” Journal o f American 
History 79 (1992), 874. White’s observation has been particularly true of field scientists 
whose conceptions of nature often reflect visual and literary conventions depicted in 
nature writing and landscape painting, Henrika Kuklik and Robert E. Kohler, eds., 
“Introduction,” Osiris 11 (1996), 5-6.
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the oil business as petroleum geologists, discovered some of the most significant oil 
fields in the Midcontinent region, and acquired great wealth. Gould left his greatest mark 
on the oil industry by training this cadre of students who parlayed the knowledge he had 
taught them into valuable prospecting skills that oil companies increasingly desired, 
placing petroleum geology on a solid foundation within the industry.
Gould interacted with nature frequently as a child, and these experiences fostered 
his interest in geology. He was bom July 1868 in the small farming community of Duck 
Creek in the southeastern comer of Ohio.^ Although Gould “thoroughly disliked farm 
work,” he eagerly took advantage of the opportunities rural life presented for abundant 
and diverse outdoor activities.^ He enjoyed hunting and fishing, and in the autumn helped 
his sister gather walnuts, butternuts, chestnuts, and hickory nuts.'* Wild fruit grew so 
plentifully around the family’s home that pawpaws, persimmons, black haws, mulberries. 
May apples, wild grapes, and June berries offered a comucopia during the summer.^ 
Geology too attracted Gould at an early age. In addition to helping his father dig for coal, 
he filled window ledges in the family’s home with collections of smooth pebbles and rock 
specimens.^ He must have found many of these items while indulging in his favorite
 ^Charles N. Gould, Travels Through Oklahoma (Oklahoma City: Harlow 
Publishing Company, 1928), 9-10.
 ^Ibid., 20.
" Ibid., 11, 19.
'  Ibid., 17.
® Charles Gould, Covered Wagon Geologist (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1959) 11,20.
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activities which included digging in the dirt banks along streams and rivers and exploring 
caves and ravines/ In 1887, the Gould family headed west and left the Ohio landscape 
behind but the natural world continued to intrigue young Charles as he grew to 
adulthood/
When they settled sixty miles west of Wichita in the small town of Ninnescah, 
Kansas, the Goulds encountered a distinctly different environment than in Ohio. The new 
landscape made an immediate impression on young Charles: “What a contrast to the old 
home in Ohio with its timbered hills, narrow valleys, swiftly flowing streams, little 
hillside fields, and big farmhouses and barns!”® The familiar Ohio landmarks lingering in 
Gould’s mind starkly conrasted with the new images he encountered on the Kansas 
prairie. He was overwhelmed trying to orient himself amidst a circular horizon 
“stretching away in all directions for unnumbered miles” and the treeless topography 
which offered “nothing to meet the eye but grass-covered plains.”'® Instead of large 
farmhouses and barns, he saw dugouts, sod houses, and claim shanties." The weather in 
this new environment also disoriented him. When the spring rain gave way to summer 
heat, “the words will convey little meaning. Day after day of burning, blistering wind 
from the southwest; wind that scorched the skin like a blast from a furnace; hot wind that
" Ibid., 20.
* Ibid.
® Ibid., 27.
‘® Ibid., 26.
" Ibid.
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dried up the vegetation till the green leaves of the com turned white, then rattled and hlew 
away.”*^ Despite the drastic differences between Ohio and Kansas, Gould eventually 
oriented himself to his new locale and acquired a deep appreciation for its landscapes and 
people. He grew so fond of his new surroundings that his experiences there significantly 
shaped the career path he followed.
If the Ohio landscape sparked Gould’s initial interest in geology, the Kansas 
plains cultivated his curiosity and prompted him to choose geology as a profession. One 
day while picnicing north of Ashland, he began to walk over the nearby low-lying hills 
where he encountered several distinct geological formations: red beds along the valleys, 
black shale on the slopes, and white shales covering the uplands.*^ Gould found fossil 
shells and two femurs of an animal buried within the shales, and this find “revived my 
desire to learn something about geology.''' He spent almost every subsequent weekend 
combing the hills twenty miles north and northwest of Ashland until he found a row of 
vertebrae, a few leg bones, and skull fi-agments protruding fi'om the s h a l e . H e  shipped 
the bones to University of Kansas professor S.W. Williston who notified Gould he had 
discovered a new species of reptile. Gould’s interest in geology blossomed. He 
cultivated a relationship with Williston and they began hunting fossils together. Williston 
tried to prevent him from becoming a geologist, warning that ‘“It’s a dog’s life, Gould,
Ibid., 28.
"  Ibid., 45.
Ibid..
Ibid., 46.
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and there is nothing in it. A geologist never makes any money, he works hard all his 
days, he is called a fool and a crank by nine-tenths of the people he meets, and he lives 
and usually dies unappreciated."" Undeterred, Gould pursued his passion despite 
Williston’s warning. While field work provided Gould the means for indulging his love 
of nature, it also directly influenced his decision to study geology.*® Throughout the 
spring and summer of 1894, he collaborated with Robert T. Hill, a prominent University 
of Texas geologist and member of the U.S.G.S., on field work in southwestern Kansas, 
and “from that time on there never was a shadow of a doubt as to what my life’s work 
should be. I knew I must be a geologist, and could never be anything else.’’*^ Gould 
continued practicing fieldwork each summer for nearly the next two decades, often on 
horseback and in a covered wagon, to catch a firsthand glimpse of the geology in Kansas, 
Oklahoma, Texas and New Mexico.**
When Gould arrived at the University of Oklahoma in 1900, students held little 
esteem for the discipline of geology because they believed had no practical application. 
Upon his arrival, the university was only eight years old, had only sixty college students, 
and no geology department.*^ Gould painted a bleak picture of his first days on campus.
*® Kuklik and Kohler, “Introduction,” 6.
*’ Gould, Covered Wagon Geologist, 51.
**Rachel Laudan, From Mineralogy to Geology: The Foundations o f  a Science, 
1650-1830 (Chicago and London: University of Chicago, 1987), 7.
*® Charles N. Gould, “Beginning of the Geological Work in Oklahoma,” 
Chronicles o f  Oklahoma 10 (1932), 199. Total student enrollment was somewhat higher 
than sixty because the university functioned as a preparatory school for a number of years 
and counted highschool students among its population.
130
When he showed up to teach, “there was no geological equipment whatever, no 
laboratories, no collections, no books, no students, not even a class room.” *^* Students did 
not enroll in geology classes because they did not feel the discipline prepared them for 
future employment: “As I remember now, there was no mad rush among the student body 
to avail themselves of the opportunities offered to secure a first-class geological 
education.” *^ He explained students’ apathy with the observation that working as a 
geologist failed to make the list of “legitimate and recognized methods of securing a 
permanent meal ticket. Students avoided the discipline because “in those far-off days 
of 1900, geology was one of the so-called cultural subjects taught in college. It was a 
pure science, meaning one that had no known practical application.”^^  The perception 
that geology could not secure a young man’s future changed drastically during the course 
of Gould’s tenure at the university and in subsequent years.
The best measure of how opportunities for geology students had changed was 
Gould’s reeolleetion in 1931 of how differently the publie and private industry had 
perceived geologists in 1900 when he arrived at the university. He cautioned that when 
considering geologists’ image at the turn of the century, “it should be remembered that
Ibid., 200.
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Ibid.; Charles N. Gould, “Pioneer Geology in Oklahoma,” Tulsa Geological 
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these were the old days.” '^* Since that time, the notion that geologists’ work did not merit 
substantial financial rewards had entirely changed. Recalling the public’s expectations of 
geologists nearly thirty years before, he remembered that “at that time geologists were not 
supposed to become o p u l e n t . I n  the three decades that had elapsed, geology students 
had not only begun to find jobs but struggled to stay in school by refusing large amounts 
of money offered by companies trying to lure them away. Such lucrative opportunities 
had not always existed for Gould’s students. When he first began teaching, “the 
persuasive promoter had not yet begun to comb the universities and inveigle reluctant 
sophomores from their studies, holding out as inducements fabulous salaries, an interest 
in the business, and an opportunity to marry the blonde daughter.”^^  His discipline had 
become so popular that there emerged a “Sears Roebuck, mail-order variety of geologist” 
who had never attended college but hoped to profit from claiming that he had.^  ^ Geology 
began to warrant more authority among oil speculators and invoking science to justify 
investing in a venture gained acceptance. Thus, the “mail-order” geologist was a type of 
“fellow who always found the anticline crossing the block of leases held by the promoter, 
and whose reports, like a certain brand of soap were 99.98 percent favorable.” *^ 
University-trained geologists would eventually protect their turf from invasion by these
Gould, “Beginning of the Geological Work in Oklahoma,” 200. 
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unscrupulous hucksters who threatened to usurp their authority. The changing perception 
of geologists that Gould had witnessed in Oklahoma was part of a larger national trend.
At the turn of the century American geologists who worked solely on economic, 
or “applied,” geology began publishing ajournai as part of an attempt to assert their 
professional identity and stake a claim to legitimacy within the scientific community. In 
the inaugural issue of Economic Geology, the author of the opening article believed that 
nineteenth-century distinctions between theoretical and practical research had disappeared 
and boldly declared that “all geology is applied geology.”^^  American geologists began to 
conform to scientists in other cultures who had never created this false distinction. For 
example, German scientists possessed a long and prestigious tradition of regarding 
economic geology equivalent to other branches of the earth sciences.^" Americans, on the 
Other hand, inherited from the British a tendency to conceive of geology as either a pure 
science which appealed to the human imagination or as an applied science which offered 
practical and potentially economic advantages.^' British geologists viewed research into 
the occurrence of natural resources on a lower plane than more grandiose, theoretical 
topics such as the principles of stratigraphy, erosion, or volcanism.^^ Until the end of the 
nineteenth century, famous American geologists repeated this tendency to emphasize
^  Frederick L. Ransome, “The Present Standing of Applied Geology,” Economic 
Geology 1 (October-November 1905), 1-2.
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theoretically interesting topics. Works such as Grove Karl Gilbert’s “Henry Mountains” 
or Clarence Dutton’s “Grand Canyon of the Colorado” strongly appealed to the 
imagination because they were “pursued amidst such attractive surroundings [rather] than 
investigations requiring frequent descent into the gloom and grime of mines dealing with 
processes many of which we can never hope to see in operation. Like many nineteenth 
American scientists, Gould’s enthusiasm for geology emerged from an interest in pure 
scientific research.
Although he spent much of his life demonstrating how geology facilitated 
economic growth, Gould’s affinity for pure scientific research endured until the end of his 
career. When asked why he had not emphasized in his autobiography the significant 
impact of his pure scientific research on the economic development of the state’s mineral 
resources, Gould replied “I hate oil geology.” '^' One possible explanation for his disdain 
may have been that wealth eluded him throughout his life while clients who hired him as 
an independent consultant grew rich.^  ^ Once the oil industry began to boom and students 
poured into his classes, many of them also earned fortunes by parlaying their studies into 
expertise the oil industry valued. Struggling as a university professor while students 
acquired wealth may have embittered Gould later in life, but he never hinted that the
33 Ibid.
Quoted in B. W. Beebe, “Introduction,” Covered Wagon Geologist, viii. Gould 
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acquisition of wealth motivated him. As stated in his memoirs, he grew excited by 
pursuing knowledge for its own sake or else by making an intellectual contribution to his 
field.'®
Teaching and researching at the University of Oklahoma afforded him plenty of 
opportunities to indulge his love of pure science, but throughout his tenure he grew to 
appreciate the advantages of applied geology as well. In his position as director of the 
Oklahoma Geological Survey, Gould had to approach geology in a manner different than 
he had as a university professor. As director of the survey, Gould became one of the most 
vocal boosters to advertise the mineral wealth that lay untapped within the state. He 
complained that the people “who pose as pure scientists” frequently overlook the value of 
Oklahoma’s economic geology, which, after all, is the basis of a large part of our material 
prosperity as a State.” With the exception of gas and oil, the majority of the state’s 
other minerals lay dormant in the ground, failing to “increase the revenues of the 
State...”'* At the time he made this argument, Gould had been serving as director and had 
learned how his skills as a scientist could play a central role in locating the state’s 
resources. He asked, “What better object might be sought, what more potent tasks might 
be accomplished, how can we as scientists better serve our State and our generation...?”'  ^
He knew just where to begin looking for resources too because he had witnessed them on
'® Gould, Covered Wagon Geologist.
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many excursions undertaken within the state since his arrival.
Upon arriving at the University of Oklahoma, he wasted no time organizing a 
field party to survey the state’s terrain and natural resources. The university’s first 
official field party departed June 1900 from Norman in a covered wagon and consisted of 
Gould, botanist Paul J. White, biologist A.H. Van Yleet, and cook Roy HadselU”
Heading north from Norman, they set-out to explore central and northwestern Oklahoma. 
While they hoped to gather information pertaining to the state’s geology, plants, and 
animals, “especial attention will be paid to the probabilities of gas, oil and coal in certain 
portions of the territory.”'*' Gould and Hadsell took turns driving the wagon while the 
“gentlemen of leisure rode on the rear seat.”*^  Despite Gould’s sarcasm, covered wagon 
travelers on the Plains enjoyed anything but leisure. While camping near Orlando, “a 
prairie storm out of the northwest struck camp about two o’clock in the morning, and the 
four of us hung onto tent poles for an hour to keep the tent from blowing down.”*^  The 
next day they picked up their tin plates, dishpans, and a stew kettle which the wind had 
blown as far as a quarter mile down the trail. "Their journey took them approximately five 
to six-hundred miles around the state and lasted for much of the summer.** Twenty-eight
*® “Its Geological Survey: The Party from The University is Now in Logan and 
Noble Counties,” Kansas City Star, June 19, 1900, p. 5, col. 4, in Collection, Folder 11, 
Box 1, Sardis Roy Hadsell Western History Collection, University of Oklahoma.
*' Ibid.
*^  Charles N. Gould, “Beginning of the Geological Work in Oklahoma,” 198.
*" Ibid., 199.
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years later, Gould and Hadsell (who had become a literature professor at the university) 
made the same trip by automobile in one week/^ Traversing Oklahoma in a covered 
wagon only reinforced the lesson Gould had been learning as a child in Ohio and as a 
young man in Kansas—that field work was a great method for teaching human beings 
about nature. As a university professor, he conveyed this lesson to his students.
Convinced that encounters with the natural world offered unique learning 
opportunities that could not be replicated in the classroom or laboratory, Gould instituted 
field work as a core component to his geology classes.'*® He contended that geologists 
could not afford to rely solely on classroom lectures because they practiced what was 
fundamentally an “outdoor science.”'*’ Unlike other scientists who conducted their work 
within a laboratory enclosed by four walls, “the geologist’s laboratory lies out of 
doors.”'** Nature taught valuable lessons and without proper field work students simply 
failed to learn their subject adequately. Gould reminded his colleagues that “it is the 
common thing not the unusual thing, for young men to go out from four years of
45 Ibid.
'*® Historians have recognized that field science differed qualitatively from the 
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laboratory and class room experience with but a hazy notion of what it is all about...
The same young men who left the class room with a hazy notion of the forces that shape 
the earth “wake up to the importance of the whole subject” after observing geological 
processes and structures firsthand.^® Despite the requirement by California and east coast 
universities that geology curricula include field work, conventional instructors in some 
parts of the country continued to teach without ever leaving the classroom and Gould 
hoped to change this tradition.
Although careful not to offend colleagues who taught standing in front of a 
blackboard, Gould advocated field work with a sense of mission. He and other geologists 
“who have been in the thick of the fight for some years” remained convinced that “the 
only practical geological laboratory is the field. ” *^ He asked readers to pardon him for 
expressing the opinion “that neither text-book illustrations, blackboard diagrams, high- 
priced charts, models of wood or of plaster, nor any other makeshifts, ever taught a 
student, however earnest, to recognize a fault in the field.”^^  Although he attempted to 
deliver his message delicately, he did not mince words in stating that no teacher, however 
brilliant, could “build up indoor laboratories, and devise methods of work that would in a 
measure bring home to the student of geology something of what it is all about.” ”  He
Gould, Oklahoma, The Geologists' Laboratory, 4. 
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even doubted the success of the geological masters, “giants though they were,” who 
taught students without introducing them to outdoor study. Thirty years as a geologist 
led Gould to conclude that “only by means of field work are geologists made, and that 
unless one wears out shoe leather on the rocks, vain is the help of man.” '^* Throughout his 
professional life, he practiced his preachments about the necessity of field work.
As a university instructor, Gould trained his students by taking them on field trips 
to various locations and particularly to the Arbuckle Mountains in south-central 
Oklahoma. Gould began conducting field work in the Arbuckles while working part-time 
with members of a U.S.G.S. surveying party. One evening while sitting around a 
campfire after a day’s work, he and his co-workers related to one another that they “had 
all been impressed with the unusual geology we had seen” and the members of the party 
“agreed that they knew of nothing quite like it in A m e ric a .G o u ld  did not originate the 
idea of using the Arbuckles as a location for students to conduct field work. A member 
of the party “turned to me and said, ‘Gould, you are starting a department of geology in a 
young university. Here at your back door is a magnificent geological laboratory. You 
will make a great mistake if you don’t bring young men and women in your classes to the 
Arbuckle Mountains to learn geology first hand.’” ®^ This was all the encouragement he 
needed and in 1901 arrived in the mountains with a wagon carrying his first group of
Ibid.
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students/’ He and three young men took two days to make the sixty-mile trek. As his 
mentor had guided him in the hills of Kansas, Gould and his students “spent several days 
scouting over the country and picking up fossils.” ®^ The next year the number of students 
grew by one, but by the third year a dozen students made the trip including Gould’s sister 
and another female.^® Within a few years, more than one hundred students had 
undertaken the pilgrimage.®” As the department grew, ten to twenty women and three 
times as many men made the trip annually.®* Eventually, the department took two trips 
per year.®’ Field trips to the Arbuckles continued long after Gould left the university, and 
he estimated that toward the end of his life as many as 5,000 students had visited the 
mountains.®’ Even students from universities in Texas and Kansas took advantage of the 
opportunity to learn from the site, and several leading geologists conducted field trips and 
conferences in the mountains.®'*
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The Arbuckle Mountains provided students unique opportunities to see and touch 
geological formations their teachers could merely describe and to collect a great number 
and variety of fossils their textbooks only pictured. Gould considered the Arbuckles “one 
of the best places in the United States to study rocks first hand” because it possessed “all 
sorts and conditions of geological phenom ena.C ontained  within the mountains were 
rocks of numerous geological eras and a great variety of minerals. The scenery presented 
a stimulating and exciting vision for those who witnessed it. The mountains offered 
several sites “where one may stand on a hill and see spread out before him in panorama a 
series of anticlines and synclines-Appalachian-type structure in miniature.” ®^ Visitors 
could witness how dynamic forces turned rocks on their edges, formed crevices and 
faults, resulting in “great upheavals of the earth’s crust.”®’ Nature’s forces continued to 
transform the landscape before students’ eyes, as they witnessed the Washita River wind 
through the mountains, cutting into various formations, “and many of its tributaries are 
now eating their way back into the rocks, illustrating stream piracy.”®* Gould lapsed into 
rapture when he described the opportunities the mountains presented: “And the fossils! 
Where can the American paleontologist find better collecting than here?”®^ White
®® Gould, Covered Wagon Geologist,112-13.
®® Gould, Oklahoma, The Geologists' Laboratory, 11. 
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Mound, a famous collecting site composed of white shale and approximately twenty feet 
high, “stands out on the prairie, and its surface is literally covered with small fossils. One 
might collect for a year on an area not much larger than a city block and still not pick it 
clean, for each rain washes out more new forms.”™ The mountains offered the ideal 
geological laboratory and often influenced students to study geology full time.
The Arbuckle Mountains presented such an effective teaching device that they 
inspired students to choose geology as their major or occupation. A field trip to the 
Arbuckles often inspired students who had enrolled in an introductory geology class to 
pursue the discipline as their primary field of study. Just as fieldwork in southeastern 
Kansas convinced Gould to become a geologist, his students “received their first 
geological inspiration on these trips.” *^ Many of his students who distinguished 
themselves as geologists, teachers, and businessmen later in life pointed to their field 
work as a defining moment in their professional development. They told Gould that “the 
Arbuckle Mountain trip was an eye-opener. They date their geological zeal to the 
camping trip in these mountains.”™ Gould witnessed and attested to the transforming 
experience students underwent as a result of their field work. He could name at least one 
hundred prominent geologists who, had it not been for their field experience in the 
Arbuckles, “would in all probability today have been shoe salesmen or automobile
™ Gould, Covered Wagon Geologist, \ 12-13; For an excellent photo of women 
collecting at White Mound, see Huffman, History o f the School o f Geology and 
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mechanics.”’  ^Field work impacted students at other universities in a similar manner.
Geology students at the University of Missouri also believed that field work 
provided a formative experience which shaped their careers and personal lives. Like 
Gould, other university professors hoped to get their students out of the classroom and 
into the field. Professor W. A. Tarr taught the first summer field work course at the 
University of Missouri in 1915 at a site near Breckenridge, Colorado. The following 
summer Professor E. B. Branson took the university’s geology students to conduct field 
work near Wind River, Wyoming. Many of the students on these trips eventually worked 
as chief geologists or exploration managers for major oil companies, such as The Houston 
Company, Carter Oil, and Sinclair. They considered these encounters with nature 
“rugged work and valuable experience” and acknowledged their importance as 
professional preparation because it “changed some of us from students to practical 
geologists.” '^^  The field trips taught students to translate their experience into private 
industry, but they also effected students on a deeper, more personal level.
Traveling to a new locale to perform field work had much in common with the 
tradition of a religious pilgrimage because the excursion potentially offered geologists 
intense emotional experiences and opportunities for new insight into their lives.’  ^ As
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with a pilgrimage, taking a field trip isolated students both geographically and 
intellectually. Students left behind familiar landscapes and the controlled environment of 
the classroom or laboratory where professors remained on-hand to guide and assist 
them.’® Especially in pre-modem periods when transportation was slow, expensive, and 
uncomfortable, long arduous journeys offered time for reflection and introspection as 
geologists visually surveyed the landscapes they traversed. Upon reaching their 
destination, they encountered an unfamiliar environment which demanded new ways of 
thinking in order to understand the geological forces that produced a landscape much 
different than the one to which they had grown accustomed. Removed from familiar 
surroundings and confronting an alien environment paved the way for a liminal 
experience which often led to introspection and contemplation of one’s life.”  Visiting 
the Arbuckles provided Gould’s students with just such an experience. After arriving at 
the University of Oklahoma “with no definite purpose in life,” his students “had their feet 
set in the right path, and their goings established, on field trips into the Arbuckle 
Mountains.”’* Gould understood nature’s formative impact on his students because 
roaming the hills of Ohio and the plains of Kansas influenced him in a similar manner. 
The intimate ties to nature he fashioned as a student only grew stronger in his later years.
Gould performed field work partly to meet the requirements of his job as a 
professional geologist, but the natural world he encountered brought so much enjoyment
’®Rudwick, “Geological Travel and Theoretical Innovation,” 145. 
”  Kuklik and Kohler, “Introduction,” 149-50.
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he celebrated what he saw in poetry/^ He exhibited literary aspirations at an early age. 
While attending the Normal School at Southwest Kansas College, he met Hadsell who 
had accompanied him on his first field expedition. While the two were boys, they 
“belonged to what we considered the best literary society. ...Gould got me into several 
scrapes in the regular program of songs, debates, etc.”*° Gould’s love of geology only 
fanned the flames of his literary passion, and he wrote poems which revealed a deep love 
of the Oklahoma landscape.** In “The Red Buds,” the western half of the state’s brilliant 
color manifested in the “red soils, red fields, red canyons cut in shale and sandstone; 
Brick red water in the streams.”*^  Even as he tried to wax romantic about Oklahoma’s 
natural beauty, his poems belied a geological sensibility. The Wichita Mountains 
impressed him as both “a silhouette of jagged granite peaks against the sky” and as 
“remnants of once larger mountains, upheaved in olden times, worn down by erosion...”*^ 
He also celebrated the region known as Black Mesa with the same odd mix of geological 
observations and romantic lyrics. Black Mesa struck Gould as a “product of earth’s 
internal fires; Reminiscent of the time when hot and seething lavas; Belched forth firom
Field scientists experienced natural places through their work, but the lines 
between work and leisure remained more ambiguous for them than in other social arenas. 
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crater mouths; A hot and viscous flood; Upon the land...”*'* Even the state’s coal deposits 
inspired him to write a poem: “Seventy-five billion tons of bottled sunlight; Priceless 
stores of carbon; Power for untold generations; Stored in the hills of Oklahoma.”*^ The 
mandate of his profession required him to look for the practical benefits and economic 
potential of the state’s resources, but his gaze focused upon the beauty and grandeur of 
the ancient geological processes that had shaped the land.*®
In addition to writing poetry, Gould found the perfect forum for conjoining his 
appreciation of Oklahoma’s aesthetic and utilitarian attributes in his role as director of the 
state’s geological survey. Upon receiving a Bachelor of Science degree in 1899, he 
determined to become a state geologist and achieved this objective four years later when 
the governor of Oklahoma appointed him director of the state’s geological survey.*^ Like 
J. Peter Lesley, Josiah Dwight Whitney, and other directors of geological surveys, Gould 
faced the difficult task of finding an appropriate balance between pure and applied 
science but unlike his nineteenth-century predecessors proved more adept at achieving 
this goal. Conducting field work enabled him to survey the state and inventory its natural 
resources so that taxpayers might reap an economic gain, but his excursions into the 
Oklahoma hinterlands also provided opportunities to observe the scenic landscapes which 
might serve as inspiration for future poems. Gould’s strong desire to conduct field work
*“ Gould, “Black Mesa,” cited in Ibid., 29. 
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partly explains why he succeeded as director the survey but so too did his recognition that 
a state geologist must perform as a politician as well as a scientist.
Gould almost single-handedly brought about the creation of the Oklahoma 
Geological Survey Due to his ambition, foresight, and shrewd political instincts. When 
the territorial legislature met in 1906 to discuss the possibility of statehood, he instantly 
identified an opportunity to realize his long-held professional goal of becoming a state 
geologist.** Gould must have felt as though the perfect moment had arrived, for he “long 
had in mind the establishment of a geological survey in the new state."** In addition to 
calculating the right time to broach the idea, he drew upon personal ties to ensure that the 
survey came to fruition. Because he knew several members of the convention, “I had 
little difficulty in having appointed a committee on a geological survey.”*® Once they 
agreed to consider the idea, Gould found his way into their discussions and personally 
guided the debate. Although not an official delegate to the convention, “I met with the 
committee several times and aided them in formulating plans for the establishment of a 
survey."*' Due in large part to his lobbying and guidance, Oklahoma became the only 
state with a provision in its constitution mandating that the legislature establish a 
geological survey.
Not satisfied with merely a constitutional mandate, Gould took the liberty of
** Ibid., 141.
** Ibid.
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drafting a law to ensure that the state organized and implemented a survey in the manner 
he had envisioned. As soon as the delegates adopted the constitution, he wasted no time 
formulating a law “for carrying out the plans I had in mind for so many years."^. He 
wrote to various states and countries to obtain copies of the laws governing their surveys 
and sought advice from other state geo lo g ists .H e aimed at writing a law which was 
both concise and “flexible,” not burdened “with too many provisions.”®'* He hoped this 
approach would keep the survey free from political entanglements. The law that Gould 
drafted avoided the “danger” of a large governing board unable to compromise when 
faced with difficult decisions.®  ^ He refused to leave the appointment of the state geologist 
in the hands of any single individual, “not even the governor of the state,” because he 
hoped to keep the director free from the pressure of partisan politics.®^
The final version of the law he drafted codified the University of Oklahoma’s 
influence over the survey and left the state geologist unencumbered by any legal 
restrictions. Gould’s bill called for the creation of a Geological Survey Commission 
which consisted of the governor, the state superintendent of public instruction, and the 
president of the University of Oklahoma.®® These three officials appointed the director of
®® Gould, Travels Through Oklahoma,142. 
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the survey who, because of Gould’s careful wording, “can do almost anything he 
desires.” *^ Once again Gould relied upon personal suasion to ensure that the legislature 
passed his bill. Content that he had written “the kind of law I wanted,” he campaigned 
for its passage and “again my acquaintance over the state stood me in good stead.”’  ^
Because he knew personally almost half of the state legislature and many of the 
constituents of those legislators with whom he was not familiar, the bill faced little 
opposition and the governor signed it into law in 1908. In his memoirs Gould admitted 
no pretensions to serving as director of the survey, but he should not have been too 
surprised when the governor asked him to fill the position since he had so visibly and 
aggressively lobbied for its creation.
Because of Gould’s dual role as founder of the university’s geology department 
and the state’s geological survey, the line between the two entities often blurred and at 
times no line appeared to exist at all. The draft of the bill he presented to the legislature 
helped to codify institutional ties between the university and the survey. In addition to 
vesting the university president with authority to select the director, Gould further blurred 
distinctions between the two institutions by stating in his bill that the University of 
Oklahoma should furnish rooms and equipment until the survey could provide its own.‘°' 
Just before the legislature passed the bill, however, a campus fire eliminated extra space
Ibid.
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at the university and Gould rented four rooms near his home to house the survey.'®  ^
Located so close to his home, Gould had nearly unlimited oversight. Just as the close 
proximity blurred lines between the survey and geology department, so too did the 
activities each undertook. For example, the university catalogue for 1913 included more 
than four pages detailing the nature of survey’s work, publications produced, and 
explained to curious students the advantages of studying at an institution which housed 
the state’s geological research headquarters .T he  geology department and survey’s 
activities continued to overlap even after Gould resigned to work in the private sector. D. 
W. Ghern assumed the directorship and, like Gould before him, chaired the geology 
department which gave him access to students. Geology students benefitted from the 
survey’s affiliation with the university because it afforded summer employment that 
provided valuable experience conducting field work.'^^
The students Gould and Ghem hired conducted field work for the survey and in 
the process gained experience which prepared them to make significant contributions to 
the discipline of petroleum geology as private consultants and as employees of major oil 
companies. In the opinion of one petroleum geologist, “the Gklahoma Geological Survey
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had a decisive part in the sudden progress of petroleum geology during and immediately 
following the Cushing boom, not so much by its publications as by the professional work 
of the geologists whom it trained.”*®^ The combination of coursework taken at the 
university, field trips to locations around the state, and field experience working for the 
survey taught students how to prospect for oil in a manner dramatically different than the 
methods practical men employed. The joint efforts of the geology department and 
geological survey trained a generation of geologists whose efforts began to transform how 
prospectors searched for oil.
Experience had taught Gould the importance of field work and consciously made 
field work the centerpiece of the survey’s activities. Although he feigned ignorance when 
stating that he had merely “an inkling of what was to be done” to organize a survey, his 
decisive action indicated otherwise: “Within an hour after my appointment I had long 
distance telephone calls to five men in different parts of Oklahoma, directing them to 
begin field work.”'®’ By the end of the summer, he had arranged for nine different field 
parties to conduct work throughout Oklahoma.'®* Gould found a ready supply of
'®® J. V. Howell, “History of Petroleum Geology,” Box 16, Edgar Owen 
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History o f  Exploration for Petroleum (Tulsa: American Association of Petroleum 
Geologists, 1975), 278. Note that Owen almost certainly derived his information from 
the Howell document.
'®’ Gould, Covered Wagon Geologist,147.
'®* Ibid.,
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assistants to hire in the geology classes he taught at the university. L. L. Hutchison 
studied at the University of Oklahoma and parlayed the knowledge he gained into a 
profitable business as an independent consultant before most oil companies proved 
willing to hire petroleum geologists. While at the university, he enrolled in classes such 
as economic geology, paleontology, and mineralogy.'”® After graduating, he attended 
Yale University where he received a Master of Science degree."” In addition to his 
academic training in geology, he also gained experience observing firsthand the principles 
he had learned in the classroom. While attending college in Oklahoma, he worked for the 
Oklahoma Geological Survey and studied the stratigraphy of oil fields while traveling in a 
covered wagon in the northeastern corner of the state.'" His astute ability to observe 
geological structures and processes in the field prompted Gould to comment that 
Hutchison was “one of the best men I have ever taken out. He has a keen eye, correlates 
accurately and is able to express intelligently what he has observed.”"^ After graduating 
from Yale in 1908, he returned to Oklahoma where he accepted a position as assistant 
director of the geological survey under Gould and headed a field party that surveyed the
'”® Charles N. Gould to Charles W. Brown, June 1,1908, File 1-1, Box M2179, 
L.L. Hutchison Collection., Western History Collection, University of Oklahoma. 
(Hereafter cited as Hutchison Collection)
Charles N. Gould, “Memorial-Lon Lewis Hutchison,” American Association o f  
Petroleum Geologists Bulletin 31 (March 1947), 650-51.
" 'Ib id ., 650-51.
Gould to Brown, June 1,1908, Hutchison Collection
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northeastern counties he had traveled as a student.”  ^ Hutchison quit the Oklahoma 
Geological Survey after two years and moved to Tulsa where he opened an office as a 
geological consultant. Fifty miles to the north in the smaller town of Bartlesville,
Roswell Johnson continued to struggle as a geological consultant and grew so 
discouraged he left Oklahoma in 1912. Many practical men remained unconvinced of 
geology’s utility, but others began to believe that they could not ignore this emerging new
Science.
Starting in 1913, the demand for petroleum geologists greatly increased as both 
practical men and oil companies sought geologists’ services.**'' While Johnson struggled 
to make a living, Hutchison found his services in such high demand that he became “the 
first man in the state to devote his entire time to petroleum geology,” suggesting that a 
new era in the history of the oil industry and geologists’ place within it was about to 
begin. **^ The knowledge Hutchison acquired at the university as well as his experience 
traveling the state as assistant director of the Oklahoma Geological Survey enabled him to 
increase the probability of finding oil before investors incurred the expense of drilling.
His consulting fees increased so much that by 1911 he realized he could afford to resign 
from the survey because “my private affair matters bring me a living.”**^ Although
**^ Gould, “Memorial-Lon Lewis Hutchison,” 650-51.
**'* Owen, Trek o f  the Oil Finders, 293.
**^ Charles N. Gould, “Memorial-Lon Lewis Hutchison,” American Association o f  
Petroleum Geologists Bulletin 31 (March 1947), 651.
**® L. L. Hutchison to Tom Wall, February 14, 1911, File 2 “Correspondence 
Regarding Hutchison’s Work as a Consulting Geologist,” Box 2, L. L. Hutchison
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careful never to charge for advice he gave while working for the Survey, Hutchison had 
written a number of reports for individuals and companies including the practical oil man 
Tom Slick. Even though Tom Slick drilled the initial well at Cushing, Hutchison played 
a pivotal role in the huge amount of oil this field eventually produced. Several other 
geologists played important roles in various oil ventures on or near the Cushing anticline 
and their work collectively caused many practical men who had once viewed geology 
with contempt to begin viewing it favorably.
Like Hutchison, Frank Buttram took geology classes at the University of 
Oklahoma and worked for the Oklahoma Geological Survey, and his work on the 
Cushing field further convinced practical men to take petroleum geology seriously. In 
addition to employing different methods for finding oil, geologists and practical men 
typically did not enter the oil industry in the same manner. Whereas Slick was “bom 
among the oil derricks” in Pennsylvania and smelled oil upon taking his first breath of air, 
Buttram was born in 1886 to a poor farming family who had migrated to Indian Territory 
from Missouri."* He worked his way through the Teachers’ Institute at Tecumseh, 
Oklahoma, received high grades, and earned a certificate to teach school. After finding
Collection, Western History Collection, University of Oklahoma.
Owen, Trek o f  th Oil Finders, 294.
"* C. B. Glasscock, Then Came Oil: The Story o f the Last Frontier (New York; 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1938), 315. Buttram’s daughter wrote a very filiopietistic biography of 
her father, but it it is useful for factual details. Merle Buttram, One M an’s Footprints: 
The Story o f  Frank Buttram (Muskogee: Western Heritage Books, 1985); C. C. B., 
“Frank Buttram, 1886-1966,” in Huffman, History o f  the School o f  Geology and 
Geophysics, 220.
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employment as a teacher, he continued taking college classes at the Normal School in 
Edmond until 1909 when he acquired enough credits to enter the University of Oklahoma 
as a junior where he received a bachelor’s degree in chem istry .B u ttram  continued his 
education and while pursuing a master’s degree caught the attention of Gould who hired 
him to work as a chemist for the s u r v e y . T h i s  position familiarized Buttram with the 
state’s geology and initiated his entrance into the oil b u s i n e s s . H e  authored three 
bulletins while working for the survey, and one entitled “The Cushing Oil Field” served 
as a key turning point in the way Midcontinent prospectors found oil and in the history of 
the oil industry.
Buttram’s bulletin and the accompanying maps demonstrated to practical 
operators that a relationship existed between anticlines and the accumulation of oil. Slick 
drilled the Cushing discovery well in March 1913, and approximately four months later 
Buttram led a team of geologists in an effort to survey and map the oil f i e l d . T h e  
survey devoted most of its resources that year to surveying and mapping the Cushing 
field.’^ '* In December 1914, the Oklahoma Geological Survey published bulletin number
‘ Glasscock, Then Came Oil, 315-316.
™ Ibid., 317.
‘2* Ibid.
Ibid.
C. C. B., “Frank Buttram,” in Huffman, History o f the School o f  Geology and 
Geophysics, 220.
J. V. Howell, “History of Petroleum Geology,” Owen Collection.
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eighteen, a report written by Buttram which was the “best description of any mid­
continent oil field which had ever been published.”*^  ^ Beyond just describing the field, 
though, Buttram’s real accomplishment lay in demonstrating that Cushing’s subsurface 
geology bore a direct relationship to the location of oil. By mapping the area’s surface 
and subsurface geology, he convinced practical men that “geologists were able to predict 
the limits of production of Cushing.”*^® His ability to articulate and illustrate geology’s 
relationship to oil made his work “the first important oil publication in Oklahoma...”' ’^ 
When practical men found oil on the basis of Buttram’s maps, geologists “gained the 
confidence of the oil operators” because they had provided a predictable method for 
locating oil.’^ * With geologists’ maps to assist them, “the structure of these fields was 
taken as the type to be sought elsewhere,” and practical men expanded out from the initial 
well to find additional domes or anticlines in each d i r e c t i on . Th e  more success 
practical men scored on the basis of information gleaned from Buttram’s maps, the more 
they believed that geology, and particularly the anticlinal theory, could lead them to oil.
Ibid., p. 8; Frank Buttram, The Cushing Oil and Gas Field, Oklahoma, 
Oklahoma Geological Survey Bulletin No. 18 (Norman: Oklahoma Geological Survey, 
1914)
Sidney Powers, “Petroleum Geology in Oklahoma,” Oil and Gas in Oklahoma. 
Oklahoma Geological Survey Bulletin 40, Volume 1 (Norman: Oklahoma Geological 
Survey, 1928), 8; Merle, One M an’s Footprints, 35.
Edward Bloesch, “Early Day Petroleum Geology in Oklahoma,” File: Ed 
Bloesch letters. Box 3A, Owen Collection.
Powers, “Petroleum Geology in Oklahoma,” 8.
Ibid.
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As they encountered additional oil throughout 1914 by drilling into deeper sands, “the 
proof by drilling that geological maps of surface outcrops delimited oil accumulation 
gave further impetus to geological reconnaissance.”'^ ”
Buttram’s work at Cushing placed petroleum geology on a firm foundation and 
provided impetus to the formation of the Fortuna Oil Company, a venture he started with
D. W. Ghem and a group of New York investors. Buttram’s report on the Cushing field 
caught the attention of executives for the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company who met 
with him in their New York offices to ask, ‘“How can you get us into the oil business in 
Oklahoma?’”'”' He left the meeting with a $40,000 advance to finance the Fortuna Oil 
Company, a venture in which he collaborated with Ohem. Both men received stock in 
the company and quit their jobs at the survey to devote their full attention to building the 
company. Over the next few years, Fortuna demonstrated “an outstanding record of 
success” based solely upon the recommendations of Buttram and Ohem.'”^  Employing 
their geological expertise, the first seven out of eight wells they drilled resulted in good 
production.'”” They achieved these successes by “the discovery of surface structures,” 
demonstrating the validity of the ideas Buttram and other geologists had been
Ibid.
'”' Quoted in Buttram, One M an’s Footprints, 41.
Jerry B. Newby, “Daniel Webster Ohern,” Memorial, American Association o f  
Petroleum Geologists Bulletin 38/5 (May 1954), 963.
Buttram, One M an’s Footprints, 13; For a more complete description of the 
location of the wells they discovered, see Newby, “Daniel Webster Ohern,” 963.
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ar t icula t ing.The company quickly gained a reputation because of its geologists’ 
suceessful track record in locating oil.'^^ As the industry began to take notice of 
Fortuna’s success, the company sold a 48-acre lease to the Roxana Petroleum Company 
in 1915 for one million d o l l a r s . I n  less than four years, Fortuna acquired and developed 
a significant number of oil fields, and the original investors sold-out to the Magnolia Oil 
Company in 1918 for $8 million."^ At the age of 32, Buttram was a millionaire. 
Subsequent to the sale of Fortuna, he started his own oil company and in the early 1920s 
began acquiring large leases near the Corsicana field in east Texas and in Oklahoma’s 
Wewoka-Seminole field.’^ * In exchanging their positions as state employees for more 
remunerative possibilities in the private sector, Buttram and Ohem followed the lead of 
Gould who had also quit the survey in order to make more money working for the oil 
industry.
The oil industry in Oklahoma had just begun to boom when Gould resigned from 
the university and geological survey to work as an independent geological consultant in
Newby, “Daniel Webster Ohern,” 963.
Buttram, One M an’s Footprints, 15.
Howell “History of Petroleum Geology,” 8-9; Buttram, One M an’s Footprints,
15.
Jerry B. Newby, “George Franklin Buttram and Fortuna Oil Company,” in 
George Garrett Huffman, History o f  the School o f  Geology and Geophysics (Norman: 
Alumni Advisory Council of the School of Geology and Geophysics, University of 
Oklahoma, 1990), 245. Buttram’s daughter says that Fortuna was sold for $6 million. 
Buttram, One M an’s Footprints, 13.
Buttram, One M an’s Footprints, 43.
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1908, but he was never able to profit as much as some of his students had. When he 
embarked upon his career in private industry, prospectors in the Midcontinent region 
generally did not recognize the relationship between anticlines and the presence of oil. 
Gould had not actively taught the idea to his students and even discouraged many from 
entering the oil business. Perhaps his most famous student, Everette DeGolyer, 
remembered that “during this period of 1904 to 1908 when I was exposed, so to speak, to 
geologic influences, Gould used to take the attitude with us students that ‘if  we had taken 
up geology at an earlier date, there might have been an opportunity for us in oil geology 
but that the future did not look very bright as the big fields, such as Spindletop, Glenn 
Pool, and Caddo, had already been discovered.’"’^ ® Fortunately, DeGolyer did not follow 
Gould’s advice. Shortly after hearing this discouraging news he defied his mentor by 
taking a job for an oil company and discovered huge reserves of oil in Mexico. Although 
still in his early twenties, DeGolyer’s income quickly eclipsed the university professor’s 
salary.
Other students who studied under Gould would also prove their mentor wrong by 
playing a pivotal role in discovering much of the oil in Oklahoma. Although he had not 
trained them as oil prospectors, he indirectly gained acceptance for geologists within the 
industry by taking his students onto Oklahoma’s landscapes and teaching them how to 
conduct field work both in his classes and as members of the geological survey. They 
built upon these experiences and parlayed what they had learned into knowledge oil
Everette DeGolyer to James A. Veasey, June 10, 1941, Belt-line theory, James 
A. Veasey collection, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming.
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companies desired for mapping and rationalizing nature in order to reap a profit. Gould 
also attempted to profit from his geological expertise by working as an oil industry 
consultant but could never entirely escape bis affinity for pure scientific research and bis 
appreciation for nature’s aesthetic rather than utilitarian value.
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Chapter 5 
“Henry L. Doherty:
From Independent Consulting to Corporate Geological Research”
After leaving the University of Oklahoma and the state geological survey to work 
as an independent consultant, Charles Gould reaffirmed his legacy as a superb instructor 
of field geology but merely a mediocre oil-finding expert when he acquired a contract 
with the Empire Gas and Fuel Company to locate natural gas. Empire was one of 
approximately 150 companies within the Cities Service Holding Company, a 
conglomerate presided over by Henry L. Doherty. Empire was one of the first oil 
companies to train and recruit petroleum geologists and to establish a permanent 
geological research department as part of its corporate structure. Doherty committed 
himself to utilizing the knowledge of university-trained employees to ensure that his 
companies remained at the forefront of the oil and gas industry. Empire hired Gould as 
an independent consultant when it first began considering the idea of utilizing geological 
expertise, but it was Gould’s student, Everett Carpenter, who discovered two of the 
largest oil and gas fields in the state of Kansas. Doherty departed from standard oil 
industry practice by embracing this emerging new science and revealed to other large oil 
companies the benefits of hiring and retaining geologists as part of the production 
process. The manner in which Doherty mobilized his companies to locate oil and gas 
provides another significant episode in the history of petroleum geology.
Doherty fit the image of Horatio Alger so perfectly and the story of his success so
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captivated those who heard it that they often attributed Cities Service’s accomplishments 
to him alone, but many other employees also deserved credit for the company’s 
innovations. One senior-level employee expressed awe at his boss’s remarkable rise to 
success: “The story of Henry L. Doherty is a Horatio Alger story that outshines all the 
Horatio Alger stories at their best.”  ^ Although the rise of Cities Service owed much to 
Doherty’s engineering genius, he exhibited perhaps even greater brilliance in devising 
programs to train and educate his workforce. He hoped to cultivate innovators like 
himself who could craft technical solutions to problems the company encountered. 
Doherty declared, “If I am ever known for anything I would prefer to be known as a man 
who could develop men rather than a man who could pick men.”  ^ This image remained 
fixed in the minds of other Cities Service personnel.
W. Alton Jones, Doherty’s successor, remembered him as a man dedicated to 
recruiting highly-educated personnel and working aggressively to inculcate employees 
who lacked an education with knowledge that would benefit the company. Jones 
conceded that Doherty’s charismatic and towering persona often overshadowed 
contributions of other key personnel in observing that “Mr. Doherty’s eminence was such 
that many gained an impression of Cities Service as a one-man organization. Nothing
 ^Everett Carpenter, “Reminiscences of Everett Carpenter,” Shale Shaker 
(September 1965) in Digest V: A Compilation o f Unaltered Geologic Papers from Shale 
Shaker, Volumes 15-17,1964-1967 (Oklahoma City: Times-Joumal Publishing 
Company, 1968), 431.
 ^Henry L. Doherty, Principles and Ideas for Doherty Men, vol. 2, comp. Glenn 
Marston (Printed for the use of Members of the Doherty Organization, 1923), 143.
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could be further from the truth.”'' Far from denigrating Doherty’s contributions, however, 
Jones hailed him as an innovator, particularly because he “devoted his principal attention 
to the development of men.”  ^ Doherty pioneered “in the recruitment of engineering talent 
from the schools and universities” and when the workers he hired lacked sufficient 
training he developed “special training schools to instruct these recruits in applying their 
specialties to the requirements of Cities Service and of the business world.”® His 
commitment to recruiting and sustaining a highly-educated and well-trained workforce 
guided his efforts to build Cities Service into a dominant holding company of gas and 
electric utilities.
Doherty grew convinced of the need for university-trained engineers while 
managing Denver Light and Electric. He felt that the existing workforce lacked the kind 
of knowledge necessary for preparing the company to adapt to changes about to transform 
the industry. Hands-on experience provided the best training for workers to learn their 
jobs since the gas industry began. Self-educated workers continued to dominate the 
industry into the twentieth century, a point Doherty confirmed in 1904 when he suggested 
that the majority of employees in the gas utility business one “might classify under the 
greatly abused term o f ‘practical men.’”  ^ Although lacking a technical background, these
'' W. Alton Jones, The Cities Service Story: A Case o f American Enterprise (New 
York, San Francisco, and Montreal: The Newcomen Society in North America, 1955), 22.
® Jones, The Cities Service Story, 22.
® Ibid., 22.
 ^Doherty, Principles and Ideas for Doherty Men, vol. 2,104.
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workers possessed “valuable practical experience” and were “the kind of men that can 
never be entirely eliminated and there is no desire to do so...”* Practical men contributed 
significantly to the industry throughout the nineteenth century, but the necessity of 
providing gas for new markets in growing cities increasingly required skills they did not 
possess. To make this point, Doherty cited two examples of superintendents he had 
known who could neither read nor write but secured “better than average results of all gas 
companies throughout the country at that time.”’ Although they were “remarkable men in 
their way,” he contended that they “would be entirely out of place with our present 
methods,” not to mention that “the gas business already possesses a preponderance of this 
class of men...”*° Of course, workers who lacked technical training could always educate 
themselves by reading company manuals in their spare time as Doherty had done, but 
most chose not to exercise this option.
Even though Doherty reached a position of eminence within the gas utility 
business by educating himself, he believed a gradual but drastic transformation had been 
taking place within the industry that would eventually make all but the most brilliant self- 
educated workmen obsolete. As America’s cities grew, companies looked for 
technologically sophisticated solutions to the problems of locating and supplying gas to 
expanding markets. Organizational changes necessary to accommodate new ways of 
conducting business required skills and knowledge many workers did not possess.
* Ibid., 106.
’ Ibid., 105.
Ibid., 105,106-107.
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Doherty observed that “the gas business was formerly carried on as a craft, but is 
gradually undergoing a change and will eventually be carried on as a science.”" He 
placed practical men who made-up the bulk of the workforce squarely within the “craft” 
tradition because “they were not scientists, their education was limited, and they were at 
least indifferent to scientific methods and technical training.”"  Far from remaining 
“indifferent,” Doherty embraced science and technology and this orientation set him apart 
from the typical practical man.
What bothered him more than practical men’s aversion to new ideas was their 
outright contempt for university-educated engineers who initiated many of the changes he 
believed the gas industry required. Reflecting upon his statement about practical men’s 
indifference toward science and technology, Doherty observed that “indifference is hardly 
the word to use” because many expressed outright “opposition to technically trained men 
and to scientific and exact methods.”"  In fact, he observed, “it is not hard to find men in 
tihe gas business who have an outspoken contempt for a college education.”"  Even 
though he too lacked a formal education, he embraced the university as a training ground 
for prospective employees. He hoped to recruit a new type of employee, one “thoroughly
" Ibid., 104.
"  Ibid.
"  Ibid.
"  Ibid., 107. This was not an uncommon feeling, as “field” engineers in other 
professions typically resented coworkers who had received “theoretical” training. David 
Noble, America By Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise o f Corporate Capitalism 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1977), 27.
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educated and possessing all the necessary fundamental knowledge to enable them to take 
up the special problems of the gas business. This, to the writer’s mind, means a college 
educated man...”*^ Doherty’s commitment to hiring engineers grew so strong that he 
equated opposition to this idea as an impediment to the industry’s growth.
Practical men had grown so entrenched in their beliefs about how to conduct their 
jobs that they blocked the entry of new ideas which might invigorate the industry. In 
stubbornly refiising to acknowledge when their methods had grown obsolete, practical 
men “insist in spite of increased knowledge and changed conditions, on following what 
was considered good practice twenty years ago.”'® They failed to recognize that 
“conditions are changing and we must change to meet them.”'’ Doherty believed many 
practical men remained provincially wedded to traditions which had served them in the 
past and unwilling to consider new ways of conducting their work: “They do not take 
kindly to proposed changes and prefer to see the business conducted along the lines of 
traditions of doubtful origin.”'* Clinging to outdated work habits even as the industry 
changed, “the man who may have been a leader in the gas fraternity twenty years ago may 
be an obstacle to progress today.”'® Slowly but surely, however, “these obstacles are
Doherty, Principles and Ideas for Doherty Men, vol. 2, 106-107. 
'® Ibid., 105.
'’ Ibid.
'* Ibid.
'® Ibid.
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being overcome...” ®^ Within recent years, the example of college educated men who had 
made “remarkable progress” served as “an incentive for others to endure the direct 
opposition, and sometimes ridicule, to which they have been compelled to subject 
themselves.” *^ Throughout the first decade of the twentieth century and increasingly 
thereafter, Doherty hired those engineering graduates bold enough to run the gauntlet of 
ridicule dished-out by the industry’s practical men.
Even though some universities began engineering programs throughout the last 
two decades of the nineteenth century, Doherty initially could not find graduates with 
specific knowledge of the gas and electric industry which prompted him to create a 
training school designed to supplement their theoretical knowledge with practical 
experience. Due to the shortage of engineers, he initially hired graduates of Denver’s 
technological high school, gave them the title of “apprentice,” and insisted that they 
attend an informal instructional program designed to provide on-the-job training.^^ He 
encouraged the apprentices to continue acquiring theoretical knowledge by enrolling in 
correspondence schools, offering to pay up to 100 percent of their tuition.^^ In 
approximately 1905, he began hiring graduates of engineering colleges from throughout
Ibid., 104.
2* Ibid., 104.
Mark H. Rose, Cities o f Light and Heat: Domesticating Gas and Electricity in 
Urban America (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University, 1995), 74. 
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the nation and added a more formal cast to the training program, dubbing it the “Doherty 
School of Practice,” and granting new recruits the title “Cadet Engineer.^" Even though 
instructors instituted a prescribed curriculum and taught in a more formal classroom 
setting, the school maintained its goal of providing cadets with a forum where they “could 
obtain practical experience to supplement their theoretical education. From 1904 to 
1932, the Doherty training school admitted 1,059 engineers, almost half of whom 
remained with the company at the end of that period.^® Although the school successfully 
infused the company with new ideas to prepare for sweeping changes Doherty believed 
would soon transform the gas and electric utility industries, the company never lost sight 
of the need to strike a delicate balance between theoretical information and practical 
experience.
Although company executives welcomed the opportunity to integrate the latest 
technological ideas into a workforce which had been dominated by practical men, they 
saw the school as a vehicle to ensure that engineers not get lost in a theoretical haze and 
learn how to apply their knowledge in order to enhance efficiency and streamline 
production. Jones described the training program as a forum “to develop men who can
24 Ibid.
Ibid., 75; W. Alton Jones, “Services of Henry L. Doherty and Company to 
Subsidiaries of Cities Service Company,” p. 1, vol. II, chapter 6, Box 14, Cities Service 
Collection, Western History Collection, University of Oklahoma. (Hereafter cited as 
Cities Service Collection)
Jones, “Services of Henry L. Doherty and Company,” Cities Service Collection
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apply their technical training with good sense and good judgment.” ’^ Instructors at the 
school echoed this sentiment. They strove to indoctrinate engineers with a perspective 
wide enough to understand how the company functioned but critical enough to identify 
problems without getting lost in the details of day-to-day operations. Given this 
orientation, personality played a significant role in the type of men admitted: “The kind 
of men we need are men with large enough vision to see the problem as a whole and 
separate the essential object to be achieved from the details now in vogue for achieving 
these essentials.” *^ To ensure that students received every opportunity to acquire 
practical experience, instructors required them to spend a limited amount of time in each 
department. This approach worked well, particularly because “the men being fresh from 
school absorb information rapidly and eagerly grasp the opportunity to supplement their 
theoretical training with a wide range of practical knowledge.” ’^ Doherty’s School of 
Practice proved such a success for training young men in the utility industry that he 
applied the same philosophy to the engineers he hired after acquiring several oil and 
natural gas companies.
Already convinced that university-educated engineers would play a vital role in 
the gas and electric utility industries, Doherty acted quickly to hire similar recruits and 
train them at his School of Practice when he purchased more than fifty oil and gas 
companies. In 1912, Doherty organized Empire Gas and Fuel to serve as the parent
Ibid., 6.
Ibid.
Ibid., 9.
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company of several gas and oil properties he purchased throughout Kansas, Oklahoma, 
and Arkansas. Just as he had trained engineers to work in his utility companies, he 
employed the same strategy to fill the ranks of his oil and gas companies with employees 
who possessed a mix of technological knowledge and hands-on experience. As the oil 
and natural gas industries boomed during the first two decades of the twentieth century, 
“the demand for trained men in this work became urgent” to Empire executives.^® They 
responded by opening an additional training program in Bartlesville, Oklahoma “to train 
technical graduates in the oil and gas business.”®' In addition to engineers, the 
Bartlesville program recruited university geology graduates.®® The program accepted 
eight recruits in 1916 and twenty-five the follovving year.®® Although no students entered 
the program in 1918, the number skyrocketed to 100 in 1919.®'* Numbers tapered off 
thereafter, probably a reflection of the oil industry’s boom and bust cycle.
As with the public utility training course, Doherty’s school in oil and gas 
production required engineers to spend time in all departments in order to gain as much 
practical experience as possible. Students at the Bartlesville branch participated in tasks 
as diverse as accounting, scouting, auto service, and warehouse work. Of course, they
®® Ibid., 7.
®' Ibid.
®® Charles A. Warner, “Sources of Men,” in History o f Petroleum Engineering 
(New York: American Petroleum Institute, 1961), 55.
®® Jones, “Services of Henry L. Doherty and Company,” 8.
®‘* Ibid. The total number of students who received training in the oil and gas 
business alone equaled 352 from 1916 to 1931.
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also spent time in the oil and gas fields where “they learn production at first hand, as 
roustabouts on the leases and clerks in the field offices. They are thus brought in direct 
contact with field problems, both production and engineering.”^^  As much as Doherty 
pinned his hopes on young engineers to lead Empire Gas and Fuel into the future, the 
training program aimed to maximize their exposure to practical men such as 
“roustabouts” and “clerks in the field offices” who could provide a perspective engineers 
would never have received either in a classroom or an office. As Americans consumed 
more oil and Empire expanded its operations to include gasoline manufacturing plants 
and oil refineries, students spent time in these facilities too and learned “by actual 
experience how the various products of crude oil are made and prepared for the market.” ®^ 
Practical men demonstrated by example how to perform specific tasks engineers had 
never encountered, and in this respect contributed as much to the learning process as did 
the instructors. The Doherty School of Practice drew upon a wealth of experience by 
exposing its engineers at every turn to practical men working in the field at tasks many 
had been performing all their lives.
Even before Empire established the Bartleville training program, the work 
traditions of practical men influenced Empire’s approach to oil production because the 
previous owner of the subsidiaries which made-up this parent company built them from a 
lifetime of experiences as a Peimsylvania oil man. Doherty purchased the fifty-six oil and 
gas companies which became Empire Gas and Fuel Company in 1912 from Theodore N.
Ibid., 11. 
Ibid.
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Barnsdall, a Pittsburgh-based practical oil man. Empire’s three most important 
subsidiaries were the Wichita Natural Gas Company, the Quapaw Gas Company, and a 
large interest in the Indian Territory Illuminating Company (I. T. I. By acquiring 
these companies, Doherty marked his entrance into the Midcontinent oil and gas industry 
but also inherited the problem of locating new natural gas reserves to supply their 
customers which had been running dangerously low. The men Doherty’s company 
assembled provided a solution to the problem of diminishing natural gas reserves which 
placed petroleum geology on a firm foundation within the oil and gas industry. One of 
the men who contributed to this effort included Barnsdall himself who retained a minority 
interest in each property and continued to play a role in management-level decisions.^* 
Barnsdall was a second-generation Pennsylvania practical oil man who had 
achieved great success and wealth by the time he and Doherty came into contact. The 
success of Drake’s well in 1859 inspired Barnsdall’s father, William, to undertake his 
own search for oil and he drilled the nation’s second commercial well in a nearby location
William Donohue Ellis, On the Oil Lands with Cities Service. (Cities Service 
Oil and Gas Corporation, 1983), 40, 55. According to Ellis, Doherty acquired a total of 
eighteen companies on July 1, 1912. See Ellis pg. 56n8 for a list of all but two of these. 
However, Everett Carpenter who worked for Empire reported that Doherty acquired from 
Barnsdall “about fifty-six separate oil properties and two gas companies...” Everett 
Carpenter, “As I Remember It,” Shale Shaker (June 1957), 40, in folder entitled, “Everett 
Carpenter—Company’s Full-time Geologist,” Box 5, Cities Service Collection.
Edgar Wesley Owen, Trek o f the Oil Finders: A History o f  Exploration for  
Petroleum (Tulsa: American Association of Petroleum Geologists, 1975), 298; Although 
Doherty acquired Barnsdall’s shares in ITIO, he did not became the majority shareholder 
until later.
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on his brother-in-law’s farm.^’ As Pennsylvania’s oil boomed, William soon acquired the 
wealth to send his second son, Theodore, to a preparatory school but after a brief stint 
realized that a job in Barnsdall Oil Company rather than a scholar’s life better suited the 
rebellious lad.'*® Theodore thrived in the atmosphere of a booming oil town and seemed 
at play among the confidence men, wildcatters, speculators, and gamblers/' He quickly 
earned the reputation of a savvy businessman who instinctively recognized a good deal, 
and at the age of sixteen successfully brought-in his own well/^ Theodore extended his 
holdings to Oklahoma and Kansas by 1912 when his western-most companies caught the 
attention of Doherty. Barnsdall’s aversion to academic life and instinctive business 
acumen enabled him to blend well among practical oil men but did not prevent him from 
hiring a prospector who systematically studied geology to find oil rather than relying upon 
hunch or intuition.
Shortly after 1903 when William B. Pine arrived in Indian Territory, he began 
studying geology and eventually gained employment finding new oil reserves for 
Barnsdall. Prior to accepting this position. Pine spent approximately three years working 
for an oil-well equipment distributor and in his spare time supplemented his income as a
Norman M. and Dorothy K. Karasick, The Oilman’s Daughter: A Biography o f  
Aline Barnsdall (Encino, California: Carleston Publishing, Inc., 1993), 5; The Derrick's 
Hand-Book o f Petroleum. A Complete Chronological and Statistical Review o f  
Petroleum Developments during 1859 to 1898. Vol. 1 (Oil City, PA: Derrick Publishing 
Company, 1898), 870.
Karasick, The Oilman’s Daughter, 6.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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creek skimmer.'*^ This activity involved skimming the surface of creeks to collect oil that 
leaked into the water from natural reserves beneath the ground. His work experiences 
taught him many of the most rudimentary aspects of the early oil industry’s production 
and prospecting techniques. Finding oil through the application of geology did not 
qualify as accepted practice during his informal apprenticeship, but Pine began studying 
the subject through a correspondence course.'''^ In 1906, he parlayed what he had learned 
into a job scouting oil reserves for Barnsdall.''^ Over the course of three years. Pine 
worked with Bamsdall’s general manager, F. M. Robinson, to acquire 40,000 acres of oil 
leases.'"  ^ When Barnsdall decided to relinquish control of the leases. Pine and Robinson 
took them over. Pine earned enough money to initiate wildcat prospects of his own and 
achieved significant success as an independent operator.'*’ He believed that the 
application of geology lay behind his prosperity and differentiated him from other 
independent oil men who continued to rely on intuition, dowsing, and other less scientific 
methods."** Whether Pine’s geological prospecting method by itself won him Bamsdall’s 
favor remains unclear. What is clear, however, is that Barnsdall showed no fear in hiring
"** Maynard J. Hanson, “Senator William B. Pine and His Times,” (M. A. 
Thesis-University of South Dakota-1983), 6.
"^* Ibid.
"*' Ibid.
"*" Ibid., 9.
Ibid., 10.
"* Ibid.
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men who used this emerging, new science.
Although motivated primarily to help a friend in need, Barnsdall bucked the 
traditional antipathy practical men felt for geologists when he hired Herbert R. Straight 
who possessed a degree in geology from Stanford University. Other than Straight’s 
university education, the two men had much in common. Straight’s father was also 
among Pennsylvania’s early oil pioneers, following on the heels of Drake and William 
Barnsdall by drilling the nation’s third commercial well.''® Like many practical men who 
relied on intuition rather than science for finding oil, the elder Straight “was imaginative 
and creative in his approach to drilling and to prospecting for oil.” °^ This expertise 
directly benefitted his son because “during summer vacations, it was customary for 
Herbert to work on his fathers [sic] leases near Bradford Penna, hwere [sic] his father 
lived.” '^ Herbert took leave fi-om helping his father for three and a half years prior to 1896 
to attend Stanford where he graduated with a degree in geology in 1896.^  ^ After school, 
he returned to Pennsylvania and worked for his father’s oil company until either 1911 
when the elder Straight “suffered financial reverses” and could no longer employ his
Lois Straight Johnson, “Bartlesville Historical Society,” April 16, 1975, H. R. 
Straight, Box 14, Cities Serviee Collection.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid; Straight’s reasons for attending college are not entirely clear, but one 
latter-day biographer offered the vague statement that he “began to realize the importance 
and need for academic background” and thus enrolled at Stanford. “Biographical 
Sketch-Herbert R. Straight,” October 8,1954, H. R. Straight, Box 14, Cities Service 
Collection. This file contains numerous but brief biographies of Straight which mostly 
take the form of press releases.
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son/^ Herbert soon found employment when his friend, T. N. Barnsdall, offered him a 
job overseeing oil and gas properties in Oklahoma. When Doherty acquired Barnsdall’s 
holdings, his decision to retain Straight as general manager of the oil and gas division 
revealed an affinity for scientifically-trained experts that was ahead of its time within the 
oil and gas industries but consistent with the philosophy he had employed since his 
earliest days in business.^'' Straight’s degree in geology qualified him as the new breed of 
university-educated employee Empire increasingly sought to hire, but in assembling the 
company Doherty chose executives and managers who complemented each other with a 
mix of practical experience and theoretical knowledge. As president of the new properties 
he chose a longtime Pennsylvania oil man, J. C. McDowell, who had worked as general 
manager of the famous J. M. Guffey Petroleum Company which had played a significant 
role in Spindletop and later grew into the Gulf Oil Company.^^ Guffey and his partner
Johnson, “Bartlesville Historical Society,” Cities Service Collection; Herbert 
Straight to James A. Veasey, May 17, 1941, Belt-line theory. Box 23, James A. Veasey 
collection, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming. (Hereafter cited as Veasey 
Collection)
Although a practical oil man, Barnsdall probably had no aversion to geology 
and it may have even appealed to him and motived him to hire both Pine and Straight. 
Petroleum geology was accepted by oil companies outside the United States at a much 
earlier date. The first company to employ geology in Oklahoma was the Union des 
Pétroles d‘Oklahoma in 1911, originating out of Holland and Paris. Straight worked for 
this company at some point but I have been unable to determine the beginning date of his 
employment. It is highly possible that this position drew him to Oklahoma and the 
geology he practiced there made him an even more attractive candidate to Barnsdall and 
eventually to Doherty. Owen, Trek o f the Oil Finders, 291-92; Samuel P. Ellison, Jr., 
Joseph J. Jones, and Mirva Owen, eds.. The Flavor o f  Ed Owen: A Geologists Looks Back 
(Austin: Geology Foundation, University of Texas at Austin, 1987), 11.
Everett Carpenter to Edgar W. Owen, July 31,1963, Folder 88, Box 1, Everett 
Carpenter Collection, Western History Collection, University of Oklahoma, (Hereafter
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John H. Galey earned a reputation as two of the oil industry’s most famous wildcatters 
and two of the earliest to hire geologists.^® They bucked the industry’s anti-geologist 
sentiments in 1885 when they hired I. C. White who performed the now-famous location 
of oil by applying the anticlinal theory.”  Although Guffey and Galey’s refusal to eschew 
technical knowledge outright remained the exception among practical men, they almost 
certainly would have demanded that McDowell as their general manager demonstrate a 
similar tolerance. The man beneath McDowell in Empire’s executive hierarchy exhibited 
an even greater orientation toward technical knowledge.
Alfred J. Deischer served as Empire’s vice-president and, like Doherty, had little 
formal education but acquired technical expertise as a self-taught engineer and produced a 
number of innovations which benefitted the company.®* The Diescher family was of 
German descent but Alfred’s father, Samuel, emigrated from Hungary after studying at 
Carlsruhe Polytechnic College and the University of Zurich and working as a mechanical 
designer for various industrial enterprises throughout Europe.®® In America, the senior
cited as Carpenter Collection). This letter is reprinted in its entirety as “Reminiscences of 
Everett Carpenter,” Shale Shaker (September 1965) in Digest V: A Compilation o f  
Unaltered Geologic Papers from Shale Shaker, Volumes 15-17, 1964-1967 (Oklahoma 
City: Times-Journal Publishing Company, 1968), 431.
®® They hired petroleum geologists Lee Hager in 1901. Lee Hager to James A. 
Veasey, June 5, 1941, Belt-line theory. Box 23, Veasey Collection.
Owen, Trek o f the Oil Finders, 298.
®* Ibid.
®® Arthur B. Fox, “The Incline Builders: Forgotten Engineers of Pittsburgh,” 
Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, June 1,1997.
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Deischer built a sueeessful engineering firm and designed and constructed projects such 
as steel bridges, incline planes, pipelines, oil pumping stations, and gas compressor 
stations.®® Alfred quit high school during his first semester to begin working in his 
father’s Pittsburgh engineering practice and eventually became a full-member of the 
firm.®' The lack of formal education did not deter Alfred from working in his spare time 
to prepare himself as an engineer. A subordinate of Diescher’s at Empire, Everett 
Carpenter, reealled that his boss “mastered Trigonometry, Analytical Geometry, 
Differential and Integral Calculus all on his own.”®^ Although Carpenter had received a 
geology degree from the University of Oklahoma, his formal education did not diminish 
the esteem he held for the self-edueated Dieseher whom he considered a “clear thinking 
and far seeing individual with a keenly analytical mind.”®^ Similarly, Diescher showed 
none of the traditional disdain for geologists exhibited by many practical men. According 
to one account, “Dieseher was paying much attention to geology for some time before 
1913,” which is the year he hired Carpenter to employ the skills he had aequired .®‘‘
Diescher placed enough faith in geology to hire Carpenter who he hoped could 
find additional reserves of natural gas to supply the subsidiaries Doherty had purchased
®® Ibid.; Carpenter to Owen, July 31,1963, Everett Carpenter Collection.
®' Carpenter to Owen, July 31,1963, Everett Carpenter Collection.
®" Ibid.
®" Ibid.
®'' John H. Kane to James A. Veasey, July 15, 1941, Belt-line theory. Box 23, 
Veasey Colleetion.
178
from Barnsdall. The field work Carpenter practiced as a student at the University of 
Oklahoma and later at the U.S.G.S. facilitated his ability to locate and map the anticlines 
which held the gas Diescher desired. Carpenter began exploring near Augusta, Kansas 
because “some small showings had been found in some wildcat wells.”^^  Nothing 
particularly “geological” led him to the site other than the “small showings,” and like 
some practical men he merely looked for oil by following the success of others.^® After 
arriving in the immediate vicinity, however, his approach changed significantly. He 
began surveying the area to acquaint himself with the surface geology and identified two 
stratigraphie layers of limestone which he then “mapped by pacing the distances from 
numerous points on the outcrops to Section lines and comers.”^^  Carpenter drew upon 
skills he had learned at the U.S.O.S. to depict in visual form the geology he had observed. 
After carefully traversing the area, he documented the surface geology so that “the 
outcrops were appropriately indicated and colored on a map.”®* Rather than merely 
draAving pictures of what he had observed, “the inclination or dip of the rocks was shown 
by the conventional dip and strike symbols then in use.”®^ With his work completed, he 
expressed satisfaction that “it was a noble map-one that would warm the heart of the
®® Ibid. 
®® Ibid. 
®’ Ibid. 
®* Ibid. 
®" Ibid.
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most cold blooded.”™ With map in hand, he set-out to convince his boss how they would 
find natural gas with this visual representation as their guide.
Carpenter encountered a problem when he returned to Empire’s Bartlesville office 
because company executives, although not averse to geologists, could not entirely 
understand their methods. Despite the great pleasure Carpenter took in his map, he 
lamented that “there was just one thing wrong with it-the general manager could not 
understand what was meant to be shown.”’’ Both Diescher and Barnsdall proved willing 
to hire geologists, but they retained an understanding of the oil business based upon the 
traditions of practical men. Both men initially failed to comprehend the significance of 
the anticline Carpenter depicted because they could not read his map. Carpenter included 
different perspectives of the structure, explaining that “cross sections were tried but 
without absolute elevations it was difficult to give them the rosy appearance that graces 
the modern reports.”™ Diescher could not make sense of the map’s graphic symbols, but 
“still a good enough picture was made to enable me to convince him that a detailed 
survey with a telescopic alidade was necessary.”™ Although Diescher supported the 
request to perform additional work, he refused to approve funds for equipment Carpenter 
considered necessary to complete the task.
Even though Diescher proved willing to hire geologists, their methods remained
™ Ibid. 
™ Ibid. 
™ Ibid. 
™ Ibid.
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so unproven at the time that he could not justify extravagant expenditures on equipment 
that only a few years later every geologist would possess. Carpenter began exploring at 
Augusta with “none of the tools so necessary to a geologist such as a compass, aneroid, 
hand level, etc.,....and for transportation I had my own two legs.” '^* Although he 
eventually acquired a compass and hand level, “it was still forbidden to spend any money 
even for an alidade” and he “did not get permission to buy one” even though Diescher 
agreed to additional field work.’  ^ Carpenter “finally succeeded” in overcoming his boss’s 
intransigence but admitted that “it took considerable scheming and a lot of nerve to get 
around that hurdle.”’® He waited until company officials left the office for a two-week 
period so he could place an order for the alidade and receive it before they returned. They 
eventually uncovered his scheme and “I was called on the carpet for a rather severe 
lecture...””  Carpenter received a tongue-lashing but had acquired the tool he needed and 
initiated the field work necessary for creating an even more detailed map.
The second survey produced such a superior map that it convinced Empire 
executives to lease acreage and begin drilling on the Augusta anticline. Carpenter 
solicited the services of another University of Oklahoma graduate, J. Russel Crabtree, to 
carry out the field work. Although Crabtree studied engineering rather than geology, his 
education may have better equipped him to survey and map the area because “he became
”  Ibid. 
”  Ibid.
Ibid. 
”  Ibid.
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one of our best men in geological mapping. His maps were works of art...”’* The use of 
an alidade enabled Crabtree to measure geological structures with more precision and 
represent them more clearly on the map through the use of contour lines. Crabtree’s work 
greatly impressed Empire executives because “the structure was portrayed by means of 
contours which the management could visualize and understand at a glance.”’  ^ Carpenter 
met with Barnsdall and Diescher to show them the map and “to explain the geology of the 
Augusta field.”*® At the end of their meeting, “Barnsdall asked if it was our contention 
and belief that simply because the contour lines ran around in complete circles that that 
made this a good place to drill.”** Carpenter assured him that this was his position and on 
that basis Barnsdall “gave his consent to whatever it was that was desired.”*’ The use of 
contour lines on the new map showed more clearly the anticline’s elevation and 
convinced Empire executives to invest in drilling at the site.
Perhaps more than any other single event, Carpenter’s discovery of the Augusta 
and El Dorado fields won acceptance for petroleum geology within the oil industry. 
Petroleum geologists working at the time of the discovery remembered it as a pivotal 
moment for their discipline. One declared, albeit inaccurately, that “Empire invented Oil
’* Ibid.
Ibid.
*®Ibid.
** Ibid.
*’ lbid.
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Company geology, based on experiences in Augusta and El Dorado, Kansas.”*^  Other 
companies had previously used geologists but mostly as consultants and in a much less 
systematic way than Empire. Edgar Owen, one of the first geologists Carpenter hired, 
expressed clearly and succinctly how Empire’s approach to geological exploration 
differed from any previous attempt. The company’s discovery of these two fields “was 
most influential in popularizing the application of geology at a time when the Mid- 
Continent was becoming the most important districts in the world.”*'' Empire’s 
achievement lay not in originating any new exploration techniques but in demonstrating 
“the economic utility of a program consisting of geological reconnaissance followed by 
detailed mapping of surface anticlines and promptly leasing and drilling of large blocks 
on the favorable structures.”*^ After the success at Augusta and Eldorado, Empire 
executives no longer needed convincing of the utility in Carpenter’ s methods and 
reasoned that if one geologist could find oil then many geologists could find a lot more.
Confidence in Carpenter’s methods ran so high among Empire’s top-level 
managers that they ordered him to hire as many geologists as he could find and in doing 
so created the largest geological exploration department the oil industry had ever 
witnessed. Empire committed significant resources to acquiring a staff that could
** Horace L. Griley to Mr. Jenkins, March 4,1973, Horace L. Griley Letters, Box 
3A, Owen Collection. A clear consensus exists among geologists at the time that 
Empire’s discovery of Augusta and Eldorado marked a turning point in their profession. 
For examples, see the following; William N. Davis to James Veasey, June 5, 1941, Belt- 
Line theory. Box 23, Veasey Collection.
*'* Ellison, et al.. The Flavor o f Ed Owen, 21. 
*' Ibid.
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conduct field work on a large scale and translate observations into high-quality contour 
niaps which outlined the structural characteristics of anticlines. After receiving the order 
“to increase the personnel of the department greatly before the Standard group and other 
large companies gathered up all the geologists,” Carpenter acted swiftly and began 
combing the geology departments of nearby universities for as many students and faculty 
as he could fmd.®^  He particularly drew upon his close ties at the University of Oklahoma 
to build his staff. As an instructor there recalled, “Mr. Carpenter employed six or eight of 
the graduating class from Oklahoma University in June 1914; in fact, practically every 
man that had majored in geology.”*’ A geologist working for the company remembered 
how swiftly the number of his coworkers grew, as “Empire expanded its geological staff 
from practically nothing at the beginning of 1915 to more than 100 men early in 1916.”** 
By the summer of 1917, the company had hired “about 250" geologists and placed them 
“just about everywhere” throughout the United States, including New York, Kentucky, 
Texas, Ohio, and Wyoming.*® Accounts vary as to exactly how many geologists Empire
86 Carpenter to Owen, July 31,1963, Carpenter Collection.
*’ Alex W. McCoy to James A. Veasey, June 20,1941, Belt-Line Theory, Box 23, 
Veasey Collection.
** L. Murray Nuemaiin to James Veasey, May 20, 1941, Belt-line theory. Box 23, 
Veasey Collection.
*® Horace L. Griley to Edgar W. Owen, September 14, 1965, Empire Gas and Fuel 
Co. (Cities Service), Box 3 A, Owen Collection. Elsewhere, Griley states that the number 
was closer to 200. See Griley to Jenkins, March 4, 1973, Owen Collection.
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employed, but the number certainly exceeded 200 and may have approached 250.^ No 
longer content to invest in drilling on the basis of a hunch, Empire committed itself to 
geologists who could identify and map anticlinal surface structures and increased the 
probability of finding oil.
A problem quickly surfaced in this plan, however, because the students and 
faculty Carpenter hired from universities understood geological theories and principles 
but did not know how to construct contour maps or operate the necessary surveying 
equipment. Even though professors like Charles Gould ensured that their students 
experienced field work first hand, these excursions tended to focus on examining 
geological processes rather than practical tasks the oil industry required such as mapping 
the formations they had observed. The nature of field work students practiced to fulfill 
university degree requirements particularly differed from that performed by employees of 
the U.S.G.S. Geologists like Carpenter who had worked for the U.S.G.S. prior to joining 
Empire learned how to make maps and isolate resources while conducting field work. 
Although Empire and other oil companies that followed its lead initially “were raiding the
^  Carpenter reported that “I am unable to arrive at so large a figure” as 250. He 
continued, “I have been unable to arrive at a number greater than a hundred, but there 
may have been several whose names have been overlooked.” Carpenter to Owen, July 31, 
1963, Carpenter Collection. Owen attempted to document every geologist Empire 
employed from 1916 to 1919 and he compiled 212 names plus eight “probables” for a 
total of 220, although they probably were not all employed at the same time. “Empire Gas 
and Fuel Co. Geology Department Personnel,” Empire Gas and Fuel Co. (Cities Service), 
Box 3 A, Owen Collection. John Steiger, claimed that the geological staff grew “to 
almost 250 by 1917...” John Steiger, Untitled Document, June 8,1968, Miscellaneous 
Text Documents, Box 11, Cities Service Collection. Perhaps the most definitive source is 
that which says “some records which we have found indicate a total of 149 geologists 
were on the pay roll during the summer of 1917.” Herbert Straight to James A. Veasey, 
May 17, 1941; Belt-line theory. Box 23, Veasey Collection.
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faculties” of universities, they eventually began to recruit geologists from the U.S.G.S. 
instead. Johnson explained that “the reason that the companies preferred survey men to 
faculty men was that the latter were on the whole less good field men.” '^ Following the 
lead of Doherty, Empire executives believed that they could teach university geologists 
the practical skills their company required.
The Bartlesville branch of Doherty’s School of Practice aimed at teaching 
university educated geologists how to operate surveying equipment in order to make 
contour maps which depicted anticlinal structures. The methods of detailed structure 
mapping developed piecemeal over a number of years.®  ^ Through field work, geologists 
hoped to identify control points by measuring the elevations of identifiable stratigraphie 
layers which outcropped at the surface.’  ^ Although the preferred instruments varied with 
the nature of terrain and structure in question, geologists most often adopted the 
telescopic alidade and plane table.^^ This devise consisted of a tri-pod with telescope-like 
instrument attached as well as a flat surface where the geologist recorded coordinates
Roswell Johnson to James A. Veasey, February 24,1941, Veasey Collection.
^  Owen, Trek o f  the Oil Finders, 225. For a more detailed description of the 
instruments and techniques employed at the time, see Owen 225-27, 241-42, 295-97 and 
the following sources: C. W. Hayes, Handbook for Field Geologists (New York: John 
Wiley and Sons, Inc.; London: Chapman and Hall, Limited, 1913) and Field Mapping for  
The Oil Geologist (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.; London: Chapman and Hall, 
Limited, 1921); Frederic H. Lahee, Field Geology, 2™" ed. (New York and London: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1923); Walter A. English, “Some Planetable 
Methods,” American Association o f Petroleum Geologists Bulletin 8 (January-December 
1924), 47-54.
”  Owen, Trek o f the Oil Finders, 225.
Ibid., 225-26.
186
which served as the basis for contour lines depicting the structure. To ascertain the 
coordinates, the geologist looked through the alidade to follow an assistant who walked 
over the structure with a “stadia rod,” which resembled a large ruler, stopping at various 
points for the viewer to plot measurements marked on the rod. Teaching young geology 
students meant showing them how to operate these instruments and to perform this 
procedure, so Carpenter hired an associate from the University of Oklahoma, Luther C. 
Snider, to train new recruits. Learning this process required time, “at least a foil year’s 
practice...,” but time was not a luxury Empire could a f f o r d . Af t e r  experiencing 
significant success by mapping and drilling anticlines at Augusta and Eldorado, the 
company so zealously committed its resources to expanding this approach that it acquired 
“an enormous amount of acreage in the MidContinent region, particularly in Kansas and 
Oklahoma.” ®^ The pressing need to return a profit on an “enormous” investment 
prevented new geologists from getting the practice necessary to learn the art of map- 
making.
Numerous accounts confirm that Empire dramatically decreased the amount of 
time new geologists received to practice making maps and that the company’s 
unprecedented commitment to field work failed to meet its expectations. The urgency 
with which Empire and its subsidiaries searched for geologists resonated in a letter J. W. 
George, head geologist at I. T. I. O., sent to the University of Missouri’s geology
95 Carpenter to Owen, July 31,1963, Carpenter Collection.
^  “Scientific Methods of Exploration for Oil Help Industry Meet Its Demands,’ 
Oil and Gas Journal 34/31 (December 19,1935), 14.
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department. He explained that he was “much in need of some men that can do plain [sic] 
table with telescopic alidade.” Even students who could not operate this equipment 
qualified for employment, as he had “been starting men who have not had previous 
experience at seventy five dollars per month and expenses while in the field.
Executives at Empire, I.T.I.O.’s parent company, felt the same sense of urgency to hire 
and train geologists, pushing them through the training process with utmost speed. 
Johnson related that “Diescher had a scheme that flopped of quickly training in a few 
weeks youth to do anticline hunting. That was about 1914.” *^ The training program 
“flopped” because simple “anticline hunting” did not directly translate into new 
discoveries of oil.
Empire’s massive undertaking to find surface structures started out with much 
promise and proved successful for a time but quickly grew into a dogmatic formula that 
failed to produce results. Despite considerable resources and personnel, Empire “mapped 
many anticlines which yielded some commercial discoveries but none of great 
significance.”^^  As a result, the “crash program” of hiring and training geologists which 
lasted until 1917 “did not fulfill expectations...”'®*’ After drilling a number of dry wells, 
“the large geological department then was reduced and it was realized detailed and
J. W. George to W. A. Tarr, October 30,1917, Oklahoma Notes and Extracts, 
Pre-1921, Box 1C, Owen Collection.
Johnson to Veasey, February 24, 1941, Veasey Collection.
Ellison, et. al.. The Flavor o f Ed Owen, 21.
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careful field work was more important than mass production of field maps by 
inexperienced men, many of whom had been taken from the college class rooms before 
completing their regular course of study.”*®* Empire had learned an important lesson that 
would not occur to the management of other companies who mimicked their approach for 
a number of years, that no substitute existed for “detailed and careful field work.” By 
reducing the search for oil to mere “anticline hunting,” Empire overestimated the 
anticlinal theory’s suitability for explaining all occurrences of oil and failed to consider 
alternative explanations.
Once oil industry geologists and executives accepted the utility of the anticlinal 
theory, they employed it so dogmatically that it failed to yield results and the creativity of 
many petroleum geologists diminished as they ceased to think of other geological 
explanations for the accumulation of oil. The anticlinal theory appealed to prospectors 
because it offered visual clues which guided them to potential new pools. *®^ Although 
every hole drilled next to an anticline did not always yield oil, most geologists’ faith in 
the theory endured because success at places like Cushing, Augusta, and Eldorado 
seemed to verify its validity.*®  ^ Over time, however, perfunctory application of the theory
*®* “Scientific Methods of Exploration for Oil Help Industry Meet Its Demands,”
14.
*®^ Everett DeGolyer, “Concepts on Occurrence of Oil and Gas,” in History o f  
Petroleum Engineering, American Petroleum Institute (New York; American Petroleum 
Institute, 1961), 24.
*®" Ibid.
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retarded the rate of d is c o v e ry .A s  one of the most prominent and successful petroleum 
geologists of the time put it, “this beautiful conception, perfectly valid in principle, has 
often actually led us astray in the practical search for oil.”*°^  Geologists soon 
learned that in addition to structural traps such as anticlines which they could observe at 
the surface other geological phenomena deep within the subsurface of the earth could also 
trap oil beyond their purview. Although hunting anticlines served geologists well for a 
time, they eventually located the most prominent ones and needed to devise new methods 
for finding oil.
Like most who had heard of the anticlinal theory, Carpenter initially conceived of 
it as a prospecting method with universal application and never considered how other 
geological phenomena might also trap oil beneath the ground. As a college student 
studying at the University of Oklahoma, he became “very much intrigued with Dr. I. C. 
White’s anticlinal theory of oil and gas accumulation and bent my best efforts” to some 
day work as a petroleum geologist.'”® His view of this theory that prompted him to enter 
the profession changed dramatically over the years. In 1924, he reflected that “it never 
occurred to me during my university days that there was any limitation to the theory of 
anticlinal accumulation.”'”’ Thirteen years of experience in the oil industry gave him a
Wallace Pratt, Oil in the Earth, (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas 
Press, 1942, 1944) 23.
'”® Pratt, Oil in the Earth, 23.
'”® Carpenter to Owen, July 31,1963, Carpenter Collection.
'”’ Ibid.
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different perspective which he expressed in a letter to Gould, stating that “I do not regard 
anticlines as the only controlling factor in the accumulation of oil. There are other factors 
equally important.”*”* He had ceased believing that the theory offered a panacea for 
finding oil, a notion some geologists would not accept until a much later date.'”® Partly as 
a result of the initial successes Empire scored searching for anticlines, other companies 
followed suit and also applied the theory perfunctorily. Some geologists had ceased to 
think creatively in their search for oil or to consider “other factors” trapping oil beneath 
the ground. Convinced that “anticlines furnish only one condition under which oil and 
gas may accumulate,” Carpenter determined to identify alternative explanations for the 
occurrence of oil."”
By the mid-1920s, Carpenter’s recognition of limitations in the anticlinal theory 
led him to postulate other geological features associated with the presence of oil. While 
he did not dismiss the validity of the anticlinal theory, he expressed to Gould that “other 
conditions equally important are furnished by Sand Lenses, Faults, Shoe-string Sands, 
etc.”" ' A contemporary of theirs considered “this view-point years ahead of its time.” 
Management at some companies so “slavishly worships the anticlinal theory” that a
'”* Everett Carpenter to Charles N. Gould, December 19, 1924; quoted in Carl 
Branson, “Petroleum Notes from the Twenties,” Oklahoma Geology Notes 17 (October 
1957), 94.
Ibid.
" ” Ibid.
Ibid. For further explanation of shoe-string and lense traps, see A. I. Levorsen, 
Geology o f  Petroleum 2"” ed. (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1967), 293- 
305 and 305-318.
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geologist “has to sell an anticline to get a stratigraphie trap drilled ." 'G eologists found 
it necessary to justify drilling at a site by “selling” an anticline because this structure, 
unlike a stratigraphie trap or the other geological phenomena Carpenter described, 
manifested at the surface which easily lent itself to mapping and, therefore, offered 
tangible evidence that they could find oil nearby.
A major advance in the discipline of petroleum geology and in the oil industry 
occurred when geologists articulated the principle that stratigraphy, like structures, also 
trapped oil but far below the surface beyond human purview. By definition, a 
stratigraphie trap consisted of a discontinuity, or open space, missing fi-om a layer of 
stratigraphy providing a reservoir for oil to pool. The missing space resulted from one of 
several different processes."^ For example, the reservoir may have been formed from a 
cessation in deposition or by erosive forces which broke away a section of the stratum 
many years in the past.” '* A. I. Levorsen, the petroleum geologist who most clearly 
articulated the concept and argued for its acceptance, defined a stratigraphie trap “as one 
in which a variation in the stratigraphy is the chief confining element in the reservoir
Branson, “Petroleum Notes from the Twenties,” 94.
Max Ball, Douglas Ball and Daniel S. Tuner, This Fascinating Oil Business 
(Indianapolis, Kansas City, New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965, 1940), 
37. For further elaboration on stratigraphie traps, see Kenneth K. Landes, Petroleum 
Geology, 2"'* ed., (New York: John Wiley and Sons.; London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 
1959), 276-279, 388-391, and A. 1. Levorsen, Geology o f Petroleum 2"‘‘ ed. (San 
Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1967), 287-339.
Ball, et. al.. This Fascinating Oil Business, 39-40.
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which traps the Regardless of how stratigraphie traps formed, geologists could
not observe them from the surface and relied primarily on drillers’ logs to conceptualize 
subsurface conditions which provided for the accumulation of oil.
Long before geologists and engineers began to identify limitations in the anticlinal 
theory, they recognized and attempted to understand how subsurface conditions trapped 
oil beneath the surface and influenced its production. Subsurface geology consists of a 
variety of techniques geologists used to gather information about underground conditions 
in order to construct a map depicting the relationship of oil reservoirs to successive layers 
of stratigraphy. Many geologists considered John Carll, who worked under J. Peter 
Lesley on the Second Pennsylvania Geological Survey, a candidate for the title “father of 
petroleum engineering” because he compiled one of the first subsurface maps detailing 
the location of oil."® Although Carll had no university education, he drew upon well-log 
data compiled by civil engineers to reconstruct the stratigraphy underlying Pennsylvania’s 
Venango oil district and published these findings in 1875. Carll’s report included maps 
which depicted cross-sections of twenty layers of stratigraphy and their position in 
relation to three different levels of oil reservoirs.*" In addition to identifying the relative 
position of the strata, he included descriptions of distinctive beds and of fossils
A.I. Levorsen, “Stratigraphie Versus Structural Accumulation,” American 
Association o f  Petroleum Geologists Bulletin 20 (May 1936), 524.
Warner, “Sources of Men,” 38; An equally, if not more, viable candidate is 
Edwin T. Dumble who ran the geological department for the Southern Pacific Railroad in 
California, but this debate is beyond the scope of my present purpose. See Dorsey Hager 
to James A. Veasey, June 18, 1941, Veasey Collection.
Owen, Trek o f  the Oil Finders, 107.
193
characteristic of certain depths as a guide to drillers. Card’s practice of creating a 
subsurface structure map was far ahead of its time, but his greatest contribution lay in 
illustrating the fallacy that a relationship always existed between surface topography and 
the presence of oil.*'* Other geologists and engineers subsequently illustrated and 
articulated how subsurface conditions governed oil production, but their ideas for the 
most part fell upon deaf ears."® Many practical men and geologists so ardently desired a 
single, comprehensible prospecting method that they held tenaciously to ideas such as the 
belt-line theory and later the anticlinal theory because they could employ them on the 
basis of surface observations alone. Once these methods failed to produce results, 
though. Empire Gas and Fuel Company took an unprecedented step by exploring the 
subsurface in a systematic and comprehensive way.
In 1917 Empire became the first company in the history of the oil industry to 
create a department devoted exclusively to understanding how subsurface geological 
conditions effected oil exploration and production when Carpenter hired Alex W. McCoy 
to oversee this new effort. McCoy received his degree in civil engineering from the 
University of Missouri and in 1914 graduated with a master’s degree in geology."® He 
had been teaching in the geology department at the University of Oklahoma when
118 Ibid., 108.
The history of subsurface geology unfolded over a number of years and 
involves a number of geologists. For the best source for identifying the geologists who 
made the greatest contributions and describing their work, see Ibid., 106-116, 127-133, 
and 166-173.
Executive Committee, “Memorial: Alexander Watts McCoy,” American 
Association o f  Petroleum Geologists Bulletin 30 (February 1946), 293.
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Carpenter hired him to work for Empire. The study of subsurface geology utilized all 
available data in order to create three-dimensional models that represented underground 
structures and processes and their relationship to oil.'^* Researchers obtained data from 
as many sources as possible, including surface exploration, drillers’ core samples, and 
fossils to name a few. In the 1920s, geophysical exploration revolutionized the kind and 
quantity of data available to conduct subsurface explorations.'^^ McCoy started Empire’s 
subsurface department just before that revolution took place, however, and during his 
tenure there initiated innovative research which would shift the industry’s focus from 
relying solely upon geology to locate and produce oil to utilizing engineering principles 
as well.
Although other candidates legitimately deserve the title “father” of petroleum 
engineering, McCoy brought recognition to this field in much the same way Carpenter 
had for mapping surface structures. Just as CarlTs report and maps charted the 
subsurface of Pennsylvania’s oil fields, McCoy’s “group of geologists constructed 
subsurface structure maps, made a detailed investigation of stratigraphie problems 
throughout the MidContinent district, and served generally as a research group for the 
Empire Companies.” '^  ^ Apparently unaware of contributions by previous geologists and 
engineers, McCoy never doubted that “the first attempts at petroleum engineering work, 
as we know it today, were made by the Empire Gas and Fuel Company in 1917,” the year
Landes, Petroleum Geology, 84.
Ibid.
McCoy to Veasey, June 20,1941, Veasey Collection.
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he began employment.'^'* Although he may have somewhat overstated the case, the 
subsurfaee work he direeted popularized and won acceptance for the application of 
engineering principles to oil exploration and production. Initially, his department focused 
on maximizing production at sites Carpenter had already located, as “all wells in the El 
Dorado and Augusta fields were drilled in, pipe and cementing recommendations 
submitted, and the responsibility of measuring up wells was turned over directly to this 
department. In addition to creating and implementing more efficient procedures for 
extracting oil already located, McCoy’s work also shifted prospectors’ focus from surface 
to subsurface exploration.
To geologists like Carpenter who recognized the anticlinal theory’s limitations, 
McCoy offered promising alternatives to surface exploration by conducting research into 
methods that illustrated how they could find oil by shifting their focus from surface traps 
to stratigraphie traps. What most differentiated principles of “engineering” from those of 
“geology” was the less prominent role field work played in generating information. Prior 
to the creation of Empire’s subsurface department, “the geologic evidence for guidance of 
operators had been predominately, if  not entirely, a study of surface structure.”*^® 
McCoy’s hiring marked a turning point in this approach because it “began a period where
*^'* MeCoy to Veasey, July 15,1941, Belt-line theory. Box 23, Veasey Collection. 
For another example of McCoy’s belief that his efforts constituted “the beginning in the 
Midcontient of petroleum engineering as it is known today,” see the same file for McCoy 
to Veasey, June 20, 1941.
McCoy to Veasey, June 20, 1941, Veasey Collection.
McCoy to Veasey, July 15,1941, Veasey Collection.
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scientific evidence used by engineers and geologists was not limited to the study of 
surface outcrops.”*^’ Instead of relying solely on field surveys, the subsurface branch of 
the geological department “carried on a number of experiments regarding production 
problems, estimates of reserves, underground stratigraphie studies, and originated many 
of the general practices which have been greatly improved and are now in vogue by all of 
the departments of geology.”’^ * McCoy saw his approach to exploration as a significant 
departure from the traditional field surveys of the kind Carpenter and other university- 
trained geologists conducted. He characterized his work as the starting point for a new 
type of exploration. McCoy differentiated “between the period when geology first 
became prominent throughout the Midcontinent, since it was primarily a field science of 
an exploratory nature, limited to the study of surface outcrops” and the period beginning 
in 1917 when “various phases of scientific endeavor were commenced which later have 
developed into the intricate phases of petroleum engineering.”*^  ^ In the first period he 
described, finding and producing oil had been a geological enterprise but in the later 
period engineering knowledge and technical expertise determined how efficiently 
companies could extract oil that lay trapped beneath the ground.
*^’ Ibid.
Ibid.
'"''Ibid.
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Chapter 6:
“Practical Oil Men and the Oklahoma Oil Conservation Statute, 1915"
Oklahoma’s practical oil men devised and implemented an oil conservation plan 
in 1915 that successfully limited overproduction and curbed the ability of integrated 
companies’ to use pipelines in order to control particular oil fields within the state. The 
success of their conservation plan contradicts historian Samuel Hays’ argument that 
professional scientists working in the federal government established the conservation 
agenda during the Progressive era. Hays argued that conservation sentiment did not 
spring fi-om a grassroots public railing against “the interests” but from professional 
scientists working for the federal government whose “ideals and practices” set the tone 
for the movement to conserve natural resources.' Practical men in Oklahoma found oil 
consistently on the basis of methods they had crafted and devised their own solutions to 
overproduction, challenging Hays’ contention that “conservation, above all, was a 
scientific movement, and its role in history arises from the implications of science and 
technology.”  ^ On the contrary, the movement to conserve oil on the Southern Plains 
began as a grassroots political struggle led by practical men who consciously avoided
' Samuel Hays, Conservation and the Gospel o f Efficiency: The Progressive 
Conservation Movement, 1890-1920, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999; 
Originally published: Cambridge ; Harvard University Press, 1959), 1-2.
 ^Ibid., 2. For a critique of Hays which influenced some of the following points I 
make, see Donald J. Pisani, Water and American Government: The Reclamation Bureau, 
National Water Policy, and the West, 1902-1935 (Berekely, Los Angeles, and London: 
University of California Press, 2002), 287-288.
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science and technology devised by professional scientists like Gould. The situation in 
Oklahoma revises Hays’ argument on another count.
Considering how practical men consistently identified Standard Oil affiliates or 
subsidiaries as the culprits responsible for overproduction, Hays’ contention that 
conservation advocates did not center their “fire primarily upon the private corporation” 
fails to characterize the attitude of Oklahoma’s independent producers.^ The 1911 
Supreme Court which broke-up the Standard Oil trust occurred only ten years after the 
discovery of Texas’ highly productive Spindletop oil field opened the way for new 
companies to begin integrating their opérations."* The pattern was repeated throughout the 
region as additional oil was discovered in Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas for 
approximately the next thirty years, providing companies with significant incentive to 
perfect integration. Pipelines proved key to their strategy because companies who owned 
them supplied the only effective means of transportation, enabling them to dictate the 
price paid to independent producers for oil. Integrated companies often induced 
independent oil men to produce as much oil as possible with the promise of purchasing it 
all, leading to frenzied competition, a glut of oil, and power in the hands of pipeline 
companies. Independent producers moved to remedy the situation when they organized 
into producers’ associations, crafted an oil conservation statute, and lobbied the
 ^Hays, Conservation and the Gospel o f  Efficiency, 1.
"* Joseph A. Pratt, “The Petroleum Industry in Transition: Antitrust and the 
Decline of Monopoly Control in Oil,” Journal o f Economic History 40 (December 1980), 
817.
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legislature for reform. Variations of the movement which coalesced in Oklahoma 
surfaced in other Southern Plains’ states, and independent oil men, not professional 
scientists in the federal government, continued to dominate the issue until the latter- 
1920s.
Shortly after 1859 when Edwin T. Drake drilled the first commercial oil well in 
Pennsylvania, the question of who owned this resource grew into a hotly contested issue. 
Oil men possessed only rudimentary knowledge of how to extract petroleum from the 
ground, but they recognized very soon the conflict of interest between themselves and 
others who rushed-in to drill next to their productive wells.^ Derricks sprouted overnight 
and the race began among multiple drillers to drain as much oil as possible before their 
neighbors could do the same. The migratory nature of oil after drilling had begun 
complicated matters of ownership. In an undisturbed state, oil remained in one place but 
when a well released pressure by puncturing the boundaries of a reservoir, it moved 
toward that point and crossed property lines designated at the surface.^ Owners of 
adjoining tracts who felt cheated by their neighbors looked to the courts for a 
determination of ownership.
Judges could not easily decide who owned the oil because no legal precedents 
existed prior to the mid-nineteenth century. Operating within this legal vacuum, the
 ^History o f  Petroleum Engineering, (New York and Dallas: American Petroleum 
Institute, 1961), 1124.
® Max W. Ball, This Fascinating Oil Business (Indianapolis and New York: 
Bobbs-Merrrill Company, 1940), 92-3; Nicholas George Malavis, Bless the Pure and 
Humble: Texas Lawyers and Oil Regulation, 1919-1936, (College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 1996), 12.
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court drew upon English common law rules of property and 
issued three rulings which collectively established “the rule of capture,” a precedent 
which provided the predominant rationale for determining ownership of oil and gas rights 
until approximately 1935. Just as a property owner acquired title to a wild animal if 
“captured” on his land, title to oil or gas devolved upon the person who “captured” them 
even if they migrated to his land from beneath an adjoining tract. Without the knowledge 
that petroleum geologists would later develop explaining how and where oil pooled, the 
court offered the rule of capture as the most reasonable method for resolving ownership 
conflicts.
The Pennsylvania court acknowledged that its ruling originated from an 
inadequate understanding of underground conditions. As one justice explained, “exact 
knowledge on this subject is not at present attainable, but the vagrant character of the 
mineral” justified the decision.’ Oil’s “vagrant character” complicated the court’s task of 
formulating an effective law because “there is no certain way of ascertaining how much 
of the oil and gas that comes out of the well was when in situ under this farm and how 
much under that.”* The only resolution the court could offer to aggrieved litigants who 
complained that neighbors siphoned oil from beneath their land was to “go thou and do
’ Barnard vs. Monongahela Gas Company 216 PA. 362, 65 Atl. 801 (1907); as 
cited in Robert E. Hardwicke, “Rule of Capture as Applied to Oil and Gas,” An Address 
Delivered Before the American Bar Association Section of Mineral Law, at the Annual 
Meeting in Los Angeles, California, July 15, and 16,1935, p. 9; James Veasey collection. 
Folder 4, Rule of Capture, Box 33, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming.
* Ibid. In situ means in an original place or location, such as oil in its natural 
underground state.
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likewise.”  ^ Every owner had to protect himself by extracting as much oil and gas as 
possible, for “he knows it is wild and will run away if it finds an opening and it is his 
business to keep it at home. This may not be the best rule; but neither the Legislature nor 
our highest court has given us any better."'^ The rule of capture amounted to no rule at 
all. The court codified a climate which led to unremitting production and caused waste 
because the market could not absorb this surplus oil.
Unabated production empowered large, integrated companies like Standard Oil to 
dictate the price per barrel when purchasing supplies from independent producers in 
Kansas. Standard purchased significant amounts oil in the state from 1902 to 1905, but 
independent producers began to resent the company in early 1904 when it announced a 
series of price cuts." They accused Standard of price-fixing but, prompted by the rule of 
capture, independent producers contributed to the declining price by continuing to 
produce oil. Production more than quadrupled from 932,000 barrels in 1903 to 4,250,000 
in 1904, causing prices to continue dropping.*^ The more independent men produced, the 
more their dependency on Standard grew. Surplus production benefitted Standard 
because the company’s integrated structure allowed it to control the state’s refineries, 
pipelines, and storage tanks, providing independent producers the only market to sell
 ^ Malavis, Bless the Pure and Humble, 14.
Barnard vs. Monongahela Gas Company; cited in Hardwicke, “Rule of Capture 
as Applied to Oil and Gas,” p. 9.
" Francis W. Schruben, From Wea Creek to El Dorado (Columbia: University of 
Missouri Press, 1972) 57, 67.
Ibid., 100.
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their oil.*  ^ Independent producers felt exploited by the Standard Oil “octopus” and 
organized the Kansas Oil Producers Association in order to resist control.*'* Their 
vulnerability intensified when Standard bypassed independents and purchased from its 
own production subsidiaries.
The Prairie Oil and Gas Company began functioning as Standard’s primary 
Midcontinent supplier of oil in 1901 and continued for many years thereafter selling oil to 
subsidiaries formed as a result of the 1911 antitrust ruling. Prairie dominated the 
Midcontinent crude oil markets for approximately a decade starting 1910.'^ The company 
learned quickly that the rule of capture worked to its advantage. Prairie purchased oil 
when overproduction pushed prices down, stored what it had purchased in huge tank 
farms, and sold when prices increased.'® The company’s ability to invest in pipelines and 
tank farms allowed it to exploit the advantages of its integrated structure. Independents 
who made-up the ranks of the Kansas Oil Producers association focused their wrath on 
Prairie just as they had on Standard.'^ Among their efforts, independents lobbied the 
Kansas legislature for a law deeming all pipelines within the state common carriers.**
** Ibid., 35,
*" Ibid., 57.
*® Edgar W. Owen, Trek o f  the Oil Finders: A History o f Exploration for  
Petroleum (Tulsa: American Association of Petroleum Geologists, 1975), 333.
*® Ibid., 333.
*^ Schruben, From Wea Creek to El Dorado, 101.
** Ibid.
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When the Prairie Oil and Gas Company extended a pipeline into Oklahoma in 1905, 
independent producers in that state inherited Kansas’ problem.'®
Oil men in Oklahoma struggled to deal with problems of overproduction upon 
discovering the state’s first major oil field at Glenn Pool in 1905.^ ® Prospectors from 
eastern states located oil and gas in southeastern Kansas in 1882 and continued exploring 
southward where they discovered additional accumulations in Indian Territory.^' They 
found Glenn Pool in December 1905 which at the time lay within the Creek Nation. 
Initially, much of the oil they found lay at shallow depths which they retrieved without 
pumps because gas pressure drove it to the surface.^^ Upon the completion of each well, 
oil flowed relatively easily and abundantly to the surface. By 1907, independent 
operators had drilled 102 wells which produced approximately 100,000 barrels a day. 
Although oil flowed in vast quantities from numerous wells, it bottle-necked on its way to 
market because inadequate railroad facilities could not transport the field’s voluminous 
production. A more efficient mode of transportation arrived when pipelines entered the 
field.
'® Blue Clark, “The Beginning of Oil and Gas Conservation in Oklahoma, 1907- 
1931,” Chronicles o f Oklahoma 55 (1977-1978), 377.
Kenny Franks, The Rush Begins: A History o f  the Red Fork Cleveland, and 
Glenn Pool Oil Fields (Oklahoma City: Western Heritage Books, 1984); Frank Galbreath, 
Glenn Pool, A Little Town o f Yesteryear (Tulsa: By Author, 1978)
Ibid.
^  Carl N. Tyson, James H. Thomas, and Odie B. Faulk, The McMan: The Lives 
o f Robert M. McFarlin and James A. Chapman (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1977), 19.
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Three major oil companies built pipelines to Glenn Pool by 1907 and in the 
process placed independent operators without an easily accessible market at their mercy. 
The Gulf and Texas companies constructed pipelines from southern Texas to Glenn Pool 
in 1907.^  ^ The principal purchaser of oil in the field, however, was the Standard 
subsidiary and supplier. Prairie Oil and Gas Company.^'' These companies purchased the 
oil independent operators produced and transported it to refineries. After acquiring their 
own leases, integrated companies produced and transported their own oil and purchased 
from independent producers only enough oil to fill the space remaining in their pipelines. 
When pipeline companies integrated the production end of the business into their 
operations, independent men’s market instantly diminished but most continued extracting 
oil even though they could not immediately sell it. If they ceased producing altogether, 
the rule of capture ensured that pipeline companies who owned the means of transport 
would continue to drain whatever oil remained in the field. No easy solution presented 
itself, and in February 1909 at Glenn Pool “the principal topic of discussion among oil 
men has been a shut-down, general or in part.”^^  Most expressed unease at shutting down 
production entirely, and “a larger number favor the cessation of all new drilling including
^  W. P. Z. German, “Legal History of Conservation of Oil and Gas in Oklahoma,’ 
in Legal History o f  Conservation o f  Oil and Gas (Chicago; American Bar Association, 
1939), 111.
Ibid.
“Oklahoma Operators Talk of a Shut Down,” Oil and Gas Journal 7 (February 
6, 1909), 73.
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wildcatting.”^  Confronted with this dilemma, independent men chose to continue 
producing oil and to store what they could not sell. The question of how and where to 
store large quantities of oil efficiently soon presented another vexing problem.
Feeling helpless against integrated companies, many small producers built earthen 
storage ponds to house surplus oil hoping eventually to find a purchaser. One early Glerm 
Pool independent, Charles Colcord, recounted the dilemma he and other oil men often 
faced when pipeline companies ceased purchasing their oil. Colcord and his partners 
leased a tract of land and agreed to drill ten holes by a certain date, but they produced so 
much oil after the first six wells that “our storage was brimful.”^^  They could not sell 
what they had stored because “pipelines were taking only about ten or twenty percent of 
the production” which meant “we had to let up on our drilling to avoid wasting the oil.” *^ 
When notified that their lessor would hold them to the terms of the contract, Colcord and 
partners drilled around the clock to complete the agreed upon ten wells. Meanwhile, they 
hired “all the teams in that part of Oklahoma” to begin building an earthen storage pond 
by “damming up a big h o l l o w . A f t e r  completion of this additional storage site, all that 
they produced firom the ten wells “filled this great lake and I believe that the greater part
26 Ibid.
Charles Francis Colcord, The Autobiography o f Charles Francis Colcord 
(Tulsa, OK: C. C. Helmerich, 1970), 199. .
Ibid., 200.
^ Ibid.
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of all this oil was wasted.” ®^ Ruptured storage reservoirs wasted oil but also caused 
serious environmental damage.
Inadequate storage facilities heightened the need for conservation because 
escaping oil polluted nearby streams and killed water fowl. Oil stored in earthen 
reservoirs failed quickly evaporated, seeped back into the ground, or washed-out retaining 
walls.^* One observer noted that ‘“more oil has run down the creeks from the famous 
Glenn Pool than was ever produced in Illinois.”^^  Colcord recounted how the production 
from another operator’s wells flowed into “the biggest lake of oil I ever saw.”^^  Each day 
anywhere from 250 to 500 barrels flowed from the wells, creating lakes of oil “so large 
that thousands of wild ducks alighted on them never to rise a g a i n . A l t h o u g h  the 
producer had taken great pains to store what he could not sell, “the greater part of this oil 
was also wasted. Harming the environment did not concern independent men as much 
as the economic loss they suffered.
Failed storage facilities caused independent men to lose the oil they had worked 
so hard to produce, and resulted in wasted effort and the loss of potential profits.
Ibid.
German, “Legal History of Conservation of Oil and Gas in Oklahoma,” 112.
Order No. 937, Eight and Ninth Annual reports o f the Corporation Commission 
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Integrated companies could afford steel tanks to store surplus production but this 
additional expense placed a financial burden on many independents. Insufficient capital 
dictated that small producers like Colcord pursue the cheaper alternative of constructing 
earthen reservoirs, but pools of oil sitting uncovered quickly evaporated and seeped back 
into the ground.^® Even at the risk of losing all they had produced, the rule of capture 
prompted independents to continue this inefficient practice at a dizzying pace. Colcord 
recounted how producers at Glenn Pool who owned abutting property often engaged in a 
“line fight” to extract oil which sat beneath both parcels of land. Bob Galbreath and Dave 
Connally owned eight acres of land next to one another, and “they each started a line of 
wells three hundred feet apart, the full half-mile length of their eighty acres.”^^  Connally 
“had the same kind of line fight” with Bill Milligan who owned eighty acres on the other 
side of his property.^* Milligan pumped his oil into “a large draw running the full length 
of his eighty acres.”^^  After he created one lake of oil, Milligan “had number two lake 
ready and it was filled, then number three was filled-a monument to the folly of both 
men.”'**’ Colcord considered their actions “folly” because he had experienced firsthand 
how waste resulted from inefficient storage facilities. Independent men also displayed 
folly because they competed amongst themselves while integrated companies with
^  German, “Legal History of Conservation of Oil and Gas in Oklahoma,” 112. 
Colcord, Autobiography, 200.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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pipelines continued transporting oil.
Prior to Oklahoma statehood, the Secretary of the Interior held the only 
governmental authority to address wasteful oil field practices and prescribed a set of rules 
governing reservoir construction and use but not the competitive advantage pipelines 
gave to integrated companies. On June 11, 1907, the secretary issued regulations which 
established fifteen feet as the minimum height for reservoir walls.'" He also required 
producers to gauge accurately a tank’s holding capacity before filling it with oil in order 
to avoid spillage.'*  ^ These regulations, however, only impacted independent men because 
companies that owned pipelines did not have the added burden of having to store their oil. 
The Secretary did not issue any rules which addressed the issue of competition, thereby 
perpetuating “staggering physical surface wastes of oil and economic losses to practically 
all except the few strong companies.”'*^ Although the federal government did not provide 
independent men with any legislative relief, the state legislature enacted laws intended to 
remedy the situation once Oklahoma entered the union.
The Oklahoma legislature passed a law in 1909 what was probably the first statute 
by any state addressing problems within the oil industry resulting from competition 
between integrated companies and independent producers.'"' To ensure an equal 
opportunity for all independent operators to sell their oil, the law deemed pipeline
German, “Legal History of Conservation of Oil and Gas in Oklahoma,” 112. 
'*2 Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 113-114.
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companies “common purchasers” and stipulated they must buy oil “without 
discrimination in favor of one producer or one person as against another....”"'^  In addition 
to preventing pipeline companies from bestowing preferential treatment on a particular 
operator, the law went further by specifying that “in the event such purchaser is likewise a 
producer, it is hereby prohibited from discriminating in favor of its own production...”'*® 
To prevent pipeline companies from giving priority to their own oil and purchasing from 
independent producers as an afterthought, the law deemed that they “shall purchase and 
transport petroleum from each person and producer ratably, in proportion to the average 
daily production.”'*’ Another section of the law directly addressed the competitive 
advantage integrated companies possessed over independent producers by declaring it 
illegal for the owner of a pipeline “to own or operate, directly or indirectly, any oil well, 
oil leases or oil holdings or interests...”'*® Companies already in possession of oil 
properties “shall divest themselves” of such holdings.'*® The 1909 common purchaser 
statute worked well for a while, but the threat to independents from integrated companies 
reemerged with additional discoveries of oil throughout the state.
'*® Section 4307, Revised Laws o f  Oklahoma, 1910, vol. 1, (St. Paul, Minnesota; 
The Pioneer Co., 1912), 1112. See section 4309 of the law deemed all pipeline 
companies “common carriers” to ensure that even if the company had not purchased the 
oil it could not discriminate in whose oil it chose to transport.
Ibid.
Ibid.
'*® Section 4310, Revised Laws o f  Oklahoma, 1910, 1113. 
Ibid.
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Discovery of two very productive Oklahoma fields in 1912 and 1913 reintroduced 
many of the problems between independent operators and integrated companies that had 
plagued Glenn Pool. Oklahoma led the country in production at this time, and most of 
the state’s oil came from the Cushing and Healdton fields. Together, they produced so 
much oil that many operators could not find a market regardless of the 1909 common 
purchaser statute.^® As at Glenn Pool, oil men at Cushing and Healdton believed 
pipelines would solve the problem of overproduction by providing them with the means 
to sell their oil. Magnolia Petroleum Company was a fully integrated organization and 
moved aggressively to build pipelines from its refineries on the Gulf Coast to Cushing 
and Healdton.^' Formed in 1911 with Standard Oil assets. Magnolia competed with the 
Prairie Oil and Gas Company to buy oil cheaply throughout the Midcontinent region. 
Magnolia built its first pipeline from refineries in Beaumont and Corsicana to north Texas 
and continued building north to Healdton in 1913-1914.^^ Within a year, the company 
paid $35,000,000 for leases and an existing pipeline to the Cushing field.^  ^ Even though 
other companies built pipelines to Cushing, together they could not purchase all the oil 
produced. Tank farms sprouted overnight in order to store the surplus oil. One operator 
recalled that “this is the first time in the history of the business that so many different
German, “Legal History of Conservation of Oil and Gas in Oklahoma,” 117,
119.
Owen, Trek o f the Oil Finders, 333-334.
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individuals have built the large number of tanks that are being completed at Cushing.” '^' 
Similar problems occurred at the Healdton field.
Wirt Franklin remembered how his discovery of oil precipitated a rush of like- 
minded prospectors seeking fortune and that they produced so much oil the market 
eventually disappeared. He recounted that “after discovery of Healdton, there was a great 
influx of oil operators, who leased everything they could get for miles around the 
discovery well in all directions.”^^  So many oil men flocked to the area “there was a wild 
scramble for leases” as they attempted to secure land and drill their own wells.^^ 
Eventually, prospectors discovered the Hewitt field ten miles to the west and another 
“wild scramble” ensued. After the Hewitt discovery well had been drilled, “everything 
that was open and unleased was quickly gobbled up at high prices by the operators of this 
area in all directions from the well.” ’^ At both Healdton and neighboring Hewitt, oil men 
acquired leases and sank wells which eventually yielded large amounts of oil. As long as 
they could sell the oil they produced, independent operators’ prospects at Healdton 
appeared bright. Their situation appeared to brighten even more when Magnolia finished 
its pipeline.
Representatives from Magnolia encouraged independent operators to produce as
“Building Storage Tanks,” Oil and Gas Journal 13 (August 13,1914), 14.
Wirt Franklin to James Veasey, June 28,1941, James A. Veasey collection, 
American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming. (Hereafter cited as Veasey 
collection)
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much oil as possible in order to fill the pipeline it was constructing from Ft. Worth, Texas 
to the Healdton field. Franklin recalled that Magnolia president, Dave Stewart arrived at 
nearby Ardmore and “called on everybody who had a lease in the Healdton field.” ®^ 
Gathering independent producers around him, Stewart “urged them to drill as many wells 
as possible and get them on production because his company, the Magnolia, was building 
a pipe line to the field and they wanted enough oil to fill the line by the time it could be 
completed, in 60 or 90 days.” ’^ Oil men willingly complied with Stewart’s request 
because he promised that his company “would buy all the oil that we could produce, and 
would pay us therefore the posted price then in effect in other parts of Oklahoma, which 
was $ 1.03 a barrel.”®” Franklin remembered that he “urged me to put at least ten strings 
of tools to work drilling up our leases...”®' Franklin and his partners complied too 
because “we believed him, took him at his word,” and contracted with drillers to sink 
wells on their leases.®  ^ Prompted by the promise of an easily-accessible market once the 
pipeline arrived, they extracted as much oil as possible so that “by the time the pipe line 
was completed, there was a very large production.”®^ Oil men produced so much oil that
Ibid.
Ibid.
®” Ibid. Magnolia offered to pay 70 cents a barrel “for oil under 32 gravity and 
$1.03 for that above 32 gravity.” Oil and Gas Journal 12 (March 12,1914), 8-10.
®* Franklin to Veasey, June 28, 1941, Veasey collection.
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“we had 1600 barrel wooden tanks in large numbers around each producing well and later 
on earthen storage on nearly every lease.” '^* Having produced such a bountiful supply of 
oil, the producers had only to await the pipeline’s arrival which would provide them with 
a market for their product. Ostensibly, the situation served the needs of both the pipeline 
company and independent producers.
Completion of the pipeline spelled disaster for independent oil men who had 
produced and stockpiled enormous amounts of oil because Magnolia lowered the price it 
promised to pay once construction completed. Franklin recounted, “it was not long until 
there was a wild orgy of drilling and there was no market for the oil.”®^ They had 
dutifully complied with Stewart’s request to produce as much oil as possible, but “when 
the pipe line finally reached the field, the Magnolia cut the price from $1.03 a barrel to 70 
cents a barrel and a short time later by successive cuts until the price was reduced to 30 
cents a barrel.” ®^ To make matters worse, “Magnolia had acquired a few leases and 
drilled wells thereon.”®’ Acquiring its own oil-rich land enabled the company to transport 
what it produced and avoid purchasing from independent men. This strategy proved so 
successful that the company increased its holdings from “a few leases” and became “the
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
®® Ibid. 
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largest buyer and checkerboarded the area for twenty miles around.”®* In the event that its 
properties did not yield sufficient quantities of oil, Magnolia ensured that its pipeline 
remained full by negotiating a contract to purchase the McMann Oil Company’s 
production. Independent oil men realized that Stewart had them in a vulnerable position. 
As Franklin explained it, “even at 30 cents we could not sell any oil for the reason that the 
Magnolia was filling their pipe line with oil from their own properties and the properties 
of the McMann Oil.”®® The company created a situation that enabled it to purchase from 
independent operators only as a last resort, and even then dictated the price. Despite the 
low price independents received, they had no incentive to cease producing oil.
In a situation very reminiscent of Glerm Pool, independent men at Healdton 
continued producing oil even though they had no market resulting in waste and 
significant environmental damage.’® Recalling how he and other producers competed to 
extract as much oil as possible, Franklin said that “the Healdton field was in a state of 
indescribable chaos.”’* The rule of capture dictated they either extract oil as quickly as 
possible or lose any opportunity of every acquiring it. Because of this mindset, “oil was 
being put into earthen tanks and in some cases into ravines, which had been dammed for 
the purpose to prevent properties being drained by the Magnolia and McMann companies
®* The term “checkerboarded” refers to the system of acquiring large amounts of 
land in a checkerboard pattern in anticipation of finding oil. Owen, Trek o f  the Oil 
Finders, 3\2).
®® Franklin to Veasey, June 28, 1941, Veasey collection.
’® German, “Legal History of Conservation of Oil and Gas in Oklahoma,” 115.
’* Franklin to Veasey, June 28, 1941, Veasey collection.
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through wells on their property.”’  ^ Nature seemed to undermine their efforts when 
“heavy rains came and washed out the oil which had been impounded in ravines and 
hundreds of thousands of barrels went down the creek.”^^  Their situation worsened when 
“in these same storms lightning struck the stored oil and other tens of thousands of barrels 
went up in flames.” '^' In addition to the environmental damaged caused by polluting 
nearby creeks, independent men wasted natural resources and impaired the long-term 
prospects for the field’s productivity by allowing huge stores of natural gas to escape into 
the atmosphere. At the time, producers did not widely recognize the utility of preserving 
natural gas in order to maximize underground pressure and drive oil more forcefully to 
the surface which would have increased the total yield. Franklin lamented that wells 
producing as much as 30,000,000 cubic feet of gas per day “were allowed to blow wide 
open in order to bring them into oil producers.”’  ^ Without a market to sell their oil and 
nature undermining their efforts at every turn, Healdton oil men sought redress by taking 
their complaints to executives at Magnolia.
Independent oil men organized themselves into the Ardmore Oil Producers 
Association and appointed Franklin as their president in order to present their grievances 
Magnolia officials. Members of the producers’ association traveled to Dallas to conduct 
a meeting at the company’s headquarters, but when they arrived and expressed their
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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intention to a secretary “the young lady came back and informed us that they had nothing 
to discuss with us. They refused to see us.”’® Employing another tactic, “we tried also to 
discuss the matter with C. R. Stewart then in charge of the Magnolia pump station in the 
Healdton field, and he likewise told us there was nothing to discuss.””  Only when 
independent producers took their complaints to state officials did Magnolia executives 
express a willingness to discuss the matter.
The Oklahoma constitution provided for a three-member Corporation 
Commission and charged it with establishing rates and operating standards for 
transportation and utility companies within the state, and the commissioners listened to 
Healdton producers’ complaints. The commission had significant investigative and 
administrative authority and only the state supreme court could overturn its decisions.’* 
Rebuffed by Magnolia, the producers’ association filed a grievance with the Corporation 
Commission which held a hearing on the matter. Franklin recounted that “when the 
hearing was about half over and we were proving discrimination in the taking of oil, 
George C. Greer, Counsel for Magnolia, asked that the hearing be continued until the 
following day and that a committee of producers be appointed to negotiate with the 
Magnolia officials...”’® As a result of these negotiations, the company and producers
’® Ibid. 
”  Ibid.
’* James R. Scales and Darmey Goble, Oklahoma Politics: A History (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1980), 24-5.
’® Franklin to Veasey, June 28, 1941, Veasey collection.
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agreed to a contract in which Magnolia would buy all oil in earthen storage at thirty cents 
a barrel and make subsequent purchases from all oil men in the field based upon a 
percentage of what each produced. When the First World War broke out in 1914, “they 
forgot the contract and commenced all over again the same old and a second ease was 
brought before the Corporation Commission which resulted in a compromise and a new 
contract.”*® Feeling emboldened after finding an ally within the ranks of state 
government, independent producers moved to consolidate even more power behind their 
cause by approaching the Oklahoma legislature.
Oil men throughout Oklahoma realized by 1914 that the common purchaser law 
passed four years earlier ceased to protect their interests and looked for a new solution to 
the problem of physical and economic waste incurred when pipelines entered a field.
After experiencing Magnolia’s perfunctory attempts to negotiate, independent producers 
“were not satisfied with the treatment they had received under these contracts and decided 
to take the matter to the legislature.”*' Problems of overproduction and waste plagued 
other Oklahoma fields, “and the market for oil throughout the state was sadly 
demoralized.”*^  Amidst these conditions, independent operators at four other Oklahoma 
fields followed Healdton’s lead and organized themselves into producers’ associations. 
Together these five groups lobbied the legislature for redress. Two men from each 
producer’s association met in Oklahoma City and “decided to ask the legislature to pass
*® Ibid.
*' Ibid.
*2 Ibid.
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an oil and gas conservation law to stop the terrible waste that was going on in the state, 
and to force ratable taking of oil from a common pool when the entire production could 
not be taken.”*^ This ten-member advisory board next selected three men to draft a 
conservation law and chose Franklin to push the law through the legislature.
The Oklahoma legislature convened it January 1915 and passed legislation which 
addressed practical oil men’s concerns about waste and the monopoly that integrated 
companies exerted throughout the state. Commonly referred to as the Oil Conservation 
Act, the legislature enacted House Bill No. 168 on February 11, 1915. The law declared 
that extracting oil “in such manner and under such conditions as to constitute waste, is 
hereby prohibited.”*'* More importantly, the law expanded the definition of what 
constituted “waste.” In addition to the term’s “ordinary meaning,” the legislature deemed 
that it “shall include economic waste, underground waste, surface waste, and waste 
incident to the production of crude oil or petroleum in excess of transportation or 
marketing facilities or reasonable market demands.”*^ This statement enumerated the 
multiple ways in which the rule of capture wasted oil. Economic waste resulted when 
overproduction required producers to spend capital constructing storage facilities. 
Underground waste occurred when producers allowed large stores of natural gas to 
escape, disregarding its utility in maximizing recovery of oil deep within a reservoir.
83 Ibid.
*'* State o f  Oklahoma Session Laws o f  1915, Passed at the Regular Session of the 
Fifth Legislature of the State of Oklahoma, January 1915 (Oklahoma City: State Printing 
and Publishing Co., 1915), 35.
*' Ibid., 36.
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Evaporation and broken dikes caused surface waste. Frenzied competition among 
producers to capture oil before competitors led to production “in excess of transportation 
or marketing facilities or reasonable market demands.” By expanding the definition of 
the term “waste,” the Oklahoma legislature moved to conserve oil but also to address the 
competitive advantage pipelines gave to integrated companies.
To ensure that all producers enjoyed access to the Healdton field, the 
Conservation Act deemed oil beneath the ground a common resource and stipulated that 
the quantity each producer could extract must correspond to the number of productive 
wells he owned. The law took for granted the inability to determine property rights of oil 
still in the ground, stating that each producer drilling into a “common source of supply 
may take therefi-om only such proportion” as his well or wells bore to the total production 
of the field.*® By classifying oil as a “common” resource, the law empowered the 
Corporation Commission to regulate production “to prevent the inequitable or unfair 
taking...by any person, firm, or corporation, and to prevent unreasonable discrimination in 
favor of any one such common source of supply as against another.”*’ To ensure that 
integrated companies with pipelines could not dictate the price of oil, the law further 
stipulated that “the actual value of such crude oil or petroleum at any time shall be the 
average value as near as may be ascertained in the United States...”** The Conservation 
Act vested the Corporation Commission with full authority to enforce all these
*® Ibid.
*’ Ibid., 37.
w IWd^36.
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provisions. Never before had any state enacted an oil conservation law which 
simultaneously addressed the problems of wasting oil and monopoly control created by 
the rule of capture.*®
Franklin wasted little time putting the law to a test when less than two months 
after its passage he filed a complaint on behalf of the Ardmore Oil Producers’
Association with the Corporation Commission, alleging violations at Healdton of all 
major provisions in the Oil Conservation Act. The complaint argued that a number of 
companies wasted oil by producing more than their apportioned share, exceeding pipeline 
capacity, and stored this surplus oil in above-ground tanks.®® In addition to the physical 
waste resulting from overproduction, independent producers incurred economic waste 
because they had to expend capital continuing to produce what they could not sell and 
build tanks to store the oil rather than leave it in the ground for others to extract. 
Independent producers had drafted the Oil Conservation Act to address these very issues, 
and the Corporation Commission enforced the law as they had written it.
One of the three commissioners, George Henshaw, understood clearly the 
mandate the law bestowed upon he and his colleagues. According to Henshaw, “the 
legislature had in mind mainly two objects” when it passed the Oil Conservation Act.®'
*® German, “Legal History of Conservation of Oil and Gas in Oklahoma,” 127.
®® Defendants in the case included: W and F Oil Company, 1911 and Bayou 
Company, Corsicana Petroleum Company, and Ardmore Refining Co. Eight and Ninth 
Annual Reports o f  the Corporation Commission o f the State o f Oklahoma, For the Years 
Ending June 30, 1915 and June 30,1916. (Oklahoma City, 1916), 252.
®' Ibid., 261.
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First, lawmakers intended the commission “to regulate the production of oil by the 
operators so that the weaker or small producers would be guaranteed his pro rata part of 
the oil.”®^ Second, the legislature charged commissioners with ensuring that oil was 
“produced and preserved in such manner that the public would enjoy the full benefits 
thereof at reasonable prices...”®^ Henshaw defined “the public” broadly to include 
average citizens who consumed the oil, independent producers like Franklin who initiated 
the complaint, and even integrated oil companies whose headquarters may have resided 
outside the state but who invested capital in Oklahoma oil fields.
Henshaw strove to render a judgment which took all these interests into 
consideration. He acknowledged that “some of the producers in the Healdton field have 
gone to great expense in establishing pipe lines and refineries” and that others “have 
contracted to furnish a certain amount of oil within a given time.” '^* Despite significant 
investments and binding agreements, he reasoned that these conditions did not bestow 
upon integrated companies greater access to the common supply of oil than independent 
producers possessed. For example, the Magnolia Pipe Line Company built a pipe line to 
the field as well as three refineries throughout Texas in order to process the oil it 
transported. In addition, the Corsicana Petroleum Company incurred costs acquiring
"'Ibid.
"'Ibid.
Order No. 937, Eight and Ninth Annual reports o f the Corporation 
Commission o f  the State o f Oklahoma. (Oklahoma City, 1914); cited in German, “Legal 
History of Conservation of Oil and Gas in Oklahoma,” 257.
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“extensive marketing facilities” throughout Texas, Oklahoma, and other states.^^
Henshaw could not accept, however, that these companies “have a right to extract from 
the common source of supply” all the oil necessary “to supply all of their market demands 
and the contracts entered into.”®^ Without some authority to regulate production, large 
integrated companies “would have the other producers absolutely at their mercy.”®’ 
Unsettled at this prospect, Henshaw posed the question, “Must the field be turned over 
entirely to the Magnolia Petroleum Company, the other pipe line companies and the 
individual that makes his private contract, and the state be powerless to protect a citizen 
who has an equal right to take oil from the field?”®* Although a hypothetical question, he 
made clear that only the authority of the state could ensure all operators-large and 
small-enjoyed equal access.
The Corporation Commission identified the rule of capture as the source of the 
problem among producers in the Healdton field and unequivocally asserted its authority 
as a representative of state power to determine fair production practices. As proof of its 
authority, the Commission invoked the Oil Conservation Act and reiterated that it was 
“authorized to prescribe rules and regulations for the taking of oil under certain
®' Ibid.
®" Ibid.
®’ Ibid.
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conditions so as to prevent inequitable or unfair operations by the producers.”®^ Since the 
law did not delineate how much each producer could extract, the Commission authorized 
itself “to ascertain from day to day and from time to time the pro rata part of the oil that 
each producer may take from the ground without constituting waste as defined by the 
law.”'°® The commission enumerated ten rules and regulations including a provision 
appointing an umpire to ensure that whether each producer extracted only his “pro rata 
part” of the field and nothing more. The commissioners designated A. L. Walker their 
agent and empowered him to “make a gauge of each well” in order to determine its 
potential production and apply this measurement as “a basis for the fair and equitable 
taking of oil from the common source...”'*^* Once he had measured each well’s 
production capacity, Walker calculated the maximum potential for the entire field. The 
last step in determining how much each producer could extract required Walker to 
measure pipeline capacity in order to “ascertain the amount of oil necessary to meet the 
daily market demands.”'®^ This oversight at the local level provided the key component 
to an effective conservation plan and prevented overproduction at Healdton and all oil 
fields throughout the state until approximately 1930.
The best testament to the effectiveness of the 1915 oil conservation statute came
^  Order No. 920, Eight and Ninth Annual reports o f the Corporation 
Commission o f the State o f  Oklahoma. (Oklahoma City, 1914), 255
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from Franklin himself. Nearly fifteen years after he achieved passage of the law, he 
hoped to avert federal regulation when representatives of integrated oil interests began 
lobbying for federal oil conservation legislation. He spoke at a 1929 conference of 
industry representatives and government officials and took the opportunity to make clear 
that conservation conceived at the local level worked best. Franklin made a point to 
“remind this conference that the original conservationalists [sic] in the oil industry were 
the small producers of Oklahoma.”'®^ He recounted that the legislation he and other 
producers wrote and lobbied into passage had prove effective. The oil industry did not 
need federal authority to conserve oil and he wanted jurisdiction to remain Avithin the 
statel. He also took the opportunity to tell conferees that integrated oil companies 
originally opposed conservation, stating that “at the time these laws were presented to the 
legislature they met with the concerted and determined opposition of the major pipeline 
and purchasing companies, the very interests which, during the past two years, have 
claimed to be the originators of conservation.”'®'' The fact that integrated companies had 
reversed their position on conservation by 1929 and sought a federal solution testified to 
the effectiveness of Franklin’s plan. The lobbying effort of integrated companies was 
part of an attempt to eliminate the control over oil production at the local level, but this 
was a battle Franklin eventually lost.
Wirt Franklin, “The Colorado Springs Speech”; reprinted in George Elliott 
Sweet, Gentleman in Oil (Los Angeles: Science Press, 1966), 52.
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Chapter 7:
“Contesting the Oil Field: Engineers and Technocrats Co-opt Conservation”
Oklahoma Governor William H. Murray, or Alfalfa Bill as he is popularly known, 
declared martial lavy in 1931 to take control of the oil industry in his state. The price per 
barrel had been declining and additional production continued to glut the market. 
Oklahoma had passed a law mandating prorationing, which restricted the amount of oil 
each producer could extract from a single reservoir as part of an attempt to halt the free- 
falling price. When oil men ignored this law and continued producing as much as they 
desired, Murray, who in four years as governor issued thirty-four proclamations of martial 
law, did not hesitate to exercise full authority of the state and ordered the National Guard 
to prevent oil from flowing in Oklahoma.* Conditions only worsened when that same 
year the discovery of the massive East Texas field unleashed an additional flood of oil, 
further destabilizing the price. When producers in Texas refused to obey prorationing 
orders. Governor Ross Sterling followed Murray’s lead and also declared martial law 
shutting down production in four counties.^ What had gone wrong within the industry 
that both governors felt only state power could address the situation?
A small group of oil men believed that the answer to that question lay in the 
inefficient production techniques which led to overproduction and waste and that
' Keith L. Bryant, Alfalfa Bill Murray (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1968), 198,245.
 ^David F. Prindle, Petroleum Politics and the Texas Railroad Commission. 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981).
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government cooperation with their industry was necessary in order to craft an effective 
conservation plan. Henry L. Doherty, Earl Oliver, and Mark L. Requa called upon the 
federal government for assistance in implementing an oil conservation plan based upon 
geological and engineering principles which they contended would eliminate 
overproduction, reduce waste, and stabilize the fluctuating price of oil. They faced 
opposition, however, from many oil men who had only recently begun to accept geology 
and engineering as practical aids to production. Lacking a depth of understanding as to 
how they might benefit from these emerging fields, most oil men preferred traditional 
methods of exploration and production that they felt had served their industry well since 
its inception. As a result, both independent oil producers as well as the heads of 
integrated firms opposed a conservation plan which relied upon a cadre of efficiency 
experts to implement. More importantly, though, they resisted any attempt at 
conservation that would have required federal intervention in order to implement. 
Although Doherty, Oliver, and Requa preached the gospel of efficiency, they faced a 
political battle mobilizing the authority of the state behind their plan but eventually 
succeeded and, in the process, transformed the oil industry by demonstrating how geology 
and engineering served its longterm interests by conserving oil.
Henry L. Doherty led the charge in outlining a plan for extracting oil based upon 
scientific principles which he contended would eliminate overproduction waste, and he 
called upon the federal government to require that the oil industry implement his plan. 
Referred to as “unitization,” Doherty’s plan conceived of an oil field as a geological unit
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under the control of a single person, company, or other entity.^ Rather than granting 
access to an oil field on the basis of surface property rights, Doherty’s approach called for 
determining a reservoir’s boundaries on the basis of geological principles. The manner in 
which strata had formed beneath and trapped oil beneath the ground should influence 
decisions regarding the number and location of wells at the surface. Limiting the number 
of wells drilled into each reservoir and positioning them strategically enabled producers 
to preserve stored natural gas which they could release as desired in order to expel oil 
when they needed it.
Unitization conserved oil because it utilized energy stored within the reservoir to 
maximize production. Doherty recognized that pressurized gas and water represented 
forms of kinetic energy which, if retained within the reservoir, could force greater 
amounts of oil to the surface in a shorter period of time than if multiple producers drilled 
numerous wells simultaneously."* Minimizing the number of wells decreased the 
likelihood that fluids migrated because a withdrawal from one area affected fluids 
throughout the reservoir.^ Engineering production in this way prevented waste because it
 ^Note that the derivative term "unitization” sometimes referred to the process by 
which “the owner of the oil or gas rights in an individual tract or tracts of land surrenders 
his exclusive ownership thereof in return for an assignment to him of an undivided 
interest in the oil and gas rights of the pool as a whole.” Leonard M. Logan, The 
Stabilization o f  the Petroleum Industry, Oklahoma Geological Survey Bulletin No. 54 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1930), 171nl.
"* Blakely M. Murphy discusses the “engineering basis for conservation” in 
Conservation o f Oil and Gas (Chicago: Section of Mineral Law, American Bar 
Association, 1949), 13-14.
' Ibid., 14.
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maximized a reservoir’s longterm yield. Doherty explained that “to allow an oil well to 
flow as a gusher” meant that “we often leave huge islands of oil in the sand practically 
untouched.”  ^ He reasoned that “if gas is not allowed to escape I think in most cases 
practically all the oil in the pool can be raised without pumping.”’ Doherty’s conception 
of oil production offered a rational alternative to unregulated drilling.
Doherty hoped his ideas for oil production would replace the rule of capture 
which he considered the cause of overproduction and help conserve this valuable natural 
resource in which he was heavily invested. Doherty explained that the oil industry had 
been “under laws that are different from those that pertain to any other property or 
product from property, except those pertaining to wild birds and to wild animals.”* 
Relatively simple steps had been taken to conserve wild game such as the closing of 
hunting season, “but no one as yet has advocated even ‘closed seasons’ for petroleum.”^
 ^ Henry L. Doherty to George Otis Smith, August 28,1924, File: Correspondence 
1924, Box 1, George Otis Smith Collection, American Heritage Center, University of 
Wyoming.
’ Ibid. In addition to the propulsive force of gas, Doherty’s researchers learned 
that they could further maximize recovery by leaving gas in the reservoir because it 
intermixed with and decreased the viscosity of oil, thereby facilitating its flow to the 
surface. For more details about this aspect of his research, see in L. E. Elkins,
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To avoid totally depleting the nation’s oil resources, “we must get away from the law of 
capture.”'® He arrived at an alternative method to oil production by drawing upon years 
of business experience during which he systematically employed science and technology 
to rationalize production processes.
Doherty campaigned to eliminate the rule of capture because he believed that it 
unnecessarily introduced the role of chance and created an atmosphere resembled a lottery 
more than an organized industry built upon rational, scientific procedures and techniques. 
In addition to reducing the oil business to a game of luck, the rule of capture required 
producers to expend capital needlessly by drilling wells with no guarantee of reaping even 
a minimal profit: “Everybody knows that more money goes into a lottery than comes out 
of it, yet the instinct for gambling is so widespread and so easily excited that lotteries are 
forbidden by law. The hope of winning the grand prize is what lures men on. The search 
for and production of oil has become a more frenzied game than the search for gold ever 
was.”"  The necessity to gamble when operating under the rule of capture offended him 
because he had devoted his life to eliminating chance. Just as lotteries were “forbidden 
by law,” he called for a federal law to forbid the lottery oil exploration had become. As a 
businessman interested in a return on his investment, Doherty showed no interest in 
playing a “frenzied game.” The necessity to gamble when operating under the rule of 
capture offended him because he had devoted his life to eliminating chance by developing 
rational and systematic processes for oil production. Out of his commitment to the
Ibid.
"  Doherty, “Suggestions for the Conservation of Petroleum,” 7.
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application of science and technology sprang his ideas for conservation.
Although the unit plan of oil development rationalized production techniques, it 
did not simplify nature but, rather, allowed its complexities to influence how the industry 
should operate.'^ Geological and engineering principles facilitated oil producers by 
enabling them to work in concert with earth processes. In Doherty’s view, the primary 
“evil” effecting the oil industry stemmed from “the bad practices that are forced upon us 
by laws,” especially when they are “in violent conflict with natural economic and physical 
laws.”‘^  Better that nature dictate how oil production proceed than laws conceived by 
human beings based solely upon economic gain. Doherty recognized that his 
consideration of nature as an active force in the process of oil extraction accounted for the 
strength of his conservation plan. As he described it, “In trying to make a different plan 
for the development of oil, I have merely tried to get in harmony with nature.”’'' Property 
rights may have proved useful in determining ovmership at the surface, but “a petroleum 
pool is by nature incapable of being divided up and operated according to the surface
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Institute o f  Mining and Metallurgical Engineers, Petroleum Development and 
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divisions that have been arbitrarily created.” '^  Unfortunately for him, many within the oil 
industry disagreed.
Doherty faced significant opposition from many different constituents within the 
oil industry when he called for a conservation plan based upon cooperation between 
industry and government. No relationship existed between the oil industry and the federal 
government from 1859 when Drake drilled the first commercial oil well until 1911 when 
the Supreme Court dissolved the Standard Oil trust. Throughout this period, the rule of 
capture and the fierce individualism it fostered governed the oil industry. Even though 
the rule of capture at times led to overproduction and destabilized the industry, most oil 
men preferred to maintain their autonomy rather than look to the federal government for 
solutions.Expanding markets reinforced this attitude as the developing automotive 
industry and the outbreak of the First World War in Europe stimulated the demand for
Doherty, “The Petroleum Problem As I See It,” p. 7.
Logan, Stabilization o f the Petroleum Industry, 209, 210.
One historian has noted that the motives for oil men’s opposition to 
conservation were as “intertwined with the exceedingly complex montage that was the 
petroleum scene in the 1920s,” Gene Gressley, “GOS, Petroleum, Politics and the West,” 
The Twentieth Century American West, A Potpourri (Columbia and London: University 
of Missouri Press, 1977), 108. Indeed, the reasons for their resistance to conservation 
were numerous and at times overlapped. One contemporary of the conservation debate 
presented a list of reasons for oil men’s opposition, which included: the need to recoup 
investments quickly, promoters who sought new fields only to sell them quickly for 
profit, small refiners who did not have a certain supply of oil, opposition to royalty 
owners, and intransigent oil lawyers overly concerned with protecting their clients’ 
interests rather than long-term planning. Logan, Stabilization o f the Petroleum Industry, 
212. For another view by a contemporary, see James A. Veasey, “May the American 
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petroleum.** Competition remained fieree, but most oil men believed the demand for oil 
great enough for all to survive.*^ When Doherty began lobbying for federally-mandated 
unitization in 1925, he met with resistance from small, independent operators as well as 
executives who presided over large, integrated companies. Independent oil men had 
experienced how integrated firms like Standard Oil consolidated power through 
monopolies, greatly limiting the ability of smaller producers to compete, and viewed any 
plan proposed by the head of a large oil company with skepticism and caution. Many 
executives of large oil companies started out as independents and earned their way 
through the ranks, retaining this fierce individualism. Even though they had begun to 
integrate their companies, they resisted any plan that called for them to relinquish 
autonomy they had fought so hard to win. Believing he could not overcome such 
entrenched attitudes, Doherty solicited help from the president.
In a 1924 letter to Calvin Coolidge, Doherty sounded an alarm by warning the 
president that inefficient production methods were rapidly depleting the nation’s oil 
reserves and that the country would eventually face a shortage which would jeopardize 
national security unless the federal government addressed the situation. Doherty 
explained that innovations in the field of geological prospecting greatly facilitated 
prospectors looking for oil and that their success led to overproduction. He told Coolidge 
that ever since discovering “that many, and probably most, of our oil pools could be 
located and mapped out by surface observations without putting a drill into the ground, I
** Logan, Stabilization o f the Petroleum Industry, 209-210. 
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realized that this might mean the early and premature exhaustion of our American oil 
reserves.” ”^ The industry was in the midst of rapid change due to innovations in 
geological prospecting, hut the problem resulted from “the fact that under our present 
unfortunate laws each pool as discovered must be immediately devastated.” '^ The rule of 
capture caused the industry to overproduce and “only through the efforts of our Federal 
Government can the oil problem be so lv ed ...D o h e rty  warned Coolidge of the 
resistance he would face in convincing the oil industry to change its ways.
As his commitment to developing new methods of prospecting and reservoir 
engineering indicated, Doherty was an innovator within the oil industry and his embrace 
of change set him apart from many of his colleagues. He explained to Coolidge that 
“every business and industry is controlled largely by its conservative and standpat 
element” and the oil industry was no different.^^ He cited the banking industry’s long­
time resistance to federal reform legislation and warned that “the attitude of the men in 
the oil business will be no different than the attitude of the bankers except in degree, and 
that for the worse rather than for the better.” '^* He had learned over the years that “you 
need only recommend to a group of oil men that they should themselves seek legislation
Henry L. Doherty to Calvin Coolidge, August 11,1924; reprinted in Robert E. 
Hardwicke, Antitrust Laws, et al. v. Unit Operation o f  Oil or Gas Pools (Dallas: Society 
of Petroleum Engineers of AIME, 1961), 179.
Ibid., 180.
Ibid.
Ibid., 187.
^Mbid., 188.
234
and the mere suggestions will throw them into a panic” because they in general are 
“afraid of our govemment.”^^  He cautioned Coolidge, therefore, that any federal attempt 
to solve the problem would be met “without much help from the men in the oil industry, 
and with the determined opposition of some...”^^  Doherty’s lobbying effort paid off when 
Coolidge organized several cabinet members to investigate the matter.
Coolidge responded to Doherty’s plea within the year by establishing the Federal 
Oil Conservation Board (FOCB). From 1924 until 1932, the FOCB served as the primary 
forum for government officials to discuss with members of the oil industry any number of 
issues concerning the future of United States oil policy, such as the quantity of untapped 
oil reserves, the necessity of restricting production, and whether federal or state laws 
could address industry problems.^’ Coolidge accepted Doherty’s argument in favor of 
conservation and expressed to the newly-appointed board members that “the present 
method of capturing our oil deposits is wasteful to an alarming degree.” *^ Heeding 
Doherty’s warning, however, Coolidge moved carefully and diplomatically by instructing 
FOCB members “to enlist the full cooperation of representatives of the oil industry in the
Ibid.
^  Ibid., 189.
Ibid., 85, 87. At the time it was created, the FOCB consisted of the following 
four cabinet members: Hubert Work, Secretary of the Interior; Dwight F. Davis, Secretary 
of War; Curtis D. Wilbur, Secretary of the Navy, and Herbert Hoover, Secretary of 
Commerce.
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investigation” to assuage oil men’s fears of government intervention.^^ Coolidge’s 
approach appeared to pay-off because oil men initially demonstrated a willingness to 
cooperate with the FOCB’s efforts to remedy the industry’s problems.
The honeymoon between the board and the industry ended quickly when oil men 
reacted defensively to a series of questionnaires the FOCB distributed to gather 
information on all aspects of the industry, including the reasons for waste. Although they 
remained guarded, many oil men responded to ensure that board members understood 
their views. George Otis Smith, director of the U.S. Geological Survey and chairman of 
the board’s technical advisory committee, digested the responses and noted that “in most 
of the replies, physical waste of oil is termed negligible or practically nil.” "^ Smith 
further observed that “the common attitude of those leaders of the oil industry who 
replied to the Board’s inquiry toward any proposal for the elimination of waste in oil 
production, is frankly defensive, as such a proposal, in their opinion, would seem to 
imply that remedial action can come only through Governmental intervention.” *^ Oil men 
became so “defensive” at the prospect of intervention that they closed their minds to any 
proposal that might alter production practices they had been employing throughout their 
lives. As one respondent explained, “there is fear that stabilization would take away from
Calvin Coolidge to the Secretaries of War, Navy, Commerce, and the Interior; 
Reprinted in Pettengill, 210-211.
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the business the ‘haphazard, sentimental, and gambling viewpoint’ still dominant.”^^  Of 
course, eliminating this “viewpoint” and replacing it with more rational production 
processes that employed geological and engineering principles is exactly what Doherty 
hoped to accomplish but industry traditionalists less comfortable with innovation opposed 
him at every turn.
J. Edgar Pew offers one example of a long-time oil man who initially resisted 
innovation and refused to accept the advantages geologists had to offer. He entered the 
industry when the techniques and methods of practical men dominated and this 
orientation prevented him from taking university-trained geologists seriously. Pew began 
overseeing Carter Oil Company, a Standard Oil subsidiary, in 1915 and like many 
industry executives at the time could not ignore geologists once their methods began to 
prove successful. He eventually relented and hired C. L. Severy but explained that “‘I 
don’t think you will do us any good and I will damn well see that you don’t do us any 
harm.’”^^  Severy recalled that Pew “meant it, too” and refused to buy him geological 
surveying equipment.^"* Only after persuading the company’s treasurer did Severy receive 
an aneroid barometer and plain table, but “it wasn’t that they were stingy or did not have 
the money. It was simply that they could not see spending good money on a crazy idea of
Smith, Digest of Responses, 2.
“C.L. Severy, 1963, Random notes in Edgar Owen Collection, American 
Heritage Center, University of Wyoming; Cited in Edgar W. Owen, Trek o f  the Oil 
Finders: A History o f  Exploration for Petroleum (Tulsa: American Association of 
Petroleum Geologists, 1975), 311.
Ibid.
237
a geologist. He still had to prove himself, however, and “when the wild scramble was 
on for leases in the El Dorado” field of Kansas Pew and other company executives 
eventually acquired land there but only “because I pestered them so much.” ®^ The 
company made millions on Severy’s advice and “finally Mr. Pew was convinced that 
geology was doing him some good and from then on he went all out with no strings 
attached.” ’^ Pew’s unwillingness to take geology seriously in 1915 placed him within the 
mainstream of oil company executives. Like other oil men tutored in the practical 
tradition, Pew resisted change. He exhibited a similar intransigence ten years later when 
Doherty proposed that engineering principles should guide any oil conservation plan.
As president of the oil industry’s first national trade association, the American 
Petroleum Institute (API), Pew used his position to oppose Doherty’s proposal for a 
federally-mandated conservation plan based upon the latest engineering research. 
Incorporated in 1919, the API was the industry’s first national trade association and 
included among its members the heads of most major oil companies, including Doherty.^* 
Pew represented a contingent within the API who opposed Doherty and denied any need 
for conservation. Although he never mentioned Doherty by name. Pew argued that “there
Ibid.
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is not the waste a few visionary theorists would have us believe there is.”^^  He conceded 
that waste had existed in the past but that ’’improved methods of operating have largely 
done away with this.” °^ Pew rejected the possibility that unit production might prove 
beneficial to the industry in any capacity : “I know of no unit leasing plan that is either 
practicable of operation or that would yield better results in the production of the greatest 
quantity o f oil from any given area.”"' About the time he made these comments, the 
FOCB planned to hold public hearings on the issue of oil conservation. Rather than rely 
upon the federal government to publicize the opinions of oil industry executives, 
however, the API initiated its own investigation to determine whether the industry wasted 
oil and the need for conservation.
Pew served on a committee of eleven API members convened to investigate 
allegations that the industry overproduced and wasted oil. Popularly referred to as the 
“API report,” the Committee of Eleven’s published findings declared that “there is no 
imminent danger of the exhaustion of the petroleum reserves of the United States” and 
that “waste in the production, transportation, refining and distribution of petroleum and 
its products is negligible.”"^  Despite the highly technical nature of these issues and the
The questions and Pew’s responses are replicated in their entirety in “No 
Preventable Waste in Oil Production, Opinion of J. Edgar Pew,” National Petroleum 
News 17 (August 19,1925), 91.
"" Ibid.
"' Ibid. 91-2.
American Petroleum, Supply and Demand. A Report to the Board of Directors 
of the American Petroleum Institute by a Committee of Eleven Members of the Board, 
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arcane knowledge required to address them, none of the committee members possessed 
qualifications as either a geologist or engineer. Ten members served as either president, 
director, or chairman of an oil company and the eleventh as general secretary of the API.''^ 
Although all API members did not uniformly ignore the benefits of technology or 
innovation, the committee’s refusal to address Doherty’s plan directly suggests that a 
political agenda other than determining efficient production methods motivated them in 
formulating their conclusions. Probably the most learned and prolific oil and gas lawyer 
at the time characterized the report as “a self-satisfied and ultraconservative viewpoint. 
The same lawyer, perhaps somewhat naively, observed that “it seems odd, however, that 
the report did not discuss or even mention unit operations.”'*^ The committee’s failure to 
mention either Doherty or his conservation plan revealed that the API’s primary 
motivation lay in preventing government regulation rather than candidly addressing the
two major conclusions and also the one’s most pertinent to my argument. For the full list 
of thirteen separate points the committee agreed upon, see pp. 3-5 of the report.
See Ibid., 5 for a full list of each committee member and his company
affiliation.
Hardwicke, Antitrust Laws, 23-24. Despite his negative assessment of the API 
report, Hardwicke was in no respect anti-oil industry. In fact, he apparently sought and 
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problem of waste and devising the most efficient solution.
In order to compensate for the lack of scientific credentials among its members, 
the Committee of Eleven established a technical advisory subcommittee but only to 
bolster conclusions it had already reached. One of the most prominent petroleum 
geologists of the period, Wallace Pratt, chaired this subcommittee which generated 
statistics the Committee of Eleven used to draft its report. Pratt expressed regret and 
embarrassment when recalling his complicity in providing data that supported the 
Committee of Eleven’s anti-conservation stance. He recalled that "it is not a story to be 
proud o f  and confessed that "1 blush at my recollection."''® According to Pratt, "lawyers 
dominated the API and the industry" and, as a result, the report's "viewpoint was 
legalistic."'*^ He explained that subcommittee members purposely reached conclusions in 
order to justify the rule of capture, casting conservation as an issue of states' rights, and 
declaring compulsory unitization unconstitutional. Remembering his actions at the time 
made Pratt "blush," but thirty years after the fact he wanted to set the record straight and 
declared that "these shibboleths the industry nourished. We wanted to maintain them. 
...We preserved the status quo." The Committee of Eleven drew upon scientific experts 
but only perfunctorily and even proved willing to alter geologists’ conclusions before 
printing them in the API report.
In addition to conceding that he downplayed the need for conservation, Pratt
'*® Wallace Pratt to Edgar Owen, December 15, 1969; cited it Owen, Trek o f the 
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alleged that committee members changed some of the conclusions he and other geologists 
reached. He explained that "the text our sub-committee submitted was re-written.'"*^ The 
revised report declared that the country contained a "billion-barrel reserve" and that "no 
physical waste" existed, but such phrases "were the language of the Committee itself.'"*  ^
Throughout the report, "the legalistic doctrine and the fear of putting too much control in 
Washington prevailed. The Committee of Eleven hoped to legitimize its findings by 
soliciting the endorsement of a trained geologist like Pratt, but as he made clear politics 
influenced the report’s conclusions. Ironically, the report’s biggest critic was an oil man 
tutored in the practical methods of traditionalists like Pew who rejected Doherty’s 
scientific conception of conservation.
Earl Oliver could not suppress his sarcasm when responding to the Committee of 
Eleven’s findings in a publication he entitled “The So-Called A.P.I. Report-An 
Analysis.” Oliver was bom in 1878 “on an oil lease” in Butler County, Pennsylvania and 
spent his life working in the oil industry.^' He recounted that “as a boy I began as a 
pumper and roustabout” and eventually passed through “the various stages of tool- 
dresser, driller, drilling contractor, production superintendent and appraisal engineer in
Ibid.
Ibid.
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the oil fields of Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and K entucky.E xperience in a variety of 
positions provided a firsthand perspective on the oil industry’s wasteful production 
practices. In particular, his “oil field and appraisal experience disclosed the extremely 
wasteful methods of the oil industry...””  Oliver’s observation of inefficient production 
methods prompted him to draft a rebuttal to the Committee of Eleven as a “protest against 
the so-called A.P.I. report being accepted as representing the sentiment of the oil 
industry.””  He objected to the report’s contention that the industry did not waste oil, that 
no danger of an oil shortage existed, and to its negative appraisal of the Federal 
Government’s efforts to address overproduction.^^ In addition to disagreeing with the 
report’s conclusions, Oliver expressed concern over the motivations behind those who 
composed it.
He alleged that the authors of the API report consciously and surreptitiously 
attempted to downplay the existence of waste within the industry. He argued that the 
committee “did not approach its problem with the mental attitude of the analyst 
impartially attempting to find the truth, but rather as a propagandist influencing public 
opinion.” ®^ He reached this conclusion because the study “was conducted under the
”  Ibid.
”  Ibid.
”  Earl Oliver, “The So-Called A.P.I. Report-An Analysis,” 1,1925, J. V. Howell 
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strictest injunctions of secrecy on all parties engaged therein,” an approach he felt 
“conducive neither to the creation of public confidence nor to impartial analysis.””  He 
conceded that although it contained “many excellently written scientific discussions” the 
report’s “general conclusions have no relationship” to the scientists’ contributions.^* As a 
result, the report “represents only the personal attitude of four or five individuals who 
were prompted to their effort and attitude by partisan zeal...””  One of these partisan 
zealots included API president and committee member Pew to whom Oliver complained 
that the report presented a “misleading picture of the American oil situation...””  Oliver 
rejected the report’s conclusions because in his experience oil men had acknowledge the 
existence of waste since the industry began. Galvanized by what he considered a 
propaganda campaign, Oliver joined Doherty throughout the latter-1920s and early-1930s 
to convince API members of the need for conservation guided by geological and 
engineering principles.
Like Doherty, Oliver understood that to effect conservation production practices 
had to conform more closely to the physical attributes of oil and the geological forces 
trapping it beneath the ground. At the first meeting of the FOCB, Oliver delivered an
”  Ibid. 
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address in which he argued that the rule of capture led to overproduction and instability 
within the industry. The rule of capture may have worked well to determine ownership of 
wild animals who wandered unpredictably from one privately-owned parcel of land to 
another, but it failed to account for the complex geological phenomena governing the 
pooling and migration of oil. Because the industry had applied this inadequate rule 
throughout its history, "evils have developed and become perpetuated because we have 
attempted to apply to petroleum principles of law and practices unfitted to the nature of 
the product."^’ The rule of capture had been conceived by taking into account the 
"nature" of wild animals but not the “nature” of oil. Rather than continuing to extract oil 
in this laissez-fare manner, Oliver suggested that "it might be well now for a time to 
forget what we want and study what petroleum must have according to its peculiar 
characteristics in order that it may be conserved and utilized efficiently."®^ The key to 
conservation, Oliver contended, lay in acknowledging and respecting the physical 
properties of oil and allowing them to determine production practices.
Like Doherty, Oliver proposed conserving oil through the application of 
engineering principles. Although not formally trained as an engineer, extensive work 
experience in oil fields throughout the United States taught him to think about extracting 
oil in a more conceptual maimer than producers who followed the rule of capture. To 
edify oil men at the hearings who did not share his perspective, Oliver explained that “we
®' Earl Oliver, “Supply and Waste in the Petroleum Industry,” Federal Oil 
Conservation Board, Complete Record o f  Public Hearings, February 10 and 11, 1926 
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must first visualize the fact that this is a highly mobile product confined under great 
pressure in very large containers frequently miles in extent with right on the part of many 
individuals to puncture those containers and draw off the product.”^^  Each oil man 
should further “visualize” that each time he punctured one of these underground 
containers “he immediately modifies in a large way the fortunes and values of every other 
individual with a like right.” '^* Oliver argued that the industry could solve the problem of 
overproduction if oil men thought more like engineers: “Progress will be made if we 
regard the emptying of that container as one big engineering problem, determining how 
this peculiar product contained and confined as it is under high pressure can be removed 
as needed and retained until needed.”^^  Conservation meant leaving oil in the ground 
until the market could absorb it. Temporarily ceasing to extract oil offered longterm 
benefits that quick extraction did not.
Government would have to play a role, Oliver believed, in order to convince oil 
men how they benefitted from a conservation plan which called upon them to refrain 
from extracting oil. He had witnessed his colleagues waste oil throughout his career but 
felt that this admission “should cause no embarrassment to the petroleum industry.” ®^ 
Rather, “if embarrassment exists anywhere it should be that of Government, not 
industry,” because legislators had not actively attempted to remedy overproduction
Ibid.
®^Ibid.
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codified by the rule of capture.^’ His solution required more government involvement, 
not less, but he did not believe that legislators should act alone. Past errors could be 
addressed only through “cooperation of Government and industry, and this Federal Oil 
Board is a most fitting tribunal to determine the way Government in its several branches. 
State and Federal, can best function in cooperating with the industry to bring about a 
correction of those errors.” *^ Oil men could not escape blame, however, and their 
persistent failure to appreciate how engineering could solve industry problems convinced 
Oliver that government could also teach them how they might benefit from this 
discipline.
Government inaction codified overproduction and inadvertently perpetuated a 
laissez-fare mentality among oil men, but it could redress its past failure by teaching oil 
men to appreciate the Utility of a conservation plan informed by engineers. The rule of 
capture established a precedent by which “certain practices and usages of the industry” 
had grown entrenched and “remain as an aftergrowth that is difficult to break through.
Oil men had followed these “practices and usages” for so long “they now claim them as 
vested rights notwithstanding they are entirely inconsistent with underlying 
p r in c ip le s . .O l iv e r  knew that “these errors die hard” and that oil men have defended 
them “by bold and baseless assertions,” but he believed that new laws could change oil
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field practice/' Longstanding customs “now give promise of becoming the subject of 
parliamentary compromise and I have no doubt they will at last be swept away and 
repudiated.”’  ^ Government could effet change through legislation and by educating oil 
men about the benefits of engineering. Oliver contended that “the Federal Government 
can, and I have no doubt will assist materially in this necessary education” and 
demonstrate to the oil industry “the value of applying sane engineering principles to the 
extraction of oil and gas from these great containers in which nature placed them.””  
Oliver did not easily win converts at the hearings but received support in his call for 
government intervention.
Mark L. Requa also spoke at the hearings and shared Oliver’s faith in the ability 
of government and industry to cooperate in fashioning an oil conservation plan. Requa’s 
family moved to California during the Gold Rush and later to Virginia City, Nevada 
where his father took a job as a mine superintendent.’ '^ Following his father’s lead, Requa 
entered the mining industry and eventually opened his own mine engineering firm in San 
Francisco before branching out to start an oil company before the First World War.’  ^ His 
profession brought him into contact with another mining engineer, Hebert Hoover, who
’* Ibid.
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had been serving as U.S. Food Administrator during the war when he hired Requa as a 
staff member. Under Hoover’s tutelage, Requa absorbed his boss’s vision of 
industry/government cooperation. Hoover conceived of a new socioeconomic order 
which grafted corporatist and technocratic values onto the energy and creativity of 
nineteenth-century individualism.^® Requa carried his mentor’s philosophy into the U.S. 
Fuel Administration’s oil division when President Garfield appointed him director in 
1918. Oil industry spokesmen applauded Requa’s appointment and pledged to support 
him.^’ Throughout his tenure as director of the oil division which lasted only a year and a 
half, Hoover’s associationalism guided Requa as he worked to strengthen ties between the 
oil industry and government.
Requa adopted Hoover’s notion that trade associations functioned as ideal forums 
to foster cooperation between industry and government and facilitated creation of the 
American Petroleum Institute. Trade associations, professional societies, and other 
cooperative institutions. Hoover believed, could function as a type of “private 
government” to reform business, stabilize industries, and expand markets.’* According to 
Hoover, these institutions would avoid the abuses of earlier trusts because of their 
members’ enlightened leadership and commitment to service, efficiency, and ethical
Ellis W. Hawley, “Herbert Hoover, The Commerce Secretariat, and the Vision 
of an ‘Associative State,”’ Journal o f American History 61 (1974), 117.
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behavior.’® Requa led the effort within the oil industry to create a trade association which 
could function as a “private government” to organize efforts at scientific rationalization 
without extinguishing the individual’s energy and creative spirit.*”
As the conflict in Europe subsided, he met with oil men to discuss plans for 
establishing a permanent trade association to perpetuate the industry’s cooperative 
relationship forged with government during the war. Requa explained that “we can not 
hope for commercial success .... without Government help.”*' The oil industry could not 
afford to let self-interest, or individualism, dictate its course because “we need for the 
future an efficiency, a co-ordination, a synchronizing of individual and Government effort 
such as never before has been attained. ”*’ Rather than “unrestricted competition, we must 
substantiate the doctrine of co-operation.”*” Oil men at the conference made plans to 
meet three months later in order to announce the creation of a trade association to act as a 
bridge between their industry and government. Requa was the principal speaker at the 
conference which gave birth to the American Petroleum Institute and in his speech, 
entitled “Cooperation,” made clear his vision for the direction the new trade association
79 Ibid., 117-18.
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should take.
Requa retained his commitment to cooperation when the FOCB held convened in 
the mid-1920s to address overproduction of oil and the need for conservation. Nor 
surprisingly, he believed any conservation plan must involve both government and the oil 
industry. He rejected the argument put forth by some oil men that “it is practically 
imossible to remedy existing unsatisfactory conditons relative to production because of 
our governmental structure.”*'* Requa did not consider government a hindrance and 
commended the FOCB for initiating hearings which he considered “the first foundation 
stone in the new structure of cooperative relationship between Government and industry 
as related to mineral raw materials.”*^ Although no easy solution to overproduction 
presented itself, he remained optimistic and saw “in the future a solidarity of effort and 
continuing progress in place of discord, and the sporadic and unorganized efforts of the 
past.”*^  Although steadfastly contending that government should play a role in 
addressing the problem, he contended that any solution start with oil men themselves: 
“What the industry must do is to develop that program and present it to the 
Government.”*^  Requa did not outline a specific plan for cooperation at the hearings, but
*'* Mark L. Requa, “The Oil Industry’s Opportunity,” Federal Oil Conservation 
Board, Complete Record o f  Public Hearings, February 10 and 11, 1926, (Washington: 
G.P.O., 1926), 131.
*' Ibid., 134.
*" Ibid.
*’ Ibid., 133. Requa repeatedly stated that the solution for conservation should 
come from the industry and not government. See also, Mark L. Requa to James A. 
Veasey, September 24,1917, Folder “Correspondence 1927-1929,” Box 1, James A.
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another California oil man who had been his subordinate at the Fuel Administration did.
In an address entitled “How Neighbors Should Cooperate,” Thomas O’Donnell 
presented a conservation plan which called for a cadre of industry experts to work 
collectively at identifying wasteful production practices and devising solutions. As
Requa’s director of production in the Fuel Administration, O’Donnell envisioned 
cooperation in a manner very similar to his former boss.** He called for “a nation-wide, 
organized, cooperative effort” to pevent waste and improve recovery methods which 
“would be of tremendous importance to the industry and to the public at large” so long as 
it had “the proper leadership.”*^  His plan would “call into action a united effort of the 
best talent in the Nation to solve the problems invovled.” "^ O’Donnell’s idea of who 
constituted the “proper leadership” and “best talent” consisted of personnel drawn from 
within the ranks of industry. Specifically, he proposed the creation of a permanent 
conservation board comprised not of government officials but “the heads of the most 
active operating companies.” *^ Board members would appoint committees for each oil 
pool or district by selecting “among those actually residing in the district and in daily
Veasey collection, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming.
** O’Donnell had been affiliated with the interests of California oil man E.L. 
Doheny. Nash, United States Oil Policy, 41.
*® Thomas A. O’Donnell, “How Neighbors Should Cooperate,” Federal Oil 
Conservation Board, Complete Record o f Public Hearings, February 10 and 11,1926, 
(Washington: G.P.O., 1926), 139.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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contact with the work under their supervision.”®^ As he envisioned the plan, “it would be 
the duty of these local committees to make periodic inspections, study and recommend 
improvements” and request that producers “install the improved methods.”®^ Like Requa, 
O’Donnell believed that oil industry personnel should bear primary responsibility for 
conceiving a conservation plan. When Hoover won the presidency in 1928, Requa would 
have the opportunity to implement his conception of a cooperative oil conservation plan.
Requa acted quickly and advised Hoover a month after his inauguration to call a 
conference of industry experts and government officials to begin discussing plans for an 
interstate oil compact based upon voluntary participation. He had begun recommending 
to Hoover the merits of an interstate agreement for implementing unit operation as early 
as 1925.®'* Hoover liked the idea because he prided himself on efforts as Secretary of 
Commerce to facilitate passage of the Colorado River Compact and felt a similar plan 
which vested authority in the states could better resolve the oil industry’s problems than 
federal regulation.®^ In July 1929, he authorized Requa to organize and chair the Federal 
and States Petroleum Conservation Conference in Colorado Springs and to invite
®2 Ibid.
®" Ibid.
®" Kendrick A. Clements, “Herbert Hoover and Conservation, 1921-1933,” 
American Historical Review 89 (February 1984), 78.
®^ Hoover did not originate the idea of conservation through interstate agreements 
but made the approach “peculiarly his own.” Clements, “Herbert Hoover and 
Conservation,” 74,75. Hoover cited the agreement as proof that voluntary efforts 
between state and local governments could succeed. Kendrick A. Clements, Hoover, 
Conservation, and Consumerism, 85.
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government and industry representatives from oil-producing states to discuss the 
feasibility of an interstate compact. The conference revealed a significant rift between 
independent oil men and integrated companies which undermined Requa’s attempt to 
fashion a consensus in favor of a compact.
Large integrated companies generally supported the idea of a compact, but small 
independents believed a tariff on imports would solve the problem of overproduction by 
creating more demand and higher prices for oil produced within the U.S.^ ® Independent 
producers believed integrated oil companies benefitted from the lack of a protective tariff. 
One independent producer explained that “major companies have not suffered to any 
appreciable extent because of the low price of crude oil...” ’^ On the contrary, inexpensive 
oil benefitted integrated firms because they purchased much of their supplies from small 
producers. Major companies enjoyed significant profits for the year 1928 which were 
“occasioned by the fact that they have been able to buy cheap crude oil in Oklahoma and 
T e x a s . . R e q u a  rejected a tariff as the solution to overproduction and pointed out that 
the United States exported more oil than it imported. He reasoned that a tariff would only 
push integrated companies to build refineries overseas and result in a loss of American 
jobs.’® Unable to resolve this deadlock, he grew finstrated at conference attendees whom
Nash, United States Oil Policy, 104-105.
”  Wirt Franklin, “The Colorado Springs Speech”; reprinted in George Elliott 
Sweet, Gentleman in Oil (Los Angeles: Science Press, 1966), 55.
Ibid.
”  Requa also faced opposition from westerners at the conference who resented 
Hoover’s recent withdrawal of federal lands from drilling. Clements, Hoover,
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considered ‘“unattached enthusiasts, cranks, etc.’”*®” The independent operator who 
made this argument, Wirt Franklin, Requa must have particularly considered a crank.
Franklin addressed the Colorado Springs conference and voiced strong opposition 
to a compact which lacked safeguards to prevent larger, integrated companies from using 
the agreement as a means to eliminate smaller producers from the industry. Introducing 
himself as the representative of Oklahoma’s small oil producers, Franklin explained that 
he and his colleagues were “sometimes erroneously referred to as independent producers, 
a misnomer, because there is no class engaged in productive enterprise more dependent 
than the small producer.”*®* The small producer’s “dependency” resulted not from the 
rule of capture per se but “because he must of neeessity drill his wells to prevent his land 
from drainage and sell his oil at the posted price, what ever it may be at the time, whether 
remunerative or not, to the major purchasing agencies.”*®^ After listening to proposals for 
an interstate agreement, Franklin explained that “we are fearful that in the name of 
conservation a compact may be initiated and presented for adoption vesting such absolute 
authority in a commission, which might fall under the domination of the major factors of 
the industry...”*®^ A eorrupt commission, he postulated, “could restrict domestic
Conservation, and Consumerism, 137.
*®® Quoted in Ibid., 136.
*®* Franklin, “Colorado Springs Speeeh”; reprinted in Sweet, 51.
*°" Ibid.
*®^ Ibid., 53. This is a highly biased biography which supports the view of 
Franklin as a of the free enterprise system. Sweet calls the Colorado Springs conference a 
“little scheme” which “smacked of the same muddled thinking and hazy governmental
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production to any extent it might desire” in the name of conservation or national defense 
while meeting domestic demand with imports from abroad.'®'* Sueh a seenario “would 
mean the annihilation and destruetion of the small produeer of erude oil.”*®^ Franklin’s 
nightmare did not become a reality until 1935 when Congress passed legislation 
authorizing an interstate oil eompact.
Although Hoover failed to aehieve passage of the compaet during his 
administration, he laid important groundwork in getting the industry eventually to aceept 
the idea through his work on the oil eonservation board as Seeretary of Commeree and 
philosophically in outlining his vision for cooperation between government and industry. 
More important to eonvineing the oil industry to aeeept this new conservation plan were 
the efforts of Doherty, Oliver, and Requa. These men shared a coneeption of 
industry/government eooperation that was a departure from the decentralized state-based 
approach to conservation advocated by Franklin. According to political scientist James 
C. Scott, state efforts to impose an “administrative ordering of nature and society” have 
been guided by an “imperialist ideology” but frequently failed by exeluding “the 
necessary role of loeal knowledge and know-how.”'®® Capitalist entrepreneurs guided by 
this ideology reeognized that they required state aetion to implement their plans and
awareness that spawned the Great Depression.” Sweet, Gentleman in Oil, 49-50. 
'®" Ibid., 53.
'®® Ibid.
'®® Seott, Seeing Like a State, 4-7.
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relied upon highly-trained experts, planners, engineers, scientists, and technicians to 
implement their goals of rationalizing the state and its resources.Despi te  local 
resistance, oil industry technocrats successfully employed their professional expertise and 
coopted the issue of conservation by implementing rationalized and efficient production 
methods which ultimately enabled integrated companies to exert more control over oil 
production than independent oil men.
Ibid., 4-5.
257
Conclusion
The oil industry underwent dramatic changes from 1859 to 1930. Throughout 
most o f the nineteenth century, practical men successfully found oil with methods they 
had crafted. Most prospectors probably possessed a good understanding of “geology” 
even though they may not have identified their methods with this term. Whether they 
consciously realized it at the time, a geological principle often explained their success. 
Most oil prospectors had not studied geology at universities or read about scientific 
principles but possessed an acute understanding of the geological formations they 
encountered on a daily basis. Because of their frequent success, they had little patience 
for university-educated geologists who presumed to educate them with esoteric 
knowledge and tell them how and where to look for oil. Their attitude would eventually 
change as the twentieth century began.
Although geologists entered the scene and generated significant amounts of 
information relevant to the oil industry throughout the late-nineteenth century, their 
influence remained minimal until the early-twentieth century. State geological surveys 
provided opportunities for directors and their assistants to gain valuable experience 
conducting field work in order to meet taxpayers’ demands about where to find natural 
resources. Men like J. Peter Lesley and Charles N. Gould understood the political fallout 
if they failed to deliver the kind of information residents in their states desired and 
employed a cadre of assistants to conduct field work and map the location of resources 
that might generate a profit. Situated in two of the country’s most prolific oil-producing 
states, both men were well situated to revolutionize the oil industry with the information
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their surveys generated. Oil-industry intransigenee proved too great a barrier for either 
Lesley or Gould by himself to convey the utility of their findings in the search for oil.
Henry Doherty did not need to be convinced of geologists’ utility and probably 
more than any other single figure paved the way for their acceptance in the oil industry. 
Like “transitional” figures in other industries, he bridged a gap in the oil business 
between the era of “heroic independent invention” in the late 1800s and the period of 
organized industrial research which coalesced in the early-twentieth century }  Although 
■John D. Rockefeller had assembled an integrated oil company before Doherty entered the 
industry. Standard Oil focused its efforts on refining, transportation, and marketing and 
purchased the oil it acquired firom large and small prospectors throughout the country. 
Doherty recognized that prospecting for oil and its extraction from the ground remained 
unsystematic, decentralized endeavors and moved to organize and rationalize these 
activities. This meant hiring university-educated geologists and engineers whose 
knowledge seemed more tangible, predictable, and therefore reliable than the intuitive 
approach practical men employed. He committed more resources than any oil company 
ever had to searching for oil through the application of geological principles. Other 
companies followed suit, and throughout the 1920s the industry located so much oil that 
overproduction which had been a problem since Drake’s well in 1859 returned with a
‘ The seminal “transitional” figure is Elmer Sperry who concentrated his work on 
the electrical industry but worked with mining machinery, automobiles, streetcars and 
other technology. Doherty too began his inventing eareer in the electric industry but I am 
more concerned with how he applied ideas he learned in that field to the oil industry. 
Thomas P. Hughes, Elmer Sperry, Inventor and Engineer (Baltimore and London: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1971), xiv.
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vengeance.
Overproduction destabilized the industry to such an extent that from 1930 to 1935 
most oil producers agreed on the need for governmental regulation to prevent waste and 
implement a conservation plan but they disagreed about how best to achieve these goals. 
Doherty believed that the answer to the question of overproduction lay in fashioning more 
efficient production techniques, and he led a crusade for a federal law mandating oil 
conservation. He outlined a plan for extracting oil based upon scientific principles which 
he contended would eliminate overproduction and waste, and he called upon the federal 
government to require that the oil industry implement his plan. He faced opposition, 
however, from most oil men who had only recently begun to accept geology and 
engineering as practical aids to oil production.^ More importantly, though, they resisted 
Doherty’s plan because it would have required federal regulation. Conservation 
advocates of Doherty’s ilk preached the gospel of efficiency, but they faced a political 
battle mobilizing federal authority behind their plan and eventually convinced the oil 
industry to adopt geological and engineering principles as part of its production
 ^Nordhauser recounts many of the events surrounding Doherty’s attempt to 
implement conservation and speculates that “perhaps historians have overemphasized the 
triumph of technocracy” in the history of conservation. However, he concluded that 
“Doherty’s original conservation proposals, and the industry’s counter-proposals, were 
directly related to current prices and profits.” While my argument certainly supports the 
view that Doherty’s experiences do not represent the unqualified “triumph of 
technocracy,” I attempt to show that the oil industry ultimately could not ignore the 
influence o f technology in streamlining production and implementing a conservation 
plan. See Norman Nordhauser, “Origins of Federal Oil Regulation in the 1920s,” 
Business History Review 47 (Spring 1973), 71; and The Quest for Stability: Domestic Oil 
Regulation, 1917-1935 (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1979); Hays, 
Conservation and the Gospel o f  Efficiency.
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processes.
Doherty ultimately lost the fight for a federal law but won the battle for 
conservation to proceed along geological and engineering principles when Congress 
approved a resolution in 1935 approving the Interstate Oil Compact. Six states agreed to 
enter the compact, which included Oklahoma, Kansas, Texas, New Mexico, Colorado, 
and Illinois. The agreement provided no formal mechanism for regulation but urged each 
state to pass laws necessary to prevent the waste of oil and gas.^ Language in the compact 
declared that its purpose originated out of the need to promote conservation and was not 
an attempt to control the industry by creating a monopoly. Supporters of the compact 
considered its strength to lay in the absence of authority to compel member states to do 
anything. Rather than a coercive tool, the compact functioned as a forum for discussion 
where state representatives could exchange ideas and valuable technical information in 
the form of books, articles, and reports. As part of the agreement, an Interstate Compact 
Commission was created to serve as an administrative agency which held meetings open 
to the public. During approximately seven years after its passage, the compact effectively 
answered many of the questions regarding the best methods and techniques to regulate 
production and unified state statutes which had hitherto conflicted and prevented 
formulation of a uniform approach to oil and gas conservation.''
 ^Rex G. Baker and Robert Hardwicke, “Conservation,” in History o f  Petroleum 
Engineering, ed. D. V. Carter (New York: American Petroleum Institute, 1961), 1143.
" Ibid.
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